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PREFACE

first met Father Gerald McCool in the spring of 1970, when
I was a sophomore taking a course in metaphysics at
Fordham University. Week after week I witnessed him electrify
the class with his dynamism as a teacher and as a lecturer. His
extraordinary mind and imagination allowed him to show even
young minds like ours how to bring ideas together, weaving in
history to put thoughts into context.
In addition to having the opportunity to study with Father
McCool while I was both an undergraduate and a graduate
student, I have also been privileged to have him as my spiritual
director for more than twenty-five years. The scholar we honor
in this Festschrift, who embodies the best of the Catholic intel
lectual tradition, is first and foremost a man of God. He has
generously given much of his time and effort to leading others
into the reality of that Incomprehensible Mystery whom we call
God and who is made manifest in the person of Jesus the Christ.
How does a former student who is now a university president
and a professor of theology say "thank you" to an extraordinary
teacher, scholar, mentor, and priest? I have gathered here a set of
essays in Father McCool's honor to celebrate his life and his
contributions to the Church and to the Catholic intellectual
tradition.
For those who know his work, Father McCool is clearly one
of the preeminent scholars of Thomistic thought. His book
Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Century has become a standard
work on the roots of contemporary Catholic thought. In From
Unity to Pluralism: The Internal Evolution of Thomism, he has
moved the discussion of the recent history of Thomism to a new
level.
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The list of scholars who have generously agreed to contribute
to this Festschrift is a clear indication of the respect that Father
McCool has among the most distinguished colleagues of the
academy. Their willingness to fit this project into their extra
ordinarily busy schedules gives testimony to the fact that their
research and writing became labors of love in honor of one who
has worked long and hard in the vineyard.
Sacred Heart University has had the privilege of associating
itself twice before with the accomplishments of this scholar and
teacher. The University honored itself in bestowing on Father
McCool the Bishop Walter Curtis medal in 1989, when he deliv
ered the Curtis Lecture (that lecture is included in its entirety in
the appendix of this book), and again in conferring on him a
doctorate of humane letters honoris causa at its May 1993 Com
mencement. Now in 1998, the Sacred Heart University Press is
pleased to publish this book as part of the celebration of Father
McCool's 80th birthday with grateful appreciation.
Anthony ]. Cemera, Ph.D.

CHAPTER ONE

Faith and Reason:
The Case ofJacob Frohschammer
JOHN

G

P.

BOYLE

erald A. McCool's groundbreaking work Catholic Theology in
the Nineteenth Century: The Quest for a Unitary Method gave
many Catholics a first look at the struggle between those nine
teenth-century Catholic philosophers and theologians who saw the
need to address new modes of thought and their intransigent
opponents who insisted that only the philosophy and theology
that came down from the medievals, especially St. Thomas, were
compatible with Catholic orthodoxy. 1 McCool chronicles the
strong interventions of papal authority, which effectively drove
from the field all the proposed alternatives to scholasticism.2
The interventions and the theological arguments which led up
to them gave rise to significant theological developments, some of
which were incorporated into official Church teaching about its
own teaching authority. I have dealt with the development of the
terminology "ordinary magisterium" in an earlier publication.3
The archival research cited in earlier research made it clear
that the Roman authorities were particularly concerned in the
early 186bs with one German scholar, not well known today
among university theologians and philosophers, who tried
repeatedly to offer a revised view of Catholic theology. Jacob
Frohschammer (1821-93) was professor first of theology and later
of philosophy in the University of Munich.4 In this paper, I look
more closely at Frohschammer's work and the influence it had on
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the response of the neo-scholastic theologians as well as on the
response of the Pope and the curial congregations both to Froh
schammer himself and to scholars perceived to be sympathetic to
Frohschammer's positions.
In fact, Frohschammer's work had attracted attention from
neo-scholastic theological critics like Joseph Kleutgen, S.J., and
from the Roman congregations of the Index and the Holy Office
almost from the beginning of his teaching and publishing career.
I will concentrate in this paper on his 1861 work, Ober die Freiheit
der Wissenschaft, and the response which it provoked from church
authorities. That response and the theological positions which
underlay it passed into the teaching of the First Vatican Council
and then into the theology of the twentieth century.
First, some biographical information. Jacob Frohschammer
was born in 1821 at lllkofen near Regensburg, where his father
owned a large farm. In his autobiography he wrote:
On the feast of the three holy kings I first saw
the light of the world and I came into the world
with at least the deep desire to seek the truth,
even if, like them, on wide and difficult roads;
and a favorable star has been able to lead me as
well as them to right knowledge. 5
The young Frohschammer found it difficult to decide whether
to pursue the truth in philosophical studies or follow his lingering
call to the priesthood. His family helped to push him in the
direction of the priesthood, and so he turned to theology in
studies at the Georgianum in Munich. In 1847 he received a
doctorate from Munich with a dissertation on the gift of tongues
in the account of Pentecost in the Book of Acts i1nd in chapter 12
of Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians. There followed another
personal crisis over whether his calling was really to the study of
philosophy rather than to theology and the priesthood. Without
funds to continue studies and with his energies exhausted, but
with the encouragement of his teachers, Frohschammer was
ordained a priest in Regensburg in 1847. He functioned as a priest
for only a few years.
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His first assignments were as a curate in small villages, which
Frohschammer carried on at the same time that he repeatedly
petitioned his bishop for permission to resume his philosophical
studies. He went so, far as to threaten to leave the priesthood if his
request was not granted. In 1848 Frohschammer returned to
Munich. He wanted to be a privatdozent in the Faculty of Philo
sophy, but was rebuffed by a faculty apparently suspicious of a
Catholic priest. To support himself, he turned to several jobs,
including being a university preacher and finally a privatdozent in
theology, lecturing on the history of theology. He also completed
a Habilitationschrift, which was a study of the Catholic and
Pelagian doctrines of free will. He then turned to lectures on the
philosophy of religion and pedagogy. At the same time, he did
intensive studies in philosophy and psychology. His preparatory
studies complete, he turned to the life of a university scholar.
In 1854 Frohschammer published a volume reflecting his
studies: Ober den Ursprung der menschlichen Seelen. Rechtfertigung
der Generationismus (On the Origin ofHuman Souls: A Justification
of Generationism). The defense of generationism provoked a
warning letter from the Archbishop of Munich, Karl August von
Reisach. Nonetheless,. Frohschammer, who shortly before had
been promoted to extraordinary professor of theology, was
incardinated in Reisach's archdiocese of Munich and Freising. In
1855 Frohschammer, to the surprise of many, was appointed
ordinary professor in the Faculty of Philosophy, a position he
held, in spite of many attacks upon him, until his death in 1893.
He attributed the promotion to the initiative of King Maximillian
II, whose attention had been drawn to Frohschammer's work on
generationism, understood as an attack on materialism. The king
stood by him later in difficult times.
Frohschammer's need for a patron became apparent in 1857,
when his book on generationism, which had received little notice
apart from criticism by the influential German Jesuit theologian
Joseph K,leutgen, was put on the Index of Forbidden Books. 6
Kleutgen was a consultor to the Congregation of the Index. Even
after many efforts, including some by the famed Munich historian
Ignaz von Dollinger, Frohschammer issued no reassuring "clarifi
cations" of his views, much less a submission to the findings of
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the congregation. Still, no proceedings against him were under
taken at the time.
In 1858 Frohschammer published another book, Einleitung in
die Philosophie und Grundriss der Metaphysik. Zur Reform der
Philosophie (Introduction to Philosophy and Outline of Metaphysics.
Toward the Reform of Philosophy).
It was clear early in his career that Frohsc:hammer was a
forceful proponent of the freedom of "science" and that the
primary example of a "science" for him was philosophy. That is
clear in the Einleitung, but made unmistakable in Ober die Freiheit
der Wissenschaft, published in 1861.
The German context of Frohschammer's discussion of the
freedom of science was a bitter dispute that had erupted between
the Tiibingen theologian J.E. Kuhn and the scholastic theologian,
Franz Jacob Clemens of Munster over the dictum "philosophy is the
handmaid of theology." The dispute extended to issues of the place
of faith and reason and the role of church authority in relation to
theology. Clemens strongly asserted the subordinate role of philo
sophy vis-a-vis theology, describing theology as the "fundamental
principle" and the "cornerstone" of Catholic philosophy .7
Frohschammer's account of human knowledge is heavily
influenced by German idealism. He describes a form of human
knowledge originating in the senses and processed through the
understanding (Verstand), but he also holds that human reason
(Vernunft) has a direct "God-consciousness." The fact that this
direct intuition of God is a function of reason itself denies the
common view that knowledge of the divine nature is beyond the
capacity of human reason. This issue, Frohschammer insisted, was
a difference of legitimate opinions among Catholic theologians.
Clemens, Kleutgen, and other neo-scholastic critics denounced the
idealist view as heretical, saying that it obliterated the distinction
between the divine and the human and eliminated the need for
grace to make possible an act of saving faith in God's revelation.
Frohschammer responded that attempts to impose revelation upon
reason by appeals to authority reduced the motive of faith to
external despotism (Freiheit, vii).
Frohschammer recognizes the logical implications of his
position. In a footnote he explicitly denies the distinction of
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"natural" and "supernatural" truths in Christianity. He points out
that some Christian thinkers claimed that there was a primitive
revelatio!l at the very beginning which was modified and dimmed
in the process of being handed on and which has been renewed by
Christian revelation (Freiheit, 40, n.1). And he insists that whether
the Christian revelation is divine or not is a matter of fact and
cannot be demonstrated without simultaneously arguing for the
content of that revelation. The proofs offered in traditional
apologetics - prophecies, miracles, the moral conduct of the
founder, of Christianity - cannot provide the desired proof apart
from the content of the revelation, especially if the unconditional
right of reason to make free rational judgments upon the positive
law and the bearers of authority is denied (Freiheit, 41).
Nor does introducing the work of divine grace change any
thing. Frohschammer insists that the work of human reason is as
important as the operation of grace to the act of faith. In no way
can grace substitute for human judgment about the credibility of
revelation. Blind faith carries with it no great merit (Freiheit, 50).
The publication of Ober die Freiheit der Wissenschaft once again
called the immediate attention of church authorities in Rome to
Frohschammer. One important new factor was that in 1855 Arch
bishop von Reisach had been created cardinal and transferred from
his place as archbishop of Munich to the curia in Rome. Along
with the influential German, Joseph Kleutgen, S.J., Reisach played
a major role in relations between Rome and the German univer
sity theologians until his death in 1869 on the eve of the First
Vatican Council, of which he had been nominated a co-president
by Pius IX.
As I pointed out, criticism of Frohschammer had already been
published in Kleutgen's Die Philosophie der Vorzeit verteidigt, and
the publication of Ober die Freiheit finally provoked from Rome
a strong official response. Pius IX sent the letter Gravissimas Inter
to the then-archbishop of Munich, Gregor von Scherr, O.S.B.,
dated December 11, 1862.8 The papal letter explicitly condemned
Frohschammer's views in his· Einleitung and in Ober die Freiheit.
The Pope also condemned the periodical which Frohschammer
published almost single-handedly between 1858 and 1862 under the
title A thenaeum.
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Drawing upon a study of Frohschammer's works which the
Pope ordered from the Congregation of the Index (separate in
those days from the Congregation of the Holy Office), the Pope
pointed to two fundamental errors:
The author has strayed from catholic truth
especially in two ways: first, the author attributes
to human reason such powers as do not belong to
it at all; and second, he grants to that same reason
such freedom to hold any view and always to
dare anything that the rights, the office and the
authority of the church itself are removed
altogether (DS, 2850).
Frohschammer is reproached also for holding that humans can
attain not only to those things which are within the reach of
natural reason, but also to things having to do with the super
natural end of human beings, e.g., the mystery of the incarnation.
Indeed, if his position is taken to its logical conclusion, the deepest
mysteries of the divine wisdom and goodness and of God's free
will are attainable by natural reason. No one, the Pope continues,
will {ail to see just how false and erroneous such views are.
The Pope continues with warm praise for those who cultivate
philosophy within the proper limits:
Indeed true and sound philosophy has a noble
place, since it is for that philosophy diligently to
seek out the truth and for human reason, though
darkened by the guilt of the first humans but not
extinguished in any way, rightly and assiduously
to cultivate, -to illumine, to perceive, to understand
well, to promote the object of its knowledge and
a great number of truths. Among these many
truths are the existence of God, his nature and
attributes, which even faith proposes for belief,
and to demonstrate, vindicate, defend by argu
ments taken from its own principles, and in this
way to prepare a way for these dogmas of the
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faith to be held more correctly and for the more
recondite dogmas, which faith alone can first
perceive, to be understood by reason in some
manner. To do these things and to be versed in
them should be the difficult yet beautiful science
of true philosophy. (DS, 2853)
The Pope declares that he cannot tolerate the confusion of the
power of natural reason to know some things about God with the
claim that reason can penetrate even the profoundest realities of
Christian dogma. Nor are such claims simply disputes about
theological opinion. They are deviations from the common and
immutable teaching of the Church.
The Pope also rejects Frohschammer's claims for the freedom
of science, describing them as claims not for the "liberty but
rather the license of philosophy." And against Frohschammer's
claims that science, and especially philosophy, must have complete
freedom, the Pope asserts the right and the duty of the church to
proscribe and condemn errors when the integrity of the faith and
good of souls demand it.
The letter then takes the form of a decree in which Pius IX
condemns the works of Frohschammer and orders the congre
gation to place them on the Index of Forbidden Books. The letter
concludes with an appeal to Frohshammer to submit to the decree
while noting that he did not submit to the earlier condemnation
of his book on generationism. Again Frohschammer did not submit,
and after delays which exasperated the Roman authorities, he was
suspended from priestly duties by the archbishop in March 1863.
He felt himself isolated and very much alone. Just how alone
was clear when he was not invited to a meeting of German
Catholic scholars in Munich in September 1863, and again in
January 1864, when his colleagues from the Faculty of Theology
published a "Declaration of the Theological Faculty of the
University of Munich against Dr. Frohschammer" in the arch
diocesan pastoral bulletin.
Although Frohschammer moved to the margins of the Church
early in his career and finally left it completely, the influence of
his ideas and their rejection by the Church endured. In December
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1864, Pius IX published an encyclical, Quanta Cura, to which was
attached a Syllabus of the errors condemned by the pope in the
nearly twenty years of his pontificate. Among the eighty propo
sitions listed in the syllabus were three, numbers 9, 10, and 11,
which repeated the condemnation of Frohschammer and made ref
erence to the letter Gravissimas Inter. The First Vatican Council
included the condemned opinions in its dogmatic constitution on
the Catholic Faith, Dei Filius, published April 24, 1870.9
Frohshammer continued to publish smaller theological works,
among them criticisms of the Syllabus of Errors published in
December 1864, by Pius IX and still more criticisms of the First
Vatican Council of 1869-70. 10 The condemnation of Froh
schammer's own views by Pius IX was repeated in both places. In
December 1871 - a year and a half after the publication of the
dogmatic definitions of the First Vatican Council on faith and
reason and on the primacy and infallibility of the pope and after
great pressure was exerted by Rome on lagging bishops and
theologians to publicly submit to the conciliar definitions - the
archbishop of Munich and Freising published a document declar
ing Frohschammer excommunicated. But following Vatican I, he
never associated himself with the Old Catholics as a number of
disaffected scholars did or with any Protestant group. Through all
of this, Frohschammer continued his university teaching, while
lamenting that his work got little attention and his students had
little influence. He died unreconciled to the Church in 1893.
Concern is reflected in the alarm about the influence of
Frohschammer which preoccupied the Roman authorities in the
summer of 1863 (recall that he had been suspended in March of
that year), especially after the announcement in August of a
planned meeting of German Catholic scholars in Munich in
September 1863. The meeting was organized by Professors Ignaz
van Dollinger, Bonifacius Haneberg, and Johannes B. Alzog.
Roman concern can be seen in notes prepared by Cardinal van
Reisach as the Roman authorities developed a response to the
announcement of the meeting of scholars. Reisach puts the
concern over the proposed meeting in Munich in the context of
other doctrinal controversies in Germany. After noting the
circumstances that prevail in Germany and the "character of the
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persons who have promoted this meeting" (probably a reference
to the controversial Dollinger), the cardinal expresses the fear that
1'the results of the meeting could cause grave harm to the author
ity of the church with regard to its theological and religious
teaching." Then he suggests the larger context:
It is known to the Holy See that the question of
the relation of faith and reason is agitated among
the Catholic theologians of Germany with great
animosity, and it is also known that the various
opinions on this matter which divide German
theologians and philosophers derive from their
having in fact abandoned the principles of the
ancient and traditional philosophy and theology
of the schools and put in its place the various
principles of modern philosophy which are sub
stantially and essentially opposed to the ancient
philosophy and therefore opposed to the teaching
received and approved by the church not only in
method but also on many important points of
theological doctrine. The fact of Herr Froh
schammer is not an isolated one; the doctrine
taught by other professors of the University of
Munich and especially by those of Tiibingen, not
to speak of those professors who have imbibed
more or less the systems of Gunther and of
Hermes, shows many traces of the influence of
modern philosophical systems and on that
account above ·all are opposed to the teaching of
the church.
This influence, while admitting divine
revelation and even the authority of the church
to preserve it in its integrity, attributes, however,
to philosophy or to scientific development and
scientific teaching a certain independence and
freedom in explaining the meaning, the coher
ence, and the principles of revealed truth. While
it refuses to recognize direction by ecclesiastical
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authority, it is ready to explain dogmas in a sense
foreign to the definitions and the common teaching
of the church. It is ready in the end to destroy
the character and the nature of supernatural truths
by attributing to reason the ability and the power
to deduce them from the principles of natural
reason and thus to arrive at a perfect scientific
knowledge of the truths taught by faith.11
Reisach asserts that some German theologians have returned
to the teaching of the schools to refute false philosophies, a fact
viewed "with great displeasure" by "the defenders of the so-called
German science and of the freedom of science generally." The
allusion to Frohschammer is unmistakable. The cardinal's notes
describe the critics of the ancient theology and philosophy in
terms strongly resembling Uber die Freiheit der Wissenschaft. His
description of disputes among Catholic theologians could well
have the exchanges between J.E. Kuhn of Tiibingen and F.J.
Clemens of Munster in mind.
In fact, Frohschammer did not attend the Munich meeting,
and it appears that he was not invited. However, Rome's response
to the Munich meeting came in another papal letter to the
archbishop of Munich and Freising entitled Tuas Libenter, dated
in December 1863, though not distributed until February 1864.
The letter asserts in strong terms the authority of the church's
magisterium over theology and theologians. That authority
demanded submission to the·teachings of the magisterium, meaning
not only the solemn definitions of doctrine issued by an ecumen
ical council but also what the letter called the teaching of the
ordinary magisterium of the church. The term appears for the first
time in a papal document in Tuas Libenter.12 The forcefulness of
the Roman statement seems directed not only at the Munich
meeting, which was attended by a number of theologians who
supported the traditional theology and philosophy of the church,
but clearly was intended as another blow at the independence
claimed for theology, especially by Jacob Frohschammer.
It is not too much to say that the continued and forceful
claims made for Church teaching authority in the nineteenth and
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twentieth centuries are part of the legacy of Frohschammer to
theology and philosophy. His strong dissent from traditional
teaching and his virtual declaration of the independence of philo
sophical and theological science from magisterial supervision
provoked strong negative reaction from church authorities. The
numerous and forceful restatements of magisterial authority and
the creation of hierarchical controls over theologians and their
work which have been put in place since Frohschammer's time are
evidences that his legacy is not exhausted.
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CHAPTER TWO

Philosophy and Philosophizing tn Theology
WILLIAM V. DYCH

F

ather Gerald McCool, S.J., personifies both in his life and in
his work the value and importance of philosophy and philo
sophizing in theology. His investigation into the question of
method in nineteenth-century Catholic theology,' his study of the
evolution of Thomism from a unitary to a differentiated school of
thought,2 and the extensive work he has done on the theology of
Karl Rahner,3 one of the most philosophical of contemporary
theologians, all attest to his appreciation of and his own contri
bution to the philosophical moment in theology. At a time when
so many were declaring the death of metaphysics and celebrating
its demise, Gerald McCool was one of those whose thought helped
to keep the discipline alive and well. Both Catholic philosophy
and Catholic theology in the twentieth century, as well as their
harmonious interaction and collaboration in philosophical theo
logy, stand greatly in his debt.
It is the intention of this essay written in his honor to indicate
some of the important points, chosen somewhat at random, at
which Catholic theology in this century would be the poorer
without the benefit of philosophical reflection. The first of those
points lies in the domain of epistemology and would show how
a sound philosophy of knowledge can serve to safeguard theology
against an inherent tendency to try to encompass God within the
confines of human concepts and human language. The second
point is also an epistemological issue and tries to show the value
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for theology of the philosophical notion of knowledge by
connaturality, as used by Thomas Aquinas. The third and final
point lies within the domain of ontology and suggests that a
dialectical and symbolic notion of being can be effective in
overcoming the many dualisms ·which can distort theology's talk
of God and the world.
Knowledge of God
Since the Christian revelation upon which theology reflects
concerns not the eternal and necessary nature of God in God's
own divine self, but the gratuitous relationship with the world and
with history into which God has freely entered - that is to say,
since Christian revelation concerns not God's essence but God's
freedom - Christian theology requires a way of knowing God in
which God can be known not in isolation, but precisely in this
freely chosen relationship to the world and to history. In other
words, since Christian theology is not about what God is in God's
own self, but about who God is in relationship to us, revealed
knowledge of God must be understood as a knowledge of this
relationship. Revelation and faith precede reason and philosophy
in the sense that it is the former that reveals who God is in a
Christian context and thereby determines how God must be
known in this context: God must be known not in isolation nor
as separate from the world, but as freely involved in and bound up
with it.
This means that from the viewpoint of Christian theology,
knowledge of God and knowledge of the world, though distinct
to be sure, as the realities known are themselves distinct, are not
two separate knowledges but are necessarily and intrinsically
interrelated as the realities themselves are intrinsically interrelated.
Because of the sovereign freedom of God's disposition of creation,
there is no such thing as "pure" human nature unrelated in grace
to God, nor "pure" divine nature unrelated in grace to human
kind. From this Christian viewpoint, all knowledge of God or all
theology is also knowledge of the world and of humankind; that
is, all theology is also cosmology and anthropology, and all
cosmology and anthropology is also theology.
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But the integration of the two distinct poles in this divine/
human relationship must be such that, in the first place, the two
are never identified as they are in any of the many forms of
pantheism, but secondly and just as importantly, neither are they
ever separated as they are in deism and some forms of Christian
theism.4 To accomplish this, we must begin with the incarnational
Christology (and the incarnatiornd epistemology implied therein)
elaborated by the Council of Chalcedon in 451, when it spoke of
the unity in difference or the differentiated unity of divinity and
humanity in Jesus, and we must elaborate both the anthropo
logical and the cosmological implications of this Christological
affirmation.5 Christology thereby becomes the paradigm and prime
analogate (it is only an analogy, of course) for understanding from
a Christian perspective the divine/human relationship as SUfh:
God and the world are never identical, but neither are they ever
separate.6
Moreover, to do justice to both realities, the distinction
between the divine and the human must be understood as qualita
tive, not quantitative. In a quantitative understanding, we predicate
of God in an unlimited way what we predicate of ourselves in a
limited way: for example, our power is limited, but God is omni
potent; likewise, our knowledge is limited, but God is omniscient;
we are finite beings, but God is an infinite being. We arrive at the
attributes of God by "stretching" our finite concepts to an infinite
degree. It is just this quantitative understanding that opens the way
to seeing divine agency and human agency, for example, as alterna
tives or competitors, so that the more that is ascribed to the one,
the less can be ascribed to the other. But this "more and less" is
impossible when the divine and the human are understood as
incommensurate and incommensurable because the distinction
between them is qualitative, not quantitative. When the distinction
is understood as qualitative, God can never be understood just as
one being existing among other beings, however supreme, nor just
as one agent acting among other agents, however omnipotent, nor
known simply as one object among other objects, however infi
nite, and a qualitative distinction precludes any possibility of
God's ever being conceived as an alternative to or in competition
with finite realities.
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Unthematic Knowledge of God
One epistemology that satisfies both the norms established by
the incarnational vision of Christian revelation for the knowledge
of God - first, that God be known not as a separate "object,"
but in God's freely chosen relationship to the world, and second,
that God be known in this relationship precisely as qualitatively,
not quantitatively different from the world - is the epistemology
associated with the contemporary school of philosophy and theo
logy known as "transcendental Thomism" as this interpretation
of Aquinas has been employed in theology by Karl Rahner.7 It is
called "Thomism" because it remains faithful to the central
insights of Thomas Aquinas and his objective realism.8 But it is
called "transcendental Thomism" to distinguish it from the more
scholastic forms of Thomism because it tries to incorporate into
its interpretation of Aquinas and his objective realism the later
insights of transcendental philosophy "from Kant to Heidegger,"
as Rahner says, insights into the active role played by the sub
jectivity of the knower in all of our objective knowledge.9 It does
this not in eclectic fashion, taking this from the one and that from
the other, but rather by reading each tradition through the eye's
of the other and thereby allowing the two to cross-fertilize each
other and to be a source of mutual enrichment.
As practiced by Rahner, transcendental Thomism satisfies the
two norms mentioned above because, first, it insists that in our
original and primary knowledge of God, God is not known as an
object separate from the world, for ,this original and primary
knowledge of God takes place as a dimension within our knowledge
of the world; and second, in this multidimensional knowledge, the
qualitative difference between God and the world is captured from
the very outset because this further dimension is experienced
precisely as qualitatively different from our knowledge of the
world. For in all of our encounters in and with the world, no
matter who or what the object of our knowledge might be, the
knowing subject simultaneously, although in an unthematic way,
knows itself as reaching beyond the immediate object of its
knowledge to what lies ever beyond it. 10 Our reach always exceeds
our grasp no matter how often or how much we grasp, and in this
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further reaching we always and necessarily experience, however
silently and unthematically, what is and will always remain by its
very nature forever beyond our grasp.
Moreover, and this is the crucial point, our,experience of this
"beyond" is not like knowing another, second object, but is
qualitatively different from our experience of an object that we
can grasp and comprehend. Indeed, we experience it rather as
grasping us, as drawing and attracting us in the experience of awe
and wonder that is the source of all longing and searching and the
source of all knowledge. It is not by stretching concepts as
described earlier that we attain to a knowledge of God, but by
"stretching" ourselves in this reaching out and being drawn
beyond the confines of the finite.
On the other hand and of equal importance, it is always and
only in our encounter with the finite that this movement of
transcendence takes place, so that our knowledge of God is always
and in every instance mediated by our knowledge of the world.
Transcendence is not a leap out of the world into a separate realm
that is the domain of God: it is a step-by-step movement in and
through the world. In the epistemology of transcendental
Thomism, then, every act of knowledge includes all of these
qualitatively different dimensions within the single act of
knowledge. The same multidimensionality is also true of our
interaction with the world in acts of freedom and love.
This epistemological analysis of the pluriform structure of
knowledge gives rise to four features that would characterize
theology in the light of this philosophical reflection. First, it
enables our knowledge of this "beyond," this horizon which we
cannot grasp or comprehend but which grasps us, and which faith
and theology are going to call the mystery which we name God,
to be integrated into our knowledge of the world. For it sees the
knowledge of God as a necessary component in all of our
encounters with finite realities. Second, it sees this unthematic
knowledge of God as qualitatively different from our knowledge
of the world, so that God is known from the outset as qualita
tively different from the world, and not as one univocal object
among others in our knowledge of the world. Third, this quali
tative difference is constituted by the fact that our primary
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experience of God is precisely of what cannot be grasped or
comprehended, so that God is experienced from the very outset
as incomprehensible and as mystery. Finally, this experience of
God as mystery takes place always and only as a moment within
our knowledge of the world and is always mediated by our
knowledge of the world.
What is of special importance for theology in this philo
sophical reflection on the pluriform structure of knowledge is that
it enables us to follow the lead of the Council of Chalcedon in
understanding God and the world in a non-pantheistic way as
always distinct and always qualitatively different, but also as never
separate and never in isolation from each other after the fashion
of deistic forms of theism. This must be so because our original
and primary knowledge of God is always integrated within and
always mediated by our knowledge of the world. Moreover, that
fact that we do not know God in "test-tube purity," but always
as mediated by the world or, as Paul puts it, "through a glass
darkly" (1 Cor 13:12), throws light on the traditional teaching on
the highly analogous nature of all our knowledge of God. 11
Thematic Knowledge of God

The phrase "original and primary knowledge of God" was
just used to distinguish this from subsequent knowledge which is
the result of reflecting on, conceptualizing, and articulating the
original experiential knowledge. In this process, our know1edge of
God is objectified as it must be if it is to be brought to expression
and communication, and if the reality of God is to be distin
guished explicitly from the reality of the world. But with this
distinction comes the possibility and the danger of separation: our
objectifications of God can be mistakenly identified with God, and
then God becomes one object among other objects, one being
among other beings, and different from other beings quantitatively
rather than qualitatively as God is in truth and as is grasped in the
original experience. 12 From this objectification and separation can
come the dualistic understanding of God and the world that lies
at the heart of a great variety of dualisms that can influence
theological thinking: the dualism between the natural and super-
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natural orders, between the history of salvation and the history of
the world and humankind, and between the sacred and the
secular. 13 Each of these dualistic variations on the same theme
suffers from the same lack of integration called for by the
incarnational vision of Chalcedon, a theological vision which
never identifies, but also never separates God and the world. Good
theology, then, is always dependent on the quality of the
philosophical reflection that accompanies �t, artd an incarnational
vision of God and the world requires an epistemology that can
really integrate the two without distorting the reality of either.
Why Jesus?
At this point, a legitimate question can and, indeed, should
arise which can help clarify the proper role of philosophy and
philosophizing within theology. If all human knowledge reaches
beyond its immediate grasp to touch and be touched by the
horizon of mystery within which we "live and move and have our
being" (Acts 17:28), that horizon which at least unthematically is
always present to us and which we call God, then why is it
necessary and why was it necessary, as Christian faith maintains,
for Jesus to appear as the presence and the revelation of God for
humankind? It can seem that philosophy is not only able to pro
vide valuable insights for the benefit of theological reflection but
can even render faith and theology altogether superfluous and
unnecessary, and philosophizing in theology becomes a not very
subtle form of rationalism.
Jesus is necessary for us from a Christian point of view
because it is precisely our Christian faith, rooted in and derived
from Jesus, that prompts us to call this mystery God and that
allows us to call this God "Abba." Our philosophical analysis of
the structure of human knowledge can reveal to us the possibility
of knowing God should God so choose, but only God can reveal
who God actually is and has freely chosen to be in relationship to
us. From the viewpoint of Christian faith, it is precisely in Jesus
of Nazareth that this relationship in all its fullness has actually,
freely, and contingently happened historically, and in this histor
ical event has been revealed to us. No amount of philosophy can
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render the facticity of that event, and therein its revelation,
superfluous and unnecessary.
Indeed, so far from rendering the historical revelation in Jesus
superfluous, what philosophical reflection on the structure of
human knowledge is able to show is that what scripture and
Christian faith maintain actually happened in Jesus really does lie
within the realm of human possibilities as God has created them
precisely for the incarnation of God's own life and being, and
therefore it cannot simply be dismissed as an incredible piece of
ancient and obsolete mythology. But we cannot deduce from the
fact that God has created human beings with the capacity to hear
and respond to God's word either whether God has spoken or
what God has said. Those answers lie in the domain not of reason,
but of actual history, and for Christians they lie in the history of
Jesus of Nazareth. The logic of faith always moves from actuality
to possibility, not in the reverse direction, and it is the actual
event that reveals its possibility. Karl Rahner often used the
analogy of music to clarify this logic. Once Beethoven has actually
created his music, one knows that what he has created lies within
the possibilities of music, but the music of Beethoven could never
be deduced from these possibilities.

Knowledge by Connaturality
The second point at which we want to see how theology can
benefit from sound philosophical reflection is the elaboration of
the notion of connatural knowledge as this term was used by
Thomas Aquinas. It is of particular value in theology's attempt to
solve some of the problems that have arisen for our traditional
understanding of the faith by new initiatives taken by the Second
Vatican Council. One of these new initiatives and one of these
consequent problems is most apparent in the ,much more positive
and optimistic view taken by the Council on the question of
salvation outside the Christian church. We will consider just one
of the several texts in which this new view comes to expression.
After speaking of the share which all Christians have in the
mystery of the death and resurrection o.f Jesus, the Pastoral
Constitution on the Church in the Modern World continues: "For,
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since Christ died for all people, and since the ultimate vocation of
all people is in fact one, and divine, we ought to believe that the
Holy Spirit in a manner known only to God offers to everyone
the possibility of being associated with the paschal mystery." 14
This positive and optimistic assessment stands in stark contrast to
an earlier and now disavowed dictum: "There is no salvation
outside the church."
But it also brings with it a new set of problems for theology,
problems at which the Council itself hints. In affirming not only
the uni-versal possibility of salvation but also the Christie nature
of this salvation, the Council acknowledged in the phrase "in a
manner known only to God" that this universalism really did not
fit into the church's theology that was current at the time. The
theories that were then current about revelation and faith were
simply inadequate to explain the "manner" in which this associ
ation with Jesus takes place, and so they cannot really explain
"why Jesus?" is necessary for non-Christians. But then they
cannot really explain "why Jesus?" is necessary for Christians
either, for what the Council wants to affirm is that both groups
have the very same salvific relationship to Jesus. Without
intending to, of course, the Council's laudable desire to see the
world of grace extending beyond its own borders raises many
questions about the nature of faith and the nature of this
"association" with the paschal mystery of Jesus that call for
serious philosophical reflection.
The new situation created for theology by the Council
requires a new hypothesis which, if it is to throw light on how
non-Christians can be related to Jesus and his paschal mystery,
would also have to apply to Christians, for the Council's
affirmation of faith and hope is that both groups somehow ("in a
manner known only to God") enjoy the same salvific·relationship
to Jesus. Two factors combine to provide us with a way forward
towards· a possible and perhaps plausible hypothesis. The first is
familiar from our earlier discussion of the multidimensional
structure of knowledge and is suggested by the fact that the
problem we face has to do with knowledge: how can people who
do not know Jesus and perhaps have never heard of him be
thought to be associated with him and to be saved through this
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association? Knowledge is understood here in the first instance as
knowing Jesus in the sense of knowing an object; that is, being
familiar with him from having read the scriptures or having heard
about him from someone's preaching or teaching. Our earlier
reflections about knowledge are of value here insofar as they have
shown that not all of our human knowing is knowing something
as an object. We do not know God as an object, for example, nor
do we know ourselves in the first instance as objects. This
qualitatively different kind of knowledge opens the possibility that
there can be a real relationship to Jesus and a real knowledge of
him that can and must be understood as something quite different
from knowing an object.
What this might be like is hinted at in the word that the
Council has happily chosen to characterize the relationship of the
non-Christian to Jesus, and this brings us to our second factor.
The Council spoke of the possibility of the non-Christian's being
"associated" with the paschal mystery of Jesus. A kind of
association with Jesus is quite conceivable if a person is living out
in his or her own life the very same mystery of dying and rising
that constitutes what is meant by the paschal mystery of Jesus.
Association in this sense is possible even if the person has never
heard of Jesus and therefore has no knowledge of Jesus in the
usual sense of knowing an object. But this association brings a
profounder kind of knowledge: namely, a knowledge by "connatu
rality," which comes through sharing in the experience of Jesus.
This term is found in Aquinas in a variety of contexts which we
will consider briefly. In all of these contexts, "connaturality"
points to a certain relationship of union, affinity or likeness.
For example, in his Summa Theologiae, Aquinas contrasts the
process of arriving at a correct judgment by the use of reason with
arriving at the very same correct judgment because of a "certain
connaturality with the matter about which one has to judge." The
chaste person, for example, knows "by a kind of connaturality"
what is the chaste and moral thing to do.15 Their chaste character
gives them a familiarity with and a knowledge of chastity "from
the inside," as it were, which enables them to recognize the chaste
thing when they see it. In another context, also in the Summa,
Aquinas says that "love is a certain union or connaturality of the

PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHIZING IN THEOLOGY / 23

lover with the beloved. " 16 Here the emphasis is on oneness that
binds the two together and makes them in a certain sense one.
Finally, when speaking of the attractive power of the good,
Aquinas says that good causes "a certain aptitude or inclination or
connaturality in respect of the good." 17 In all three instances, the
term "connaturality" points to a commonality or union or like
ness in being between two things that can be the source of
familiarity with and a knowledge of one by the other.
However unfamiliar the term "connaturality" itself might be,
it points to something quite familiar to us in ordinary life. There
is a kind of knowledge of Jesus' agony in the garden, for example,
which cannot be acquired by reading the scriptural accounts of the
event nor by hearing sermons about it, and much less by learned
exegetical analysis of the texts. It can be had only by one who
actually and freely endures one's own agony .in the garden just as
Jesus endured his, for one is thereby related to reality just as Jesus
himself was. This "association" with Jesus through association
with his life and experience forges an existential likeness• to Jesus,
and it is from this likeness that there comes a knowledge of him
that can be antecedent to and is not dependent on Jesus being an
object of knowledge in the usual sense. It is precisely this
association with Jesus and the resulting knowledge of him by con
naturality that enables the knower to "recognize" Jesus whenever
his name is mentioned or his story told, for one can recognize
only what one in some way and in some sense already knows. On
this profound level of existential knowledge by connaturality,
some non-Christians can even know Jesus much better than some
Christians know him.
The Faith ofJesus
These two factors, then, first, an awareness of the qualitatively
different ways we are related to reality in knowledge and, second,
that particular way we have called, following our Catholic
tradition, knowledge by connaturality combine to provide us with
our hypothesis: what is of salvific significance for the non
Christian is not faith in Jesus in the sense of knowing and
assenting to an objective content of knowledge about him,
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whether this content be comprised of scriptural titles or later
dogmatic assertions. Rather, what is of salvific importance is the
faith o/Jesus; that is, the process whereby one lives in one's own
life the faith that Jesus himself lived and through this actual
association with him in real life comes to know him by connatu
rality. But if this is true of people who are not Christians, then it
must also be true of Christians. Christians must acquire their real
and salvific knowledge of Jesus not primarily through the content
of their doctrines about him, but through the content of the lives
they live in association with him.
It is true, of course, that until quite recently, theology did not
speak of the faith of Jesus. Following the medieval tradition,
including Aquinas, who taught that Jesus enjoyed the beatific
vision from the first moment of his conception, it was presumed
that the knowledge Jesus possessed precluded the need and even
the possibility of faith. 18 This has begun to change, however,
thanks to the contemporary effort in theology to remove any taint
of the monophysite heresy from the Church's teaching and
preaching and to recover, in accordance with the orthodox faith
of the Council of Chalcedon, the fullness of the humanity of Jesus
along with his divinity. This fullness would have to include
human faith and hope as well as homan love. 19 If that is the case,
a--ssociation with him in his faith can ground knowledge of him by
connaturality.

Connatural Knowledge of God
The philosophical notion of knowledge by connaturality can
also throw light on a much quoted but somewhat obscure text in
the Johannine literature in the New Testament. The passage
appears in the First Letter of John and reads in its entirety:
"Beloved, let us love one another, for love is of God, and he who
loves is born of God and knows God. He who does not love does
not know God; for God is love" (1 Jn 4:7-8). The context in
which John speaks here of the knowledge of God is his exhorta
tion to the community that they love one another. His argument
is brief and his logic simple. The reason one should love one's
brothers and sisters is not just because it is an extrinsic
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commandment of God, but because in doing so, one is born into
the very life of God, and living this life brings knowledge of God.
It does this because God is love.
One might wonder just why and how this would bring know
ledge of God. For John's exhortation to the community is not to
love God, but to love one's neighbor, and so it is one's neighbor
who is the explicit object of one's knowledge, attention, and love.
Here as elsewhere, John collapses the dual commandment in the
synoptic gospels to love God and one's neighbor into the single
commandment as it appears here.20 Nevertheless, it is knowledge
of God that one gains through this love. But if one's attention is
and has to be focused on the neighbor one is loving, then the
knowledge of God this brings cannot be knowing God as an ex
plicit object. But John's logic makes perfect sense if the knowledge
of God he is talking about is interpreted as knowledge through
connaturality. By living a life of love for one's neighbor, one is
touching and being touched by the very reality that constitutes
God's own life and reality, and through this very contact, one is
coming to know God not in a conceptual, but in an existential
and experiential sense. One acquires real knowledge of God as
distinguished from notional knowledge, to use Cardinal Newman's
terminology, primarily through how one lives, not through how
one thinks. How one thinks, of course, and how one concep
tualizes the reality of God are crucially important for both
philosophy and theology, but both philosophy and theology can
remain formal and empty abstractions unless both are grounded
in experience - that is to say, unless theoretical knowledge is
rooted in knowledge by connaturality.
Being as Symbolic
The final area we want to consider where once again
philosophical reflection can make a very significant contribution
to theological understanding moves us from the domain of episte
mology to that of ontology and the notion of the symbolic nature
of being. 21 Because of the differentiated unity or the unity in
difference that defines the relationship between a "real symbol"
and what it symbolizes, understanding being as symbolic can be
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of value in theological reflection wherever we are dealing with a
situation of differentiated unity (for example, the unity in differ
ence that characterizes the relations within the Trinity and the
distinction between the humanity and divinity of Jesus in the
differentiated unity of a single person). The symbolic nature of
being can also throw light on the relationship between the
invisible reality of grace and the church's visible ritual and
sacramental activities. In all of these areas and others as well, a
sound philosophy of symbol can enrich theological reflection.
A real symbol is a symbol which does not simply point to
something other than itself as a sign does, but rather, although
there is a real distinction between the symbol and the symbolized,
the symbol is the medium in which the symbolized becomes really
present and manifest. A symbol can be real in this sense because,
and only because, being itself is not composed of separate, dis
parate, and self-enclosed monads but is characterized by dynamic
interrelationship. Being is by its very nature relational, and every
being is intrinsically related outward to what is other than itself,
that other in which it can come to expression and without which
it cannot be itself. It is this dynamic and relational character of
being that grounds and constitutes the symbolic nature of being
and makes it possible for something (the symbolized) to be really
pres_ent in another {the symbol) and makes it possible for this
other to be its real symbol.
For example, in human beings, matter is really other than
spirit, but it is only in and through the materiality of the body
(the symbol) that spirit of soul (the symbolized) can be itself and
can manifest itself. In their differentiated unity, matter and spirit
are really different, and yet they are really one because each is
incomplete without the other, and neither can be itself without
the other. This symbolic character of being reaches all the way
into the inner life of God: the oneness of God is not a static and
monolithic unity but is the living, dynamic, interrelational, and
differentiated unity of the Father giving expression to God's own
self in the real symbol of the Word. It is, of course, this symbolic
nature of God's own Trinitarian life that grounds the symbolic
nature of all being. The examples of both the differentiated unity
of the Trinity and of matter and spirit in a human being make it
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clear that the relationship between a real symbol and that which
it symbolizes is always a dialectical relationship of identity and
difference: the symbol both is and is not the symbolized. In the
real symbol, the symbolized is really present and manifest, and
this constitutes the identity of the two; but it is present and
manifest in what is other than itself, and this constitutes the
difference between them.
This dialectical and paradoxical relationship of both identity
and difference comes clearly to expression in the area of sacra
mental theology in the ancient Aramaic liturgical exclamation,
"maranatha!," which is usually translated, "Come, Lord!"22 Joseph
F.itzmyer considers the phrase to be a "primitive liturgical
formula" which very early on was "probably used at liturgical
Eucharistic gatherings."23 Taken in this sense as used at-the end of
a Eucharistic memorial of the Lord's death and celebration of his
risen presence, the phrase vividly captures the experience of the
simultaneous presence and absence of Jesus in the early Christian
communities. His sacramental presence in the symbols of the
Eucharistic celebration also included a sense of his absence and a
longing for the fullness of his presence in the parousia or his
second coming.
The 'Two Natures Model"

But it is perhaps in the area of Christology that a symbolic
understanding of being makes its most significant and valuable
contribution to theological reflection today. Its contribution lies
in the context of the effort on the part of contemporary theology
that we have already mentioned: namely, to recapture the full
humanity of Jesus and to remove from the church's teaching and
preaching any trace of the monophysite heresy. That such traces
are in fact actually present is the opinion of many. For example,
in presenting his "case for Spirit Christology," Roger Haight
maintains that "a Spirit Christology is more relatively adequate to
Christological data in our time than is a Logos Christology"
because the latter has tended to undermine the humanity of Jesus,
and this is precisely "what Spirit Christology seeks to undo.'>24
Perhaps the problem lies, however, not really in Johannine Word
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Christology as such, but rather in the much later "two natures
model" that was used to speak of the differentiated unity of
humanity and divinity in Jesus. For the two natures formula can
be misleading in the sense that it can give the false impression that
a divine nature and a human nature are two species within the
common genus "nature,'' But God and the nature of God cannot
fit into any higher genus and be measured by it. God and human
ity or divine and human nature can never be juxtaposed as two
parallel realities that can then become alternatives or competitors.
In this competition, the human nature must invariably and inevita
bly give way to the divine, at least for religious minds, and this is
what creates the possibility of a monophysite interpretation that
is perhaps the all-too-common and unfortunate result of the two
natures formula.
An Alternate Model
But one can be faithful to the truth to which the two natures
formula points and to the spirit of the Council of Chalcedon wit
hout having to repeat its letter. This truth is identical to the truth
to which the four gospels point: in Jesus of Nazareth, in his life
and ministry and in his death and resurrection, his disciples found
the presence, power, and revelation of God, or as John puts it,
they found the very Word of God who in him had become flesh.
The relationship which from all eternity existed between the
divine Word or the Son and the Father has become flesh in the
life of sonship which Jesus lived and died, and this is, of course,
the :very same Jesus whom they had come to know and knew quite
well to be a thoroughly human being. This differentiated unity of
humanity and divinity in Jesus can perhaps be expressed as the
differentiated unity of a real symbol and what it symbolizes in a way
that precludes any possibility of a monophysite misunderstanding.
In the Incarnation, the Eternal Word and Son of God (the
symbolized) freely became really present and manifest in what is
other than himself - namely, in the created humanity of Jesus
(the real symbol) - and could do so because this humanity was
created and "tailored" for this very purpose: "ipsa assumptione
crearetur," as Augustine puts it: "by its very assumption it was
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created." 25 The humanity of Jesus is the real symbol of the Eternal
Word and Son because it is the embodiment and the medium of
his real presence in the world and in history. Between the symbol
and the symbolized, there exists the dialectical relationship of
identity and difference ·that we described above, and it is impor
tant to note that the very same characteristics quoted earlier by
which the Council of Chalcedon characterized the relationship
between the divine and the human nature of Jesus remain true of
the dialectical relationship of symbol and symbolized. 26 Just like
the two natures, the symbol (humanity) and what is symbolized
(the divine Word) are not confused or intermingled or changed
through their union, but each retains its own identity and
integrity. Just like the two natures, the symbol and the symbol
ized are distinct, but they are not divided . or separate in the
tension of their dialectical relationship.
But unlike the two natures model (and it is this that
recommends the language of symbol and symbolized), where the
divine nature always threatens to overshadow and overwhelm the
human nature, or to "undermine" it as Haight said above, and
thus Christology tends to become tinged with the monophysite
heresy, the real symbol must always remain thoroughly itself; that
is, it must remain completely and utterly human in order to be
the real symbol of the Eternal Word and Son in time and in flesh.
Humanity and divinity must vary not in inverse but in direct
proportion; that is, the more the symbol is and remains its human
self, the more it can be the real symbol in which the divine Word
and Son becomes present and manifest in flesh.
It is also important to note that this real presence is not a
static reality, but is a process of becoming because the flesh which
the Word becomes and which is the real symbol of the Word
exists in time. All human life is by its very nature a becoming,
and Jesus had to live and die a human life of sonship in order that
the Incarnation of the eternal Son could take place. God's free call
to sonship, which in terminology that has become commonplace
today is called "descending Christology," required the free response
of Jesus' human life of sonship, and this is what is called "ascending
Christology," and in the free response of his living and dying {the
human symbol), the Eternal Word of God (the symbolized) became
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flesh, and flesh became the Eternal Word. The Incarnation was not
an instantaneous event at the moment of Jesus' conception, but is a
process that includes his whole life, death, and resurrection.
The differentiated unity of symbol and symbolized, moreover,
and the real relationship of identity and difference between them
always prevent the humanity and divinity of Jesus from ever being
alternatives or competitors. There are never two realities or "two
natures" to balance, for when the humanity of Jesus is the real
symbol of the eternal relationship between the divine Word and
the Father, the more human Jesus was, the more he could be in
his very humanity the presence of the divine Word as its real
symbol. The divinity of Jesus must be found precisely in his
humanity as the real symbol of this divinity rather than in a
second nature alongside or above it.
Expressing the Church's faith in the divinity and humanity of
Jesus in the language of symbol and symbolized rather than of
natures also gives us a thoroughly incarnational Christology.
When the Word of God became flesh in Jesus, he thereby entered
into human finitude, and in doing so he accepted all the limita
tions of our human condition. There can be no disembodied and
free-floating divine intellect·alongside Jesus' human intellect to
endow him with superhuman knowledge, for it has become incar
nate in the limitations of flesh. There can be no disembodied
divine will to aid and abet the human will of Jesus, for this too
has become incarnate in his humanity. Jesus had to freely believe,
hope, and love like every other human being and thereby incur
the risk of failure. The measure and the miracle of his human love
is not that he -could not sin, but that he did not sin. In the free self
transcendence of his faith, hope, and love, Jesus moved step by
step through his human life of sonship to the fullness of new life
in the resurrection, and in so doing, he has become for all eternity
the Word of God made flesh, and thereby the Word of God to us
and for us.
Conclusion
Bearing in mind, as we have already emphasized, that
Christian revelation is about God's actual presence and activity in
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the world and in history and not in the first instance about ideas,
and that, therefore, Christian faith is a response to this presence
and not in the first instance an answer to theoretical problems,
revelation, ·nevertheless, does give rise to thought, and faith can
and should be deepened through reason and reflection. This
reflection constitutes the province of theology, as Anselm defined
it almost a millennium ago: fides quaerens intellectum - theology
is faith in search of understanding. We have become more aware
in recent times of the great number and variety of disciplines that
can be of service to theology in this search and in its efforts to
become inculturated in a particular time and place. These
disciplines include the natural and the social sciences and a whole
array of literary and humanistic disciplines. Among these latter
stands philosophical reflection, as we hope to have illustrated in
the three areas we have considered: first, a philosophy of know
ledge that can relate and integrate the knowledge of God with
knowledge of the finite so that God is not a stranger to creation;
second, the value for theology of the notion of knowledge by
connaturality in a variety of contexts that show the importance of
experiential knowledge; and third, the usefulness of a symbolic and
relational understanding of being for articulating an incarnational
vision of reality that sees God and the world as never identical, to
be sure, but also as never separate.
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CHAPTER THREE

The Foundational Phoenix:
Regrounding Theology in a Postmodern Age
DONALD L. GELPI

A

cademic theology suffers from a certain amount of intellectual
faddishness. The latest theological wind of doctrine to rattle
the branches in the groves of Academe goes by the name of
postmodernism.
Were John Dewey alive today, he would almost certainly rank
the term "postmodernism" high on his list of weasel words.
Weasel words have so many different meanings that one finds it
extremely difficult to pin down the term's actual referent in any
given context. Certainly, the term "postmodernism" means many
different things to different people. In general, it designates a
vague and highly diversified movement in fin-de-siecle Western
culture characterized by dissatisfaction with "modernity." As a
term, "modernity" enjoys about as much clarity as "post
modernism"; but in the present context, "modernity" usually
connotes the presuppositions of Enlightenment thinking. Post
modernists tend to call into question the omnipotence of technology,
to greet universalizing thought with considerable skepticism, and to
deplore Enlightenment individualism.1 I find myself in sympathy with
these particular postmodern concerns, although I would want to
qualify each of them.
Some scholars find postmodern themes anticipated in the
major thinkers of classical American philosophy.2 In the case of
C.S. Peirce, I would agree, although I find William James's
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therapeutic individualism, his nominalism, and the nominalism of
both Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne as varia
tions on standard modern Enlightenment themes. Peirce, however,
really did see through the individualism and nominalism of
Enlightenment thinking, and he understood well both the limits
and the strengths of scientific, technological thought. In the course
of this essay, I shall have occasion to return to Peirce's systematic
deconstruction of the Enlightenment.3
More typically, postmodern philosophy displays an affinity for
European desconstructionist modes of thought. In some of its
formulations, deconstructionism deconstructs the subject of dis
course. It tends to question the presence of intelligible patterns in
history. It sometimes portrays language as floating signifiers
without any external referent. Nominalistic resistance to universal
generalization focuses much deconstructionist thinking on the
concrete, the individual. In its most extreme formulations,
deconstruction depicts a non-subject projecting contradictory
meanings on a surd and ultimately unintelligible reality.4
In a lucid analysis of the theological issues raised by post
modern thinking, Thomas Guarino finds five sets of interrelated
challenges which postmodernism poses for contemporary theo
logy: 1) Postmodernism rejects all foundational thinking rooted in
ontology. 2) That rejection fuels postmodernism's deconstruction
of theological truth. 3) That same rejection raises hermeneutical
issues. In deconstructionist postmodernism, texts enjoy historical
stability but not their meanings. 4) The postmodern rejection of
foundational ontology calls into question the ability of' human
language to grasp reality. 5) Finally, because deconstructionist
postmodernism regards cultural-linguistic systems as incommuni
cable, it would appear to limit theology to mere intrasystemic
coherence.5
Guarino finds some merit in the postmodern critique of
theology. It challenges theologians to open themselves to the
unfamiliar, to the ''Other.'' It reminds theological thinking of the
otherness of God and cautions theologians about making facile
claims regarding divine and natural law. At the same time,
Guarino discovers in deconstructionist postmodernism "a totali
zing discipline with an (a)systematic view of reality." Guarino
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correctly discovers at the basis of postmodernism's assault on
theological thinking its systematic rejection of all foundational
ontology, and he calls for theology to respond to this speculative
challenge by formulating "an historically and ideologically sophis
ticated foundationalism.''6
In this essay, I shall try to draw broadly on classical American
philosophy in order to sketch a strategy for doing precisely that.
I shall rely most extensively on Peirce's constructive criticism of
Enlightenment presuppositions and on the foundations which he
laid for a realistic, scientific metaphysics.
The new foundationalism which I shall defend also builds
constructively on Bernard Lonergan's suggestion that a systematic,
strictly normative exploration of the forms and dynamics of
conversion lays solid foundations for the reconstruction of a theo
logical tradition because it provides criteria for distinguishing
between sound and unsound theological doctrine. The new foun
dationalism, however, uses insights gleaned from the classical
American philosophers in order to nuance and correct Lonergan's
own epistemology, logic, and metaphysics.
Peircean logic distinguishes between the coenoscopic and
ideoscopic sciences.7 Philosophy qualifies as "coenoscopic" because
it reflects critically on lived experience without the assistance of
special instrumentation. The ideoscopic sciences, by contrast, use
both special instrumentation and mathematical measurement in
order to investigate carefully limited realms of experience. The
different branches of physics, of chemistry, and of empirical
psychology exemplify ideoscopic sciences.
Peirce distinguished five disciplines in the philosophical
sciences: phenomenology; the three normative sciences of aesthet
ics, ethics, and logic; and metaphysics. In Peircean logic, these five
philosophical sciences have an organic relationship to one another.
Philosophical thinking begins descriptively by giving an account
of whatever appears in experience without making any attempt to
judge the reality or unreality of appearances. Moreover, Peircean
phenomenology seeks to reduce whatever appears in experience to
generic categories. Peirce argues that any experienced reality
qualifies descriptively as a quality, a fact, or a law. He defines a
quality as an instance of particular suchness. Sense qualities,
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emotions, images, concepts, practical and moral values: all exemplify
qualities. Peirce defines a fact as concrete, decisive interaction.
Physical struggle, the decisions one takes in response to physical
contact with one's environment or with other persons: all exem
plify facts. Peirce defines a law as an instance of real generality.
Learned skills, the laws of organic and of inorganic biology, any
generalized tendency to act in a predictable way, whether one
finds that tendency in living things or in physical nature: all
qualify as laws (CP, 1.190-91, 280-82, 300-53, 573-615; 5.108-15).
Peirce argues that within the philosophical enterprise, the
three normative sciences of aesthetics, ethics, and logic mediate
between phenomenology and metaphysics. By a normative science,
Peirce means the critical study of the kinds of habits which
humans ought to cultivate in some realm of experience. Aesthetics
studies the kinds of ideals for which humans ought to live,
including the highest good they ought to espouse. In other words,
not only does aesthetics study appealing ideals, but it also ranks
ideals according to their relative importance for advancing the
business of human living. Ethics studies the kinds of decisive
habits humans ought to cultivate in order to live for the ideals to
which they stand committed. Logic studies the kinds of interpre
tative responses one ought to cultivate in order to grasp significant
reality correctly so that one may make the right kind of ethical
choices.
The normative sciences mediate between phenomenology and
metaphysics because they put order into human evaluative
responses. Aesthetics deals with intuitive human responses.
Human intuition grasps reality in imaginative judgments of
feeling. In order to cultivate a healthy affectivity, one needs to
deal with one's neuroses and psychoses. One also needs to reach
initial judgments about those ideals which embody genuine beauty
and excellence. Until one puts order into one's affectivity, one
runs the serious risk of replacing sound judgments about reality
with the rationalization of one's psychic disorders. Ethics puts
order into the human conscience by teaching one to live con
cretely and practically for genuinely worthwhile ideals. Until one
puts order into one's conscience, one's philosophical account of
reality could all too easily rationalize personal and corporate
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selfishness. Logic puts order into one's thought processes. Until
one orders one's mind, one remains unable to deal adequately with
questions of truth or falsity, of interpretative adequacy or inade
quacy. As a result, one's account of reality remains riddled with
fallacies, contradictions, and confusion. In Peirce's philosophy,
logic, especially inferential logic, provides the final stepping stone
from phenomenology to metaphysics by demonstrating that all
three generic kinds of appearance which one described pheno
menologically actually obtain in reality (CP, 5.77-111).
Peircean logic argues that all inferential thinking exemplifies
one of three irreducible kinds of argument: abductive, or hypo
thetical, argument; deductive, or predictive, argument; and
inductive, or validating, argument. Each kind of argument inter
relates a rule, a case, and a result. A rule offers an account of S(?me
law, or generalized tendency, which allegedly shapes the way
things behave. A result offers an account of data one is trying to
explain. A case categorizes that data in a particular way. Each form
of inference interrelates a rule, a case, and a result differently; and as
a consequence, they remain logically irreducible (CP, 2.619-44).
For example, as ocean-going ships approach their harbor,
Columbus, sitting on a dock overlooking the sea, sees first the top
of a mast, then the whole mast, then the whole ship, tiny at first
but getting larger and larger as the ship approaches. These
observations provide Columbus with a logical result in need of
hypothetical explanation. Columbus reasons abductively, or hypo
thetically, that if the surface of the ocean were flat, he would not
see the ship piecemeal as he does. Instead, the entire ship would
appear in the distance and get larger and larger as it approached.
The fact that the ship appears initially piece by piece means that
it is sailing on a curved ocean surface. The curvature of the ocean
suggests that it in turn lies on a curved ocean bed and that the
earth has a round rather than a flat surface. If so, then the laws
which determine the shape of the planets have made the earth
round rather than flat. In Columbus's abductive argument, the
notion that the laws of nature make planets round rather than flat
exemplifies a rule. The roundness of the earth to which the abductive
argument concludes exemplifies a case. Abductions, then, conclude to
a case on the basis of a rule assumed to obtain in reality.
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Having reclassified the shape of the earth abductively,
Columbus then makes a deductive prediction. He reasons that, if
the earth has a round rather than a flat shape, he can reach Asia
by sailing west rather than east. In other words, on the basis of his
original abduction he predicts that other facts not in evidence will
appear, if indeed nature follows the rule on which his abduction
rests. Deductions, then, conclude to a new result, not to a case, as
abductions do.
Inductions validate or invalidate one's deductive predictions.
Having made such a prediction, Columbus must now get in a ship
and sail west. If he has categorized the shape of the earth correctly,
his vessel will carry him to Asia. If the predicted result appears
under the conditions specified in one's deduction, then one argues
inductively that the rule which grounded one's abduction actually
obtains in reality. In other words, a successful induction concludes
to a rule, not to a case or to a result.
Peirce's logic of inference justifies a realistic metaphysics
because it shows that the scientific mind perceives real generality
inferentially. The qualities, or evaluative responses, which shape
one's inferential thinking exemplify unverified possibilities until
one validates them inductively. Validation transforms them into
the inferential perception of both factual actualities (the results
about which one reasons) and real generalities (the laws which
explain those results) (CP, 5.93-115).
From these insights, Peirce drew a variety of philosophical
conclusions. First of all, he rejected categorically the nominalism
on which modern Enlightenment thinking rests. Peirce distin
guished two kinds of philosophical nominalism. Classical,
medieval nominalism categorically denies the existence of all
universals by reducing them to a flatus vocis. Conceptual nomin
alism, which characterizes modern European philosophy since
Descartes, allows for the existence of universals in the mind but
denies their existence in reality (CP, 1.16-27, 59-66). To the extent
that postmodernism denies real generality and portrays reality as
concrete and surd, postmodernism too offers yet another tired
European variation on modem Enlightenment nominalistic themes.
In refuting Enlightenment nominalism, especially in its
Kantian formulation, Peirce also repudiated Enlightenment
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subjectivism. Reality .will in fact teach us what it is by the way it
behaves provided we take the time to think clearly about it.
Peirce's pragmatic maxim provided a rule for clear inferential
thinking: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have
practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to
have. Then our conception of those effects is the whole of our
conception of the object" (CP, 5.402). He offered the pragmatic
maxim as a definition of inferential meaning. In effect, the maxim
asserts that the sum total of the predictable operational consequences
of any hypothesis exhausts that particular abduction's meaning.
Peirce's logic of inference led him to another epistemological
conclusion. The human mind cannot understand anything without
interacting decisively with that reality. Having categorized the
world as round, Columbus had no other way to verify his hyp o
thesis than to get a ship and start sailing west. Peirce
acknowledged the speculative aims of scientific thinking; but the
operational character of inferential meaning and the utterly
practical character of inductive reasoning undercut yet another
fundamental presupposition of the Enlightenment, namely, its
fallacious sundering of theory from practice.
Moreover, by analyzing the way the scientific mind works,
Peirce also demonstrated the radical limitations of scientific
thinking. Peirce's theory of inference entails the logical doctrine
of fallibilism. Logical fallibilism teaches that one has a much better
chance of understanding the laws which govern the behavior of
things if one admits one can err than if one does not. In investi
gating any question, the thoroughly finite human mind must first
decide how much time it has to consecrate to the inquiry. In any
complex question, one must therefore formulate one's hypothesis
before one knows that one has taken all the relevant data into
account. Moreover, even after one has validated an hypothesis
inductively and in a preliminary way, one has no assurance that
facts might not turn up which call one's hypothesis into question.
Nor has one any assurance that a smarter mind might not create
an entirely new frame of reference for explaining the relevant data.
The emergence of a more adequate frame of reference for under
standing a problem will almost certainly force one to revise one's
preliminary conclusions about it. In other words, at the two
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points at which scientific thinking deals directly with reality, that
thinking enjoys no logical necessity (CP, 1.141-75).
Two elements in Peirce's philosophy kept his fallibilism from
degenerating into the relativism in which much deconstructionist
postmodernism currently wallows: his doctrine of belief and his
critical commonsensism. Let us consider each of these doctrines in
turn.
Peirce defined a belief as a proposition for whose conse
quences one takes responsibility. In other words, belief requires
commitment. That commitment further blurs the sundering t>f
theory from practice. Only commitment to standing by the
practical consequences of what one asserts will enable one to find
out whether the proposition in question qualifies as true or false.
Moreover, one stands committed to one's belief until one finds a
good reason to question it. New facts which contradict the belief,
logical contradictions between two simultaneously held beliefs, or
the emergence of a novel frame of reference which forces the
revision of a belief - all these things count as good reasons for
calling a belief into question. The commitrp.ent which belief re
quires lends, therefore, stability to human thinking (CP, 5.370-73).
So does Peirce's doctrine of critical commonsensism. Critical
commonsensism teaches that if one takes doubt seriously and if
-one reflects critically on one's learned beliefs, -one finds a number
of beliefs which one cannot call into question. These basic beliefs,
which Peirce suspected to obtain in all cultures, give thinking a
stable base from which to operate. Critical commonsensism thus
teaches one to focus investigation on truly doubtful questions.
Stable beliefs also provide critical thinking with premises from
which to work (CP, 5.497-537).
Peirce's critical commonsensism dramatizes the futility of
universal doubt (CP, 5.264-317). Like deconstructionist thinking,
universal doubt finally deconstructs itself, for it allows one to
doubt anything but universal doubt.
Critical commonsensism also calls attention to another limita
tion of scientific, inferential thinking. People live most of their
lives, Peirce argued, not on the basis of abstract inference but on
the basis of commonsense intuition. Indeed, with G.K. Chesterton,
Peirce seems to have realized that lunatics have lost everything but
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the rationality with which they explain away their madness. Those
who would attempt to live exclusively on the basis of inferential
thinking alone would indeed, Peirce argued, lead lunatic lives. For
example, on returning home late at night one might hear one's
sister's voice crying out of the darkness, "Help! Rape!" One could
respond inferentially by asking oneself whether one spiritual being
can really communicate with another through the physical
medium of air; and one could begin to recall the arguments for
and against such a proposition; but, if one did, one would respond
like a person utterly daft. A practicing scientist, Peirce recognized
the . importance of scientific thinking, but he also gave a much
more nuanced and realistic account of its limitations than does
deconstructionist postmodernism (CP, 1. 616-77).
Like postmodernism, Peircean realism calls into question
certain forms of foundational ontologism. It questions any
ontology which rests on Kantian transcendental logic, and it calls
into question any foundational ontology which rests on essential
istic presuppositions. Let us try to understand the precise terms of
Peirce's challenge to these forms of foundational ontologism.
As a young man, Peirce read Kant every day for several hours
until he could recite by heart long passages of The Critique of Pure
Reason. He stopped reading Kant when he recognized the inde
fensible character of Kantian transcendental logic (CP, 1.4-6).
Transcendental logic recognizes only one kind of inference,
namely, deduction. In writing his various critiques, Kant had in
fact performed a philosophical abduction, but he had presented it
as a validated induction at the same time that he called it a
transcendental deduction. If one endorses Peircean logic, as I do,
one must also reject the foundational ontologies of both Karl
Rahner and Bernard Lonergan in their endorsement of Kantian
transcendental logic.
One must also reject the essentialism which mars Thomistic
metaphysics and anthropology. The first to the twelfth centuries
witnessed the Platonization of Christian theology. Aquinas platon
ized Aristotelian philosophy sufficiently to render it acceptable to
Christianity. Since the twelfth century, some form of Christian
Aristotelianism has tended to give metaphysical shape to Catholic
theology. Unfortunately, both Platonism and Aristotelianism
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endorse the fallacy of essentialism. Every metaphysics offers an
abductive elaboration of a root metaphor for reality. Both Plato
and Aristotle endorsed the root metaphor that reality resembles an
idea. Plato located those ideas in the transcendental realm of spirit
and explained the intelligibility of material things by their
participation in those eternal ideas. Aristotle rejected a Platonic
doctrine of participation and located ideas in things. Both Plato's
transcendent forms and Aristotle's immanent forms exemplify the
fallacy of essentialism because they both treat ideas as meta
physical principles instead of as modes of perception.
The fallacy of essentialism leads one to view the universe as
the great chain of being, as a hierarchically ordered set of fixed
and unchanging essences. Such a world view does indeed, as post
modernists complain, "close down" effective history and historical
consciousness. Peirce's realistic metaphysics, however, does not
"close down" either. On the contrary, it insists on the develop
mental character of nature, of history, and of thought. Peirce
avoids essentialism by confining essences to the realm of quality,
which shapes the way we become present to reality. In other
words, essences belong to the how, not tc1 the what, of human
experience. One experiences an essence when one abstracts a
specific evaluative response from the reality perceived and from
the-one who does the perceiving. I experience the essence "giraffe"
when I abstract the idea of a long-necked, long-legged, brown
spotted, horned, herbivorous animal from the giraffe I see and
from myself, the perceiver.
By equating real generality, not with ideas, 'but with dynamic
tendencies, Peirce conceived reality as dynamic, as evolving, as
thoroughly historical. With the emergence of protoplasm, laws,
subsisting habitual tendencies, exhibit the characteristic of habit
taking (i.e., of organic self-development). Peircean realism
accordingly endorses the developmental, evolutionary character of
both organic nature and of human history (CP, 6.7-34, 102-317).
Peircean realism also acknowledges the historical and cultural
conditioning of all human thinking. Peircean fallibilism requires
that one renounce any claim to having found an unrevisable
starting place for thought. All thinking begins in medias res. Finite
humans can think philosophically only when their minds acquire
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the mature ability to do so. By that time, they have acquired a
host of uncritically held beliefs. Critical commonsensism has the
capacity to transform many of those beliefs into critically held
beliefs, but never does thinking have a presuppositionless char
acter. Fallibilism also requires one to "keep the conversation
going," as postmodernism desires, since one can challenge settled
beliefs for a good reason. In contrast to some forms of decon
structionist postmodernism, however, Peircean realism provides
human minds with something to converse about besides their own
conversation. Indeed, the scientific study of history and of culture
reveals that, while neither repeats itself, both rhyme because
analogous dynamisms shape both (CP, 5.213-63). 8
Moreover, unlike Lonergan, Peircean epistemology does not
confuse a normative insight into the way the mind ought to think
with a quasi-metaphysical generalization about the invariant
structures of consciousness. In addition, Peirce replaces the turn to
the subject, which characterizes transcendental Thomism, with the
turn to community. The Peircean turn to community once again
follows logically from a fallibilistic understanding of human belief.
In his essay "The Fixation of Belief," Peirce weighs the pros and
cons of typical strategies humans "Use in fixing their beliefs. The
dogmatic fixation of belief fails because personal dogmatism blinds
itself to evidence which contradicts one's beliefs. The attempt to
force people to believe something through authority also fails
when people recognize contradictions between what those in
authority say and reality. The fixation of belief through taste, or
personal preference, has the advantage of relying on the instinctive
workings of the mind but remains too haphazard and unsystem
atic. The human mind fixes its beliefs most surely and adequately
through shared systematic inquiry. Commitment to shared system
atic inquiry not only demands commitment to discovering the
truth about reality; it also requires commitment to the community
of minds who share that commitment. The finitude and fallibility
of the human mind also demands the turn to community, since the
experiences of other people can fill important gaps in one's own
experience, just as their insights can enlarge and enrich one's own
insights. This social, dialogic characterization of human thinking
also undercuts Enlightenment individualism (CP, 5.358-87).
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Peircean realism also endorses theism. Peirce's neglected
argument for the reality of God weds a pragmatic logic of
relations and religious belief, but it does not require one, as
Thomistic metaphysics does, to regard God as actu infinitus (CP,
6.428-521). In my judgment, critical reflection on religious
experience suggests that supremacy rather than actual infinity
offers the best way of approaching the divine reality. As supreme,
God exemplifies that reality which always exceeds any finite
conception of it. With postmodernism, the idea of divine suprem
acy reminds theologians to recognize that their peanut brains will
never comprehend the deity. In other words, the notion of
supremacy acknowledges the otherness of God, as postmodern
theology does, without, however, making God so wholly other
that the divine reality defies historical revelation. A theology of
divine supremacy need not, then, make the turn to apophatic
mysticism which some Protestant postmodern theologians have
done. The notion of supremacy, moreover, as Anselm of Canter
bury saw, invites theological reflection on the richness of the
divine reality and excellence without ever pretending to exhaust
it. In a theology of divine supremacy, infinity means that which
comprehends all things and is comprehended by none.9
With contemporary postmodernism, Peirce's epistemology and
metaphysics deconstructs ontologies of substantial essentialism and
ontologies based on the Kantian transcendental subject. Unlike
deconstructionist postmodernism, however, it replaces both with
a dynamic, realistic metaphysics and epistemology. It does not,
then, demand, as deconstructionist postmodernism would seem to
do, that theologians abandon the quest for theological truth.
Instead, with Lonergan, it insists on the shared, communal
character of the human search for truth and on the social dialogic
character of all human thinking (CP, 6.428-51).
Moreover, Peircean logic undercuts the fallacious distinction
between theoretical and practical reason which distorts much of
postmodern thinking. In the world of Peircean realism, one need
not choose between theoretical reasoning and practical phronesis
(CP, 5.180-212). The intuitive character of all abductive reasoning
requires it to invoke prudential deliberation in the initial specu
lative fixation of belief. Moreover, one understands the theoretical
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meaning of any proposition by explicating deductively its practical
consequences.
Peircean realism also overcomes the subjectivism which
characterizes many postmodern accounts of human language. With
postmoderns, Peirce correctly argues that the human mind needs
language in order to reason, but Peircean logic also demonstrates
the fallacy of describing conceptualization as "the first falsehood"
(CP, 5.250-63): Those deconstructionists who cannot distinguish
between true and false conceptualizations of reality need to learn
Peircean logic. Their failure to invoke Peirce's pragmatic maxim
in order to clarify the speculative meaning of conceptions by
naming their predictable operational consequences only betrays
the muddled state of their minds. The pragmatic maxim even
elucidates the speculative meaning of huma!l conceptions of God
by explicating their lived, practical consequences.
I have been arguing that Peirce not only deconstructed modernity
more effectively than any so-called postmodern thinkers of today,
but he also offered a realistic ontological alternative to the least
tenable presuppositions of "modern," Enlightenment thinking.
The theistic character of Peirce's dynamic, realistic ontology leaves
it open, moreover, to theological exploitation. Indeed, it provides
an admirable foundation for what Bernard Lonergan has called
foundational theology. By foundational theology, Lonergan meant
critical, strictly normative reflection on the different forms of
conversion.
In fact, conversion comes in five forms. One converts when
one passes from irresponsible to responsible behavior in some
realm of human experience. Responsibility implies accountability.
The converted stand accountable first of all to themselves because
after conversion they measure their subsequent conduct by norms
which they have interiorized as personally binding. The converted
stand accountable to other people because responsible conduct
recognizes that both one's conduct and its motives affect the lives
of other people as well as one's world. The religiously converted
stand accountable to God, since the historical self-revelation of
God demands that one respond to that self-revelation on the terms
God sets. In other words, one must respond to God's gratuitous,
historical self-revelation in faith.
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The affectively converted take responsibility for the health and
aesthetic quality of their intuitive responses to reality. As a
consequence, both psychology and the normative philosophical
science of aesthetics supply criteria relevant to affective conver
sion. The ethically converted take responsibility for the morality
of their decisions. As a consequence, the normative philosophical
science of ethics provides criteria for initial and ongoing moral
conversion at both a personal and a sociopolitical level. Personal
moral conversion invokes rights and duties correctly understood
as norms. Sociopolitical conversion invokes the common good as
a moral norm in questions of public morality. The intellectually
converted take responsibility for the truth and falsity of their
beliefs and for the adequacy or inadequacy of the frames of refer
ence in which they choose to fix their beliefs. The normative
philosophical science of logic provides, then, important criteria for
initial and ongoing intellectual conversion. 10
Lonergan requires that one pursue foundational theology in an
interdisciplinary context. Similarly, Peirce requires that a fallibil
istic metaphysics develop in an ongoing dialogue with the results
of the ideoscopic sciences. Theological thinking which invokes
philosophical, theological, and scientific categories in order to
understand the complexities of human conversion needs to come
to critical clarity concerning what each of these different scientific
pursuits contributes to foundational thinking. In order to reach
such clarity, one needs to go beyond both Lonergan and Peirce.
After a professional career devoted to the development of a
postmodern theology of conversion rooted in Peirce's meta
physical semiotic, I have learned to name the contribution which
each discipline makes to the pursuit of foundational thinking.
A successful philosophical metaphysics interprets, integrates,
and contextualizes the results of the ideoscopic sciences. A philo
sophical metaphysics will interpret scientific results when its
categories apply to those results in the sense in which one has
defined them philosophically. Peircean realism, moreover, invites
the development of a metaphysics of experience. One develops a
metaphysics of experience by taking experience as a root metaphor
for reality. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, one does well to
ground a metaphysics of experience in Peirce's triadic realism,
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which constructs the real from qualities (values), facts (decisions),
and laws (dynamic tendencies).11
Metaphysics successfully integrates foundational thinking by
articulating a fallible theory of the whole, which has the characteristic
of being logical, coherent, applicable, and adequate. Logical thinking
contains no contradictions. In coherent thinking, all one's key meta
physical terms imply one another and therefore remain unintelligible
apart from one another. The synthetic character of religious insight
requires philosophical coherence in one's theory of the whole.
Experiential metaphysical thinking contextualizes the results of the
ideoscopic sciences by providing an integrating frame of reference for
locating the specific realm of experience on which any particular ideo
scopic science chooses to focus. Experiential metaphysical thinking
also allows one to ponder the relationship among the results ,of
different ideoscopic investigations into reality.
The ideoscopic sciences complete and validate a metaphysical
theory of the whole. Metaphysical thinking, like all philosophical
thinking, reflects on lived experience as lived. Spelling out the
practical consequence of one's metaphysical beliefs clarifies their
speculative meaning and allows one to test those beliefs against
lived experience. One also needs, however, to test one's meta
physical beliefs against the verified results of close scientific studies
of reality. The fact that the ideoscopic sciences validate or invali
date metaphysical beliefs ensures the open-ended, dialogic character
of metaphysical thinking.
Because metaphysics reflects on lived experience in order to
formulate a theory of the whole, it requires an adult mind. Ideo
sciences like developmental psychology complete a metaphysics of
experience by providing plausible, initially validated accounts
about how an immature mind develops into an adult one. Thus,
developmental psychology not only validates a sound metaphysics
of experience, it also provides a more detailed account of how the
immature human mind develops than reflection on adult lived
experience can provide. In the process, developmental psychology
fleshes out, or completes, one's descriptive account of the stages
of human development.
Theology gives concrete historical shape to one's account of
religious experience. It also validates or invalidates philosophical
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God-talk. Religious faith responds to some historical self
revelation of God. The historicity of that revelation endows
philosophical God-talk with a concreteness absent from abstract,
metaphysical generalizations about God. Moreover, what God says
historically about Himself stands in judgment on any human
hypothesis about the nature of the deity. The historical revelation
of a covenanting God, for example, invalidates any philosophical
attempt to talk about God as so absolute that the deity lacks all
relationship to creation.12
One can, of course, develop these ideas in greater philo
sophical and theological detail. I hope, however, that the preceding
reflections will suffice to suggest that Peirce's critique of
modernity goes much further and much deeper than the post
modern critique of Enlightenment thinking. Peirce's critique also
shows up the fallacious presuppositions of deconstructionist
postmodernism. Moreover, it offers both a logic and a realistic
metaphysics which regrounds foundational theological thinking
without falling into the fallacies which postmoderns discover in
classical and transcendental metaphysics.
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CHAPTER FOUR

Thomism and the Second Vatican Council
JOSEPH A. KOMONCHAK

T

he history of the modern Neo-Thomist movement, whose
magna charta was Aeterni Patris, reached its end at the Second
Vatican Council."' This was not supposed to happen.

The Preparation of the Second Vatican Council
Two texts prepared for Vatican II by the Commission for
Studies and Seminaries would have confirmed the preeminent role
of St. Thomas Aquinas in Catholic education. The first, entitled
De sacrorum alumnis formandis,2 set out a two-year program in
philosophy "to teach seminarians how to use the light of reason
to examine truths about the nature of things and about human life
and to provide the immediate preparation for the study of
theology."· "Scholastic philosophy in all its parts," it said, "is to
be transmitted according to the principles and method of St.
Thomas Aquinas so that the students acquire his complete and
coherent synthesis by solid and accurate study of his chief
arguments," obsolete and trivial questions being omitted and "the
more subtle questions" left for higher studies. Students were also
to be introduced into a critical study of modern philosophical
systems, particularly those influential in their own countries. The
four-year program in theology in all its parts was to be offered
"according to the principles of St. Thomas."
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The Commission's second text, De obsequio erga Ecclesiae
magisterium in tradendis disciplinis sacris, had three chapters:
Fundamental Notions; How to Teach Sacred Scripture; Main
taining the Doctrine of St. Thomas.3 The five short paragraphs of
the last chapter say that the Church has adopted Thomas' doctrine
as its own; that the Council solemnly endorses this choice and
orders philosophers and theologians closely to study his doctrine
and all who have a teaching role from the Church to faithfully
adhere to it; that these measures do not take away from the
wisdom of other Catholic teachers but provide a "guide and
example," particularly because of Aquinas' use of the sources and
his defense of the rights of reason; that the universal authority of
Thomas is to be understood dynamically so that his method,
principles, and doctrine enable philosophers and theologians to
deal with new discoveries and questions; and that the choice of
Aquinas, now confirmed by the Council, applies not only to
ecclesiastical teachers but also to teachers in universities and other
schools, and indeed is to be extended to the faithful themselves,
particularly to those who engage in any apostolic functions.
Often lengthy notes cite without qualification Roman state
ments from Leo XIII on. One note exegetes in detail c. 1366 § 2
of the Code of Canon Law, that professors of philosophy and
theology carefully follow Thomas' "method, doctrine, and
principles." His method meant scholastic method - th,at is,
strictly argumentative or syllogistic forms - and this was no
general endorsement of scholasticism but only of one that rests on
his principles; his doctrine was so authoritative that the Church
endorses any other teacher's or saint's doctrine only "to the
degree that the latter agrees with the principles of Aquinas or is in
no way opposed to them"; his principles, finally, were to be taken,
not simply as opinions, but as bases for investigation, departures
from which, especially in metaphysics, could only cause harm.
These principles were expressed in the famous Twentyfour Theses
issued by the Congregation for Studies in 1914; the preparatory
Commission proposed revising these theses, extending them into
the realms of ethics, natural law, economics, politics, and so on,
and drawing up a similar list of principles for speculative and
practical theology.
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Three pages of addenda completed the chapter. These vindicated
Thomist principles in philosophy: the ability of the human mind
to know the truth, the epistemological and metaphysical first
principles (contradiction, totality, excluded middle, causality, and
finality), the ability of natural reason to prove the existence and
essential character of God, Creator and last end of all things, and
the grounds of morality in the first principles of the natural law.
The basic theological principles invoked concerned the sources of
revelation, the epistemology of faith, the authority of the pope,
and the relation between nature and grace.
This chapter on Aquinas reflects the concerns which its chief
author, Fr. Cornelio Fabro, the author of important works on
participation in the thought of Thomas and a professor in the
philosophical faculty at the Lateran, had expressed in his proposals
for the conciliar agenda.4 Fabro's votum rehearsed the problems
caused in Catholic schools in the nineteenth century by the
principle of immanence, which had led in the opposite directions
of fideistic irrationalism and absolute rationalism, Kant being the
praecursor et dux infestus of both tendencies. The popes had re
sponded to these dangers negatively by condemning the errors and
positively by calling Catholic thinkers back to the teachings of St.
Thomas Aquinas. After a rapid review of papal endorsements of
his thought, Fabro argued the need for the Council to confirm
them, since Catholics were once again in similar danger. There was
an endless "confusion of tongues," especially
among cultured lay people and young priests who
choose to breathe a new air and either do not
know or reject the sober way of Thomistic meta
physics. The danger is real; a split can be seen in
the life of the Church today, between two ways,
one for clerics in seminaries, who are required to
follow Thomism, the other for lay Catholics who
often are allowed to follow the principle · and
method of immanence.
The situation is almost the same as that faced by Vatican I:
"the same broad acceptance of the principle and method of
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immanence; the same denial of the value and capacity of natural
reason; the same denial of the distinction and the harmony
between faith and reason; almost the same irrational and ration
alistic tendencies, though under other names; the same struggle
against and at times open opposition to Thomistic doctrine."
Fabro therefore proposed, first, that the solemn magisterium issue
another document against those "who say that people who begin
from idealist principles and methods can better save Christian
truth than Thomistic philosophy can"; second, that the pre
scription of the Code be completed and extended to Catholic
universities and faculties and to all other institutions of higher
education; and, third, that the Twenty-four Theses be revived and
studied further.
There was a close relationship between the schemas of the
Commission on Studies and Seminaries and a text prepared by the
Theological Commission, De deposito fide pure custodiendo.5 The
early chapters of this schema, which in short paragraphs discuss
basic epistemological and metaphysical principles, proofs for the
existence of God, creation and evolution, and revelation and faith,
resemble the typical introduction into scholastic philosophy and
theology offered in seminaries in the pre-concilia, period. The
subcommission that prepared this text was chaired by Fr. Luigi
Ciappi, O.P., Magister Sacri Palatii, who while the work was in
progress stated that Vatican II would follow earlier councils in
acknowledging the authority of Aquinas "as witness par ex�ellence
of the theological tradition, indeed as the most prolific, clearest,
and safest exponent of the Church's teaching."6
That things would not go well with these explicit and implicit
canonizations of Aquinas became clear even before the Council
opened. Even the fairly sober text on the formation of seminarians
was criticized when it came before the Central Commission.
Cardinal Frings said that other methods had been developed in
both dogmatic and positive theology, that it was not clear how
strictly the "principles" of Aquinas were to be understood, and
that he saw no reason why his doctrine should be favored over
those of other great theologians venerated in various religious
orders. Cardinal Dopfner proposed changes in the text to make
sure those other theologians were not neglected. Fr. Agostino
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Sepinski, Minister General of the Franciscans, made a similar criti
cism of the exclosive mention of St. Thomas, adding to it concerns
about how the decree would be received by oriental Catholics, the
Orthodox, Protestants, and Africans and Asians. Cardinal Ruffini,
on the other hand, agreed that "St. Thomas should be considered
princeps in philosophy (and in theology) also because he has been
commended as such by nearly eighty Supreme Pontiffs."7
The chapter on Aquinas in the other text of the Commission
on Studies and Seminaries was severely criticized by Cardinals
Micara, Dopfner, Leger, and Bea, and by Patriarch Maximos IV
Saigh and Father Sepinski: it ran the danger of imposing "philo
sophy by decree"; it inevitably reduced all other doctors of the
Church to second rank, ignored the traditions of the Christian
East, and came close to restricting the Church's tradition to St.
Thomas; Thomism is not intelligible in non-Western cultures and
should not be expected to offer easy solutions to modern problems;
by omitting the qualifications the popes had insisted on, the text
exaggerated the binding force of the papal recommendations and
in particular of the Twentyfour Theses and so would greatly restrict
the freedom of Catholic thinkers. Only Cardinals Ruffini and
Browne had kind words for the text, the former again invoking
papal approval, the latter maintaining that Thomist metaphysics
was the only one the Church had declared to be fully valid and
that no other philosophy was as able to set out the praeambula
fidei. Despite the criticisms, the chapter was only slightly revised.8
The original version of the Theological Commission's schema,
De deposito fidei, did not fare much better in the Central Commis
sion. St. Thomas was not himself explicitly at issue now, but
several members criticized the exclusively philosophical basis for
the arguments in the early chapters, which they thought inappro
priate in a text for an ecumenical council, which should use
biblical and theological arguments, and was likely to be uncon
vincing to people trained in other philosophies. In reply, Cardinal
Browne once again appealed to the Church's endorsement of
Aquinas' thought, particularly his metaphysics, "the wisdom of
human intellect and reason itself, suitable for the whole human
race. . . . Call this metaphysics into question, and everything
changes." Cardinal Ottaviani defended his Commission's text:
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If the first principles themselves are perverted,
then reason is finished, the faith is finished; � am
astonished to hear defenses of the position of
some Catholics who have other views of the first
principles; we have reached the terrible condition
that some Catholics are denying the demonstra
tive force of the fundamental principles.9
The Theological Commission's text on the deposit of faith
was among the documents that were sent to the bishops in the
summer of 1962. In general, that Commission's texts were in
tended to confirm, with the authority of an ecumenical council,
the main emphases and condemnations of the ordinary teaching of
the modern popes. 10 Implicitly, they would also confirm the neo
Thomist philosophy and theology that underlay that teaching and
were used to explain and justify it. The Council was expected to
reconfirm in particular the suspicions of modern critical methods,
of the turn to the subject, and of a new sense of history that had
been expressed particularly in Pius X's condemnation of "Modern
ism" in Lamentabili and Pascendi and in Pius XII's warnings
against "la nouvelle theologie" in Humani Generis. The documents
prepared by the Commission for Studies and Seminaries would
prqyide a practical reinforcement of this purpose by reconfirming
the privileged place assigned to Thomism.
St. Thomas at the Council
The frustration of these intentions at the Council's first
session is well known. After a discussion and overwhelmingly
positive vote on the schema on the Liturgy, the theological drama
of the first session was concentrated on a schema on the sources
of revelation. Vigorous criticisms of this text led to a vote which
revealed that nearly two-thirds of the conciliar fathers desired a
fundamental revision of the text, and Pope John XXIII ordered it
remanded to a mixed commission. The orientations of the Council
were now set. The vote on the liturgical schema revealed the
pastoral concerns of the bishops; the vote on the doctrinal text
revealed that they did not wish to produce texts that simply

THOMISM AND THE SECOND VA 11CAN COUNCTL /

59

repeated in neo-scholastic language the teachings of recent popes.
Over the next three years, the bishops would elaborate texts that
departed from the traditional language and choose instead a
rhetoric closer to the Bible, the Fathers of the Church, and the
liturgy to express a far more positive, organic, and ecumenically
sensitive statement of the faith. The text on the deposit of reve
lation never reached the Council floor, and little of its content
appears in the final conciliar texts, and then only in quite different
form. This transformation of purpose and of language greatly
reduced the presence of St. Thomas in the doctrinal texts, a
diminishment that was debated when at its third session the
Council took up the question of priestly formation. 11
The text the bishops debated had already been considerably
altered. 12 It now recommended a greater integration and harmony
between philosophy and theology and spoke rather vaguely of
"philosophical disciplines" and of "the principles of the perennial
philosophy," with no special mention of St. Thomas. Individual
dogmatic treatises should begin with the Bible, "the soul of
theology," and then study the Fathers and the development of the
dogma. The speculative effort should then be carried on "with St.
Thomas as teacher," while the liturgical and vital dimensions of
the dogma and the challenge of communicating it to contempo
raries should not be neglected. The diminishment of the role
assigned to St. Thomas in this text is confirmed by the omission
of the chapter specifically devoted to him in the preparatory
Commission's other text.
A vigorous debate occurred when this revised text came to the
Council floor.13 Cardinal Ruffini reminded the fathers of the
eighty popes who had recommended St. Thomas as the dux studi
orum, the last of these being Paul VI, who had echoed the Code's
reference to Aquinas' method, principles, and doctrine, words
which the Cardinal asked be restored to the text.14 It did not
detract from other great Doctors to insist that students and
teachers should not lightly disagree with so great a man: "He still
will be of great help in detecting and refuting new errors." On the
other hand, Cardinal Leger did not wish to retairi even the phrase
"perennial philosophy," which he thought both ambiguous,
because of the great differences among scholastic philosophies, and
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contrary to the very nature of philosophy, which, as St. Thomas
himself had noted, is not based on authority but on a study of
reality. There would be problems if so-called scholastic philosophy
were simply imposed on non-Western regions. As for the para
graph on theology, Leger was pleased that it did not delay over St.
Thomas and thus promote "an immoderate exclusivism. Vae
homini unius libri! Vae Ecclesiae unius doctorisf' He proposed that
the text be revised to refer to Thomas as "a teacher and example
for all those who study the theological sciences"; by this he meant
that "the system or doctrine of St. Thomas is not to be imposed;
instead he is to be proposed as, in his scientific and spiritual
attitude, a brilliant example of investigation and creativity in
theological matters, as one who adapted the science of his times to
the Church's benefit."
Archbishop Dino Staffa, secretary of the Congregation for
Seminaries and Universities, then intervened with lengthy remarks
that largely urged the points of the discarded chapter on St.
Thomas. He began by mocking those who urged that dialogue
with contemporaries required the Church to set aside its heritage
of scholastic philosophy and theology in favor of "new language,
adapted to new times, new mores, new systems of philosophy."
He urged the bishops to recall the basic principles needed in order
to discern the true from the false in what is new and thus promote
genuine progress. The Church's defense of the faith required "the
certain and objective validity of the fundamental principles of
reason and philosophy." Staffa's notes supplied copious references
to St. Thomas' works and recalled the Twentyfour Theses and
other papal commendations. Thomist doctrine does not "deduce
its conclusions from the always perfectible instruments and
experiments of science but borrows its principles from common
experience from which, by right reason, ·it derives certain
immutable metaphysical truths." To the argument that Thomism
was Western and thus alien to other cultures, Staffa replied that
truth i� independent of the area in which it is discovered and can
be comin.unicated everywhere else. The only question was whether
the T.gomist system corresponds to the demands of human reason;
if it does, then it transcends the distinction between West and
East. "The doctrine of the Common Doctor not only is not an
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element that divides East and West, it constitutes a universal and
necessary basis for uniting those who love the truth."
Intervening a few days later on the schema on Catholic edu
cation, the Master General of the Dominicans, Aniceto Fernandez,
responded to Cardinal Leger's comments.To the criticism of the
weakness of arguments from authority, he replied that here the
authority "is not the authority of Thomas alone but of the
Magisterium of the Church itself which again and again commends
and prescribes him, and therefore it is of a much higher order."
St.Thomas' doctrine should be accepted because "it speaks the
truth about the basic metaphysical and theological principles and
structures, as is clear to anyone who honestly seeks and studies the
truth of natural and supernatural realities." Since commendation
of Aquinas was compatible with acknowledging truth wherever it
may be found, "it is unjust and illogical to conclude that it makes
the Church a Church of a single Doctor." Finally, it was not enough
to say that Thomas provides an example of study and of adaptation
to his own times; besides his admirable habits, Thomas also
transmitted objectively true and eternally valid
doctrine ....But if the doctrine for which he
himself sweated and exhausted all his strength
were false and to be abandoned, then his magis
terial authority would be merely verbal, unreal,
and it would only be equivocally and mockingly
that he could be called a master, like the Pharisees
about whom St.John Chrysostom wittily said:
"They call Jesus a master, but they do not wish
to be disciples."
In the end, the Council's Decree on Priestly Formation
(Optatam Totius) was content with general references.Paragraph
15 referred simply to "the permanently valid philosophical heri
tage " on which students should be led to base themselves while
not neglecting contemporary philosophical investigations and
recent scientific progress. Paragraph 17 retained the brief phrase
"S. 1boma magistro" with reference to speculation in theology.
The revised Code of Canon Law repeated this phrase in c. 252 §3;
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but after the Council, the Congregation for Seminaries and
Universities explained that the phrase "perennially valid" in #15
referred to "the principles of St. Thomas." 15
The only other commendation of St. Thomas in the final texts
of the Council appears in the Decree on Christian Education
(Gravissimum Educationis), where, speaking of the role of Catholic
universities in promoting harmony between faith and reason, the
Council said: "The Church pursues such a goal after the manner
of her most illustrious teachers, especially St. Thomas Aquinas"
(#10). Although the following paragraph was devoted explicitly to
ecclesiastical faculties of theology, it made no special mention of
Aquinas and spoke simply about communicating "the treasure of
Christian wisdom handed down by our ancestors" (#11).
Historical Context

As Father McCool indicated, the Second Vatican Council thus
effectively brought to an end one moment in the history of the
modern Thomist revival. As his works make clear, the hope ex
pressed by Pope Leo XIII that a return to Aquinas would provide
Catholic intellectuals a common basis on which to join in a
unified effort to return Western society and culture to its Chris
tian roots was to be disappointed. The problem was not only in
the difficulties of returning to the Middle Ages for a response to
the distinctive problems of the modern world; it was also that
there was such disagreement as to what Thomism is.16 The twentieth
century would see a variety of "Thomisms": those of Gardeil,
Maritain, Gilson, Rousselot and Marechal, Rahner and Lonergan,
Mercier and the Louvain school, Garrigou-Lagrange, and Chenu,
not to mention the Suarezian Thomism that reigned among Jesuits
in the early decades of the century, what de Lubac calls "the
mongrel Thomism" of Action Franfaise, and the "paleo-Thomism"
that Van Steenberghen says reigned in Rome among "Thomists of
the strict observance." 17 Differences among them were not minor,
nor always pacific.
In addition to the historical, hermeneutical, metaphysical,
epistemological, and theological differences among the Thomists,
there was also the problem that, particularly after the crisis of
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"Modernism," Thomism was invoked and imposed in the manner
that Cardinal Micara feared would be dismissed as "philosophy by
decree." The larger context, of course, was the over-inflation of
the principle of authority that Yves Congar described as char
acteristic of the Church's response to the challenges of the
Reformation, to the Enlightenment, and to the political revolu
tions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 18 It is not
reductionism to consider the revival of Thomism and its high
endorsement by Leo XIII an intrinsic element of this response; in
Rome it was not perceived as odd to impose by way of authority
a certain way of reading Thomas. And this was to lead to troubles
for many of the major figures in twentieth-century nee-Thomism.
The two neuralgic issues were those of the Modernist crisis:
history and experience. Aeterni Patris had stimulated the effort to
produce critical editions of the works of Aquinas and of other
major medieval scholastics as well as first-rate historical recon
structions of the intellectual world within which Aquinas had
worked. These showed, first, the genuine diversity in medieval
thought, which made it impossible to see Aquinas as the simple
spokesman of a common philosophy and theology, and, second,
that later commentators on his thought had not always been
faithful to him. Tensions inevitably arose between those whose
Thomism was largely mediated by the great commentators and
those who were claiming to have discovered his real thought and
to be carrying it forward into the present. One may, for example,
contrast the attitudes of Maritain and of Gilson toward the
tradition of commentaries and recall Garrigou-Lagrange's resist
ance to the establishment of a chair of historical studies at the
Angelicum.
The contrast between Maritain and Gilson was less troubling
in Rome than the implications drawn for clerical studies by
another great historian of Thomas and the Middle Ages, M.-D.
Chenu. Preferring an approach close to that of the Anna/es school
of historiography, which placed great emphasis on the historical,
social, political, cultural, and religious setting within which
Aquinas had worked, Chenu was struck by certain features of
Thomas' effort: it was part of the exciting social and intellectual
movements initiated by "the renaissance of the twelfth century";
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it engaged seriously and critically the challenges posed by newly
translated works of Aristotle and his Arabic commentators; it
drew its spiritual strength and inspiration from grass-roots
developments in the life of the Church, particularly the evangelical
movements of the new Mendicant Orders. Chenu extolled the
spiritual roots of Aquinas' achievement, his courage in addressing
the intellectual challenges, his respect for the autonomy of other
sciences, his relevance to his own time. On every one of these
points he argued that the Thomist tradition had fallen far short,
and h.e drew sharp contrasts between the vital creativity of
Thomas himself and those who claimed to represent him today,
particularly in Rome. What was passing for Thomist philosophy
and theology had very little in common with the method, inspi
ration, and thought of Aquinas himself. 19
It is not surprising that the defenders of Roman Thomism
were not pleased. Shortly after Chenu's little book on Le Saulchoir
was privately circulated, he was called to Rome and forced to
make amends by signing a set of ten propositions that reveal both
the stunning incomprehension of his Roman readers and the con
cerns that drove their criticism.20 Soon after, the Magister Sacri
Palatii, Mariano Cordovani, O.P., included a caricature of Chenu's
views among the "vaporous theories" to which he counterposed
the-reasons why Leo XIII had so exalted Aquinas who, Cordovani
said, "so respected and demonstrated the rights of reason and of
faith that reason cannot ascend higher and faith cannot ask for
greater help from reason."21 When Chenu's book and the work of
his student, L. Charlier, Essai sur le probleme theologique, were
placed on the Index in 1942, an authoritative article of comment
recalled the critique and contempt the Modernists had displayed
toward scholasticism and toward the methods of St. Thomas and
his commentators.22
After the hiatus of the Second World War, the tensions erupted
again in the controversy over what its critics called "la nouvelle
theologie." More or less explicitly included in this dispute were
the interpretation of Thomas' anthropology and the fidelity of the
later commentators to his thought on the end of man, the notion
and method of theology, the relationship between biblical and
patristic thought and scholastic theology, the adequacy of scholastic
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philosophy and theology to contemporary questions, and the value
to be ascribed to classical concepts. In the midst of the debate,
Henri de Lubac offered a self-defense that pointed the issue of
fidelity to St. Thomas:
As the rules of the Society demand of me and as
its whole tradition recommends, I am quite in
favor of a certain freedom in our adherence to the
teaching of St. Thomas. On the other hand, I
believe that, apart from points which the Church
fixes as necessary to the faith, it is a serious dis
tortion to try to impose philosophical theses by
authority, as a sort of new Credo.23
I also believe that one whole contemporary
Thomist school - not the only one, thank God
- is quite far from the spirit of St. Thomas (and
often from his letter also); that those who display
the most intransigent zeal for Thomism are not
the most legitimate heirs of the great Doctor; that
St. Thomas still offers us not only his teaching
but also his example, and that the Dne cannot be
understood without the other. I believe that a
certain narrow and sectarian Thomism, which is
chiefly responsible for the disaffection of many
towards St. Thomas and scholasticism, is a con
siderable obstacle to the real knowledge of the
Catholic Tradition as well as to the action of the
Church in the world today. I stress this last
point: a teaching that closes minds and shows
itself to be anti-apostolic, as "safe" as it may
claim to be, cannot be, even doctrinally, a sound
teaching.24
This debate was brought to a halt, of course, by Humani
Generis, the encyclical in which Pius XII sided with the critics of
"la nouvelle theologie," pointedly included contempt for scholas
tic philosophy and theology among "sorp.e false opinions which
threaten to undermine the foundations of Catholic doctrine," and
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urged the need in theology for the perennial philosophy that
"safeguards the genuine validity of human knowledge, the un
shakable metaphysical principles of sufficient reason,causality,and
finality, and finally the mind's ability to attain certain and
unchangeable truth."25
And it was not only theologians who came under suspicion.
Throughout the 1950s,the Holy Office was preparing to condemn
Jacques Maritain's political views, an action prevented, it seems,
only by the death of Pius XII.26 A month after Humani Generis
appeared, two congresses were held in Rome, an International
Scholastic Congress, followed immediately by the Third Inter
national Thomistic Congress.27 Toward the end of the first
congress, Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange accosted Etienne Gilson: "M. le
Professeur," he said, "you speak of the avatars of metaphysics in
your recent work; this is very dangerous and I intend to criticize
you on the matter next Monday at the Thomist congress." When
Gilson threatened to-leave the congress, the matter was dropped
and the critique was never made.
On the first day of the Thomist congress, Fernand van Steen
berghen gave a talk on Aquinas' five proofs for the existence of
God in which he repeated criticisms he had already made else
where.At the end of his talk,Fr. Charles Boyer,S.J.,secretary of
the Congress, before introducing the next speaker, delivered a
short refutation of van Steenberghen that ended with the comment:
"Therefore, the objections of the honored Professor are worth
less." Confronted by van Steenberghen, Boyer explained, "I
couldn't let your talk pass without reacting; I saw Fr. Garrigou
Lagrange displaying his anger in the hall; he would have left the
congress if I had not intervened. Your talk was too negative."
Garrigou-Lagrange, when approached by van Steenberghen,said:
I didn't understand your talk....I thought I was
hearing a young man of twenty years who had
just read St. Thomas for the first time. . . . I
prayed for you to St. Thomas last night. You
have to repair this. Write some articles on St.
Thomas' proofs in order to dissipate this unfor
tunate impression.
Otherwise people will end up
..._
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doubting the value of your historical works. You
know I love Louvain... . But look at Lottin's
presentation at the Scholastic Congress; he didn't
understand St. Thomas. And De Raeymaeker here
this morning: if we have to talk about parti
cipation in connection with the principle of
causality, where are we going?
When van Steenberghen's talk was published, some of his critical
remarks were muted and two pages of response .to his criticisms
were added - all without his knowledge.
Now all this, which might be savored but should not be
dismissed as mere gossip, was also not simply a scholarly dispute
among various interpreters of St. Thomas Aquinas. A certain
Thomism appeared to have degenerated into an ideology.28
Maritain, Gilson, van Steenberghen, de Raeymaeker, and Lattin
were scholars of the first rank, whose often strong disagreements
seldom led to the severing of friendly relations. But Boyer and
Garrigou-Lagrange were also closely linked with Vatican congrega
tions, and when they were critical, it was not paranoia to feel the
threat of the Holy Office and the Index of Prohibited Books.29
They had led the Roman charge against "la nouvelle theologie,"
universally believed to have been censured in Humani Generis.
The atmosphere may be illustrated by the actions of Fr. Louis
Janssens, S.J., who even before the encyclical appeared had already
acted against the Jesuits of Fourviere and would soon write a letter
to the Society of Jesus, asserting that Jesuits were among the
encyclical's unnamed targets and asking for "perfect submission"
to the encyclical, including its prescriptions on scholastic philo
sophy and "the method, teaching, and principles of the Angelic
Doctor."30 The 1950s would see other disciplinary actions taken
against French Dominicans and the American Jesuit, John Court
ney Murray.
This context illumines the pre-conciliar and the conciliar
discussion of St. Thomas. The drafts prepared by the Commission
for Studies and Seminaries repeated and even exaggerated the
forceful endorsements of Aquinas by various Roman authorities
over the previous ninety years. The texts would have given conciliar
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validation not only to a necessary philosophical preparation for
theological studies, but to quite specific interpretations of the
epistemological and metaphysical principles of the required philo
sophy, which then were to serve as the controlling criteria for
both philosophy and theology. Revision and additions to the
Twentyfour Theses would have widened the range of imposed
philosophical and theological principles and extended the obli
gation to follow them, beyond seminaries and ecclesiastical
faculties, also to other educational and apostolic institutions. In its
turn, the Theological Commission's doctrinal texts would have
given conciliar authority to the philosophical and theological
principles thought to underlie Humani Generis' rejection of "la
nouvelle theologie" and its allegedly historicist and relativistic
proponents, among whom, as he was told, was Henri de Lubac,
a consulter to the Theological Commission.
It could be argued that the diminished presence of St. Thomas
in the final texts of Vatican II was due less to any lack of
appreciation of Aquinas' genius and accomplishment than to
reactions to what de Lubac called "the narrow and sectarian
Thomism" imposed as an integral part of a quite modern, un
traditional ecclesiastical and intellectual system. The criticisms of
that Thomism both in the Central Preparatory Commission and
on ,the Council floor echoed the desire, long expressed and long
frustrated, to-combat an interpretation of papal commendations of
Thomas that relegated other great figures in the Tradition to a
second rank and reduced Thomism itself to a set of determinate
principles. Also audible in the criticisms of the prepared drafts was
a desire to overturn or at least to mitigate the system of control
over Catholic intellectual life that had used St. Thomas, or its
interpretation of him, as a nearly all-sufficient criterion, often
crudely applied.
Fr. Congar described the dramatic encounter at the Council
in terms of two figures of St. Thomas. On the one hand, there
was "St. Thomas" as a symbol of "prefabricated abstractions and
solutions," of "categories and conclusions" formed and repeated
one after the other. On the other, there was St. Thomas as "a
master of thought who helps us to structure our minds, a master
of honesty, rigor, and respect for every particle of truth," who
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"spent his life in search of new texts, in having new translations
made of the Greeks and Arabs, in dialoguing (and not flabbily!)
with all the 'heretics' of his time, with all those, inside and outside
the Church, who disagreed with him." "The Council was right,"
Congar concluded; "it is less that we should be repeating his
theses than that we should go to school with him, after which we
should set to work with whatever strength we have, but in his
spirit and relying on him." While the Council's references to St.
Thomas, either in text or in notes, were fewer than many people
might have desired, Congar argued that "it could be shown that
St. Thomas, the Doctor communis, furnished the writers of the
dogmatic texts of Vatican II with the bases and the structure of
their thought."31 What ended at Vatican II, at least by the
Council's intention, was the ideologically driven reign of one of
the many forms of neo-Thomism. What happened to St. Thomas
and to "Thomism" after the Council is, of course, another story,
which will have to be told elsewhere.
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CHAPTER FIVE

Divine Transcendence and Eternity:
The Early Lonergan's Recovery
of Thomas Aquinas as a Response
to Father McCool's Question
MATTHEW L. LAMB·

P

hilosophers and theologians owe much to the dedicated
scholarship of Gerald A. McCool, S.J. Reaoing his Catholic
Theology in the Nineteenth Century: The Quest for a Unitary Method
and From Unity to Pluralism: The Internal Evolution of Thomism,
one is struck by Fr. McCool's synthetic ability in narrating the
emergence, development, and finally decline of Catholic neo
scholasticism. If there is an abiding question in Fr. McCool's
writings, it is that posed at the end of the latter study. Stating that
both Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan were formed by their
studies of St. Thomas Aquinas, Fr. McCool adds that both have
moved beyond neo-Thomism as they, each in different ways,
addressed the question: "How can a philosophy based on the
human mind preserve the fundamental meaning of the Christian
mysteries when they must be expressed through historically
conditioned concepts in a plurality of diverse systems?" 1
This essay takes up this question in the context of Bernard
Lonergan's early efforts at "reaching up to the mind of Aquinas."2
While Lonergan takes seriously contemporary historical conscious
ness, with its pluralism of cultures and contexts, he continues to
insist upon the dynamic unity of the human mind in its related
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and recurrent operations. The unity of intelligence is not surrendered
to the plurality of cultures. Quite the contrary: the vast pluralism
of cultures and historical epochs is possible only because of the
dynamic unity of human intelligence in act. This unity of intelli
gence in act amid diversity of developments and expressions is
something Lonergan learned in reaching up to the mind of Aquinas.3
It is no surprise, then, that for Lonergan there is a profound
complementarity between the tasks of recovering the great intellec
tual achievements of the past (ressourcement) and those of responding
to the challenges of the present (aggiomamento).
What is at stake in Lonergan's study of Aquinas, then, is
something far more than a simple historical exercise of interest
only to historians of past thinkers who ar� no longer relevant to
today. Indeed, as Fr. McCool has indicated, there is much more at
stake in the development of neo-Thomism. 4 Philip Gleason has
recently argued that it was above all neo-Thomism and neo
scholasticism that provided an integrative framework for the
expanding institutions of Catholic higher education during the
first half of the twentieth century in America.5 In this essay I shall
reflect on Bernard Lonergan's doctoral dissertation, his earliest
major work on Aquinas, now published as Grace and Freedom. My
concern is with the way Lonergan's reaching up to the mind of
Aquinas led him to discover a theoretical approach to theology
that contributes to answering Fr. McCool's question on how a
philosophy grounded in the operations of the human mind can
preserve the meaning and truth of the mysteries proclaimed in
Christian doctrine.
Reaching Up to the Mind of Aquinas
Fr. McCool places Lonergan within the context of the
transcendental Thomists who were influenced by the Belgian
Jesuit, Joseph Marechal.6 At the same time, Fr. McCool acknow
ledges that Lonergan's work is not simply an application of the
transcendental Thomism of Marechal, but that Lonergan depended
upon earlier historical and textual research and was, like Rahner,
a "creative and original" thinker whose system is "the result of
independent reflection and research."7
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As a matter of fact, Lonergan was much more strongly
influenced by his readings of Plato, Augustine, and Aquinas than
those of Marechal. Lonergan recalled that when he came to hear
of Marechal's approach, he evaluated it as confirming what he was
more familiar with - namely, Augustine's key notion of veritas
and Aquinas' notion of esse. 8 Lonergan's work, like his life, was
dedicated to an ever more adequate understanding of both human
intelligence and the mysteries of Christian faith. The topic he
chose for his dissertation was Aquinas' theory of grace. Setting a
pattern for his work, it is a dense and dedicated retrieval of the
work of Aquinas that is both rigorously historical and system
atically relevant to contemporary issues.
Later published as Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the
'!bought ofSt. 1bomas Aquinas, it traces the developments of specu
lative theology on grace from Augustine to Aquinas, sets out the
terms and relations in his notion of operative and cooperative
grace, and presents an as yet unsurpassed analysis of Aquinas'
theory of causation, operation, divine transcendence and human
liberty.9 Lonergan was able to disengage the core of Aquinas'
notion of causality and divine providence from the medieval
cosmic hierarchical shell with which it was often expressed. As a
result, Lonergan cut through the enormous difficulties surrounding
subsequent theological controversies on grace and freedom. From
the ·voluntarism of Scotus, through nominalism and the disputes
on God's grace and good acts (e.g., the Catholic De Auxiliis
controversy between Banezians and Molinists), to the Enlight
enment and modern variations on determinism and decisionism,
Lonergan indicated how crucial achievements of Aquinas were
ignored. 10
The intellectual breakthroughs that Aquinas effected ,were
neither understood adequately by his contemporaries nor commu
nicated through subsequent commentators. Specifically, such terms
as "supernatural," "divine transcendence," and "operation" are
used by Aquinas within a philosophically systematic framework
that differentiates their meanings from previous usage. So the
"theorem of the supernatural" in Aquinas expresses the mystery
of redemption as gifting humankind with theological virtues and
graces natural to God alone, and so absolutely gratuitous and
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supernatural relative to human nature. The theorem referred to
the entitative disproportion between nature and grace, reason and
faith, good will and agapic love, human honor and merit before
God. Some subsequent commentators missed the theoretical frame
work of the theorem and imagined instead separate realms or
planes, one natural and another supernatural. This led to a host of
difficulties characterized by supposed contradictions between the
supernatural and the natural, grace and freedom, faith and reason.
His doctoral work convinced Lonergan that the task of histor
ically retrieving Aquinas was far more difficult than most modern
historians, philosophers, and theologians had envisaged. For what
was needed to reach up to the mind of Aquinas was not simply an
historical, philosophical, or theological reconstruction of Aquinas'
work. What was needed for any of these reconstructions to be
accurate was a set of profound changes within the historian, philo
sopher, or theologian doing the reconstructions.
From Augustine, Lonergan learned that Christian conversion
to Jesus Christ as Lord involved not only religious but intellectual
and moral dimensions as well. The psychological and phenomeno
logical narratives of Augustine's intellectual conversion to the
truth, moral conversion to goodness, and religious conversion to
God revealed in Christ Jesus, together with the doctrinal theology
of Athanasius, grounded the shift towards theory in Aquinas."
This threefold conversion process of Augustine is expressed in
Aquinas as the fundamental importance of the intellectual, moral,
and theological virtues.12 To understand the systematic break
through in the theology of Aquinas, Lonergan realized that he had
to reach up to the mind of Aquinas by undergoing himself what
he would later term "intellectual conversion." 13
In Method in Theology, Lonergan indicated how a factor estab
lishing continuity in systematic theology is the occurrence in the
past of genuine achievement. In this context he evaluated his own
early work:
I have done two studies of the wntmgs of St.
Thomas Aquinas. One on Grace and Freedom, the
other on Verbum. Were I to write on these topics
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today, the method I am proposing would lead to
several significant differences from the presentation
by Aquinas. But there also would exist profound af
finities. For Aquinas' thought on grace and freedom
and his thought on cognitional theory and on the
trinity were genuine achievements of the human
spirit. Such achievement has a permanence of its
own. It can be improved upon. It can be inserted in
larger and richer contexts. But unless its substance
is incorporated in subsequent work, the subsequent
work will be a substantially poorer affair.14
Unfortunately, the serious scholarship on past achievements of the
human spirit in systematic theology has declined over the past
decades as these achievements were left to historians who had no
more than a common sense scholarly grasp of the historical
contexts. 15
Even a cursory reading of Grace and Freedom indicates the
importance of chapter five, entitled "Divine Transcendence and
Human Liberty."J6 The young Lonergan was able, in the course
of recovering the theoretical achievement of Aquinas on operative
and cooperative grace, also to recover Aquinas' differentiated
reception of Augustine's and Boethius' masterful reflections on
divine eternity.
Fortunately, we now also have available the introductory
section that Lonergan wrote to his dissertation, wherein he sets
out the theoretical nest of terms and relations central to his study.
This long introduction to his dissertation was not published in the
book edition of Grace and Freedom but has now been published
in Method: A Journal ofLonergan Studies.17 There, Lonergan shows
how a key task of speculative theology is to understand finite,
created realities properly in order that the theologian attain the
mystery of God as mystery and not as a problem. This will set the
context for reflecting on divine transcendence and divine eternity.
In recovering Aquinas, Lonergan analyzes how human intelligence
participates in eternal light, then indicates how the divine
transcendence of all change is unique to God alone.
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Speculative The ology and the Mystery of God
From the first sentence of Lonergan's introduction to his
dissertation, it is clear that his reaching up to the mind of Aquinas
had achieved something still needed in systematic theology, and as
well had cut through the major disputes which had derailed the
theology of grace in the intervening centuries:
A study of St. Thomas's thought on gratia operans
offers a threefold interest. It reveals him working
into synthesis the speculative theorems discovered
by his predecessors. It brings to light the develop
ment of his own mind. It suggests an attitude and
direction of thought distinct from the one result
ing in the impasse of the controversy de Auxiliis. 18
Immediately Lonergan zeros in on the "attitude and interest" that
later theologians missed and which he is going to explicate in
order to pin down precisely why for so many centuries theo
logians had been misunderstanding Aquinas, failing to grasp the
exact nature of Aquinas' speculative breakthrough. If the
interpreter of Aquinas misses that, then Aquinas is simply not
understood. The key lies in "an analysis of the idea of develop
ment in speculative theology," which both reaches up to the mind
of Aquinas, while also attending to "a general scheme of the
,historical process because the human mind is always the human
mind." 19 Lonergan is quite definite that the interest and attitude
of Aquinas are precisely in speculative theology. Thus he is not
trying to "read into" the texts: "We are not engaged in proposing
a theory in speculative theology. We are giving an account of
someone else's theories. . . . We ask what he said, why he said it
and what he meant in saying it."20
Two extremes are to be avoided. One is a deductive concep
tualism in which an a priori scheme ignores the historical data,
making out what Aquinas "must" have meant by reading back
present categories into the past, Lonergan met this attitude too
frequently. It was to be found in those theologians who were
conceptualist logicians. The other extreme is positivism, which
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gives up on the a priori altogether by contenting itself to "observe
facts" without adverting to the keen intelligence doing the ob
serving. If before Vatican II the conceptualist logicians seemed to
predominate in Catholic theological circles, perhaps a type of
positivism has been the tendency in Catholic systematics since the
council. We have systematic theologies of x, y, or z, but little
sense that systematic theology is a discipline that not only can, but
should, move beyond the particularities of individual theologians
to understand the mysteries of faith, the sacred realities them
selves. Lonergan was convinced that positivism could be avoided
without falling into an ahistorical conceptualism, to be followed
by that form of positivism now current, historicist deconstruction:
It remains that history can follow a middle course,
neither projecting into the past the categories of
the present, nor pretending that historical inquiry
is conducted without a use of human intelligence.
That middle course consists in constructing an a
priori scheme that is capable of synthesizing any
possible set of historical data irrespective of their
place and time, just as the science of mathematics
constructs a generic scheme capable of synthe
sizing any possible set of quantitative phenomena.
In the present work this generic scheme is attained
by an analysis of the idea of a development in
speculative theology.21
He makes it quite clear that he is not speaking of "the
development of doctrine," but of the development of speculative
theology: "Speculative deficiency is no proof of heterodoxy."22
For the young Lonergan, attending to human intelligence took
the form of seeking "a point of vantage outside the temporal
dialectic, a matrix or system of thought that at once is as pertinent
and as indifferent to historical events as is the science of mathe
matics to quantitative phenomena." 23 Such a viewpoint is no more
ahistorical than mathematics or physics are ahistorical. To claim
it is would be to assert that human intelligence is only historical
if it is in common sense patterns of experience. But to exclude the
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intellectual pattern of experience from history would deprive
history of its most esteemed and exalted characteristic: the
dynamic of intelligence in act.24 If the form of speculative theology
is human intelligence in act, the content is that intelligence as
reflecting on the Word of God down the centuries, where the
attention is not to systematic theology per se but, as he says, to the
"system" in systematic theology.
The young Lonergan calls attention to the immense efforts
required as Europeans
emerged from the chaos of a broken empire and
the distress of barbaric invasion, and gave their
leisure to the construction not only of cathedrals
of stone but also of the more enduring cathedrals
of the mind.25
The image of "cathedrals of the mind" is important. Specula
tive theology is not "mere speculation"; it is concerned with the
most real reality there is, God. Intelligence, as Lonergan was to
show in Verbum, is a created participation in the sacred for
Aquinas.26 What is more, systematic theology is not a scientific
· reflection upon faith or religious experience. As Lonergan stated
clearly in his 1954 article on "Theology and Understanding,"
for St. Thomas theology is neither the under
standing of faith nor the science of faith, neither
. . . Glaubensverstandnis nor . . . Glaubens
wissenschaft. The subject of Thomist theology is
not a set of propositions; it is not even a set of
truths; it is a ·reality. Deus est subiectum huius
scientiae. (Summa, I, 1, 7c)27
The reality of God is the subject of theology, not human faith or
human ideas or even human truths about God. Speculative theo
logy in Aquinas' and Lonergan's sense, therefore, is not simply
"speculation" in the modern idealist meaning of that term or that
activity. One must seek as full a flowering of intelligence as
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poss�ble in systematic theology in order to attain, in the inter
action of the light of reason and the light of faith, the Infinite
Intelligence and Love who is God.
In his Introduction, the young Lonergan defined the elements
in speculative theology and then showed all too briefly how the
elements were correlated in phases of development. The four ele
ments are theorems, terms, the dialectical position, and technique.
"Theorem" is "defined as the difference between a common
notion and a scientific concept." This difference he would spell
out in Insight as that between common sense description and
explanation.28
So "acceleration," with the underlying differential calculus, is
an explanatory or scientific elaboration of the common sense notions
of "going faster" or "going more slowly." In theology there is the
difficulty that the same term "supernatural" is often used in both
senses. Thus Albert the Great and Aquinas use "supernatural" as
a "theorem," as an explanatory or technical term with an exact
philosophic definition. Analogous to the notion of acceleration
depending on the development of differential calculus, the theorem
of the supernatural depends upon theoretical advances regarding
nature, habits, operations, causation, freedom, and divine tran
scendence. These theoretical advances came together in the work
of Aquinas.
Theological theorems, then, involve the development of
technical terms as analysis gives old words new meanings or comes
up with new words. The young Lonergan was very much aware
of the problems this posed for historians. It was a problem that
they were not meeting too well, for
it is less clear that historians have attended
sufficiently to a similar problem of their own
[regarding the distinction between the language of
dogmatic sources and the language of speculative
theology]; not only must they distinguish between
the language of the sources and the scientific
language of their own day; they must also take
into account the scientific language of the period
they are treating.29
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In the light of Lonergan's later distinction in critical history
between a first phase that understands the sources and a second
phase that understands the realities analyzed in the sources, it
would be important to realize that Grace and Freedom and Verbum
were Lonergan's contributions towards moving critical historical
scholarship on Aquinas from the first to the second phase.30 What
is at stake is a move from texts to the theoretical or speculative
understanding of the realities referred to in the texts.
The young Lonergan defines speculative technique as primarily
a philosophy capable of envisaging all fields of relevant data, of
accurately analyzing nature - for "nature is a theophany" - and
of ordering systematically the many questions of theology.31 What
is here termed "speculative technique" is identified with the
philosophy that is an ancilla theologiae or philosophia perennis. In
the epilogue of Insight, Lonergan wrote of the work of the specula
tive theologian seeking universal formulations of the truths of
faith, mentioning in this connection "the advantage of philosophia
perennis and its expansion into speculative theology."32
The shift that occurred in Method in Theology was the realization
that transcendental method and functional specialization expands
the notion of theology enormously, i11tegrating everything from
biblical archeology and textual criticism through exegesis and
critical history, with dialectics and foundations sorting out the
massive differences concretely operative in the history of Christianity
and theology.33 At the same time, one can see in his treatment of
the function specialty, systematics, the transposed concern for
"speculative technique" as philosophy. This is precisely why the
later Lonergan decried the separation of a philosophy of God and
systematic theology that occurred from the seventeenth century
onwards, and why he speaks of the function of a critical meta
physics in systematic theology.34 A key in this transposition from
the theoretical to the methodical is how intelligence is a created
participation in Divine Intelligence, and how this ca°' be formu
lated in terms of a metaphysics, as well as expressed in an
intentionality analysis that moves from speaking of the "lumen
intellectus agentis" to a pure and unrestricted desire to know.35
Then tp.ere is what the young Lonergan calls the "dialectical
position" in the Introduction. The "dialectical position" for
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theology is the simultaneous affirmation that (1) the truths of faith
and reason cannot be contradictory, so it is always possible to
arrive at a negative coherence of non-contradiction; and (2) as
humans we can never attain full explanatory knowledge of all
doctrines, since "ultimately theology deals with mystery, with
God in his transcendence."36 This is taken up in the later
Lonergan as "the orientation to transcendent mystery," which is
basic to systematic theology and provides the "primary and funda
mental meaning of the name, God." The orientation toward the
Mystery who is God also "can be the bond uniting all despite
cultural differences."37 The early Lonergan saw the interplay in
the development of theorems, terms, and philosophical techniques
bringing theology before the real "essence of mystery":
Theological speculation never explains mysteries,
but it does advance from an initial position, in
which the mystery is not distinguished from
adjacent merely philosophic problems ... towards
a final position in which the pure element of
mystery stands in isolation from all else.38
The role of speculative theology, of the "system" in systematic
theology, is to promote that imperfect yet fruitful understanding
of the mysteries that will clearly differentiate the mysteries of faith
from the "human problems and the human elements in religious
problems" which initially are undifferentiated from the genuine
mystery of the living God revealed in the doctrines of faith.39 The
task of a genuine theology is to realize how theology's subject is
nothing less than the reality of the mysterious God.
The task of a systematic theology dealing with grace and
freedom, then, is first of all to understand human freedom and the
natural universe sufficiently to be able to differentiate these from
the creative and redemptive action of God. Hence, for the young
Lonergan, several things were required: a theorem of the super
natural to differentiate the natural and supernatural; a theorem of
human freedom that would differentiate free acts from determined
or merely random events; an analogy of operation that would
clarify how all finite operation is within a gifted orientation to
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being and goodness; and a theorem of divine transcendence that
would differentiate the reality of God's absolute transcendence
from the misunderstandings resulting from human projections
about that transcendence. Lonergan shows how our acts of under
standing are not intrinsically conditioned by space and time. This
provides an analogue for understanding the theorem of divine
transcendence as an eternity unique to God. An understanding of
divine eternity is intrinsic to the theorem of divine transcendence.

The Mind and the Eternal
"Agere sequitur esse": acting follows being. As God is the only
being whose essence is existence, so God is the only Good whose
essence is act, just as God is the only Truth whose essence is
understanding. The theorem of divine transcendence intrinsically
involves God as eternal presence. In order to appreciate divine
transcendence in all of its pure mystery, it was important for
Lonergan to explore the human analogues, just as Augustine and
Aquinas had. In Grace and Freedom and Verbum, it is fascinating
to watch Lonergan explore the psychological orientations of the
developments from Scripture and Augustine up to and including
Aquinas. What Aquinas offered was the metaphysical analysis so
iJV.portant for speculative theology. Once they are integrated
within his own intentionality analysis, the later Lonergan in
Method in Tbeology will call for a return to psychology, no longer
as with the medieval faculty psychology, but in terms of gener
alized empirical method.40
Indeed, I would argue that Lonergan could pin down so
accurately the theorem of divine transcendence and divine eternity
because he was so steeped in the classics and Augustine Before
devoting the eleven years he spent reaching up to the mind of
Aquinas. So, in the Introduction to his doctoral dissertation, he
wrote:
Philosophy as philosophia perennis is man's
apprehension of the eternal and immutable. Like
all limited being, it is potentiality and achieve
ment, dunamis and energeia, potency and act. Its
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potency is the love of wisdom: it is .detachment,
orientation, inspiration. Its act is the triumph of
the reason systematically revealing the light of the
eternal in the light of common day. For all time
the potency is represented by Plato, the act by
Aristotle. 41
"Systematically revealing the light of the eternal in the light of
common day": this insight would wait until Verbum to find its
fuller explication. In order to appreciate the pure mystery of grace,
however, it is important that we not misunderstand as mystery
what is only a problem insofar as we have not understood our
own created natures.
I would call your attention to those passages in Verbum where
Lonergan so clearly lays out how our own conscious intention
ality transcends space and time. It would· be a mistake to read
Lonergan as dismissing Augustine: quite the contrary, as his
introduction to the book edition of Verbum makes clear. Entitled
"Subject and Soul," it introduces how Aquinas unites Augustine
and Aristotle. Lonergan's admiration for Augustine is seen ih his
characterization of him as "a subject that may be studied but,
most of all, must be encountered in the outpouring of his self
revelation and self-communication. "42
Augustine minded his own mind and heart. His Confessions
narrate how intensely Augustine's own consciousness or "presence"
was an ongoing conversation and communion with the Divine
Presence more intimate to all of us than we are to ourselves. After
the first book praising God as origin and end of creation mirrored
in his own infancy, books two to four deal with Augustine's
recollections of· his descent into disordered living. Books five to
nine begin the process of re-orienting his life back into God,
culminating in the transcendent wisdom experience with Monica
at Ostia. The graced transcendent event is concretely immanent.
It occurs in a particular place and time, and transcends it into God
in such a way that, unlike Platonists or Plotinus, the advent of the
eternal God is incarnated in concrete histories. The Eternal does
not negate time but creates it and, in covenant and Incarnation,
embraces all the concrete events of time. Augustine observes how
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God is more 'intimate to him than he is to himself, but that while
God is always present to him, he was often absent from his own
mind and heart as he pursued disordered desires.43
Conversion is needed, a turning toward the inner light of our
minds and hearts as created by eternal light. This process of re
orientation or conversion back to God, by God's own grace, is
threefold. Although it is only approximate, books five through
seven predominantly narrate the intellectual dimensions of
Augustine's conversion. In book eight, the moral aspects of his
struggle are narrated, culminating in the grace while reading
Romans 13:13. Book nine then concentrates upon the central
religious nature of his conversion. This threefold conversion
process is fundamental to all of Augustine's theology.44 A reader
can adequately understand neither his Confessions nor his On the
Trinity without undergoing such a conversion process.
This is especially so if we seek to attain some fruitful, if
imperfect, understanding of divine transcendence or divine
eternity. In Verbum, Lonergan indicates how our conscious inten
tionality, as a created participation in divine consciousness, tran
scends space and time. The texts are almost all in the chapter on
reflection and judgment. Similar to Augustine's affirmation of the
utterly transcendent God embracing all the concrete particularities
of creation, Lonergan finds in Aquinas' analysis of knowing an
eternal presence that enfolds the concrete (recall the eternal light
in the light of the common day):
Knowledge of the quod quid est takes us outside
space and time; but the act of compositio vel
divisio involves a return to the concrete. In
particular, whatever may be hymned about
eternal truths, human judgments always involve
a specification of time. 45
The very acute psychological attentiveness of Aquinas leads
Lonergan to realize that what Thomas has done is wed Aristotle's
knowledge by identity with Augustine's understanding of illumina
tion. For "since reflection is not an identity, the Aristotelian
theory of knowledge by identity is incomplete," with the result
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that Aquinas validates rational reflection with a transformation of
the Augustinian vision of eternal truth:
Our knowledge of truth is not to be accounted
for by any vision or contact or confrontation
with the other, however lofty or sublime. The
ultimate ground of our knowing is indeed God,
the eternal Light; but the reason why we know is
within us. It is the light of our own intellects; and
by it we can know because "the very intellectual
light which is within us is nothing other than a
certain created participation of the eternal light.
(Summa Theologiae, I, 84, 5c)46
The light of our intelligence derives its efficacy from the "Prima
Lux," which is God. All the certitude we possess comes from the
intellectual light within us, so that questioning and knowing is a
divine-human cooperation in teaching.47 For Aquinas, teaching is
a sacred activity. Intelligence is profoundly holy, for
inasmuch as the act of understanding grasps its
own transcendence-in-immanence, its quality of
intellectual light as a participation of the divine
and uncreated Light, it expresses itself in judgment,
in a positing of the truth, in the affirmation or
negation of reality.48
To make a judgment is to participate in, to confess, the creative
reality of God. The critical problem is to be met by attention to
intellectual light, whereby we get "beyond mere relativity to
immutable truth" and distinguish appearance from reality.49 So
"normative self-knowledge" requires attention to the soul as
participating in eternal light:
There is to intellectual light an inner nisus
towards the infinite. Aristotle opened his Meta
pbysics with the remark that naturally all men
desire to know. But Aquinas measured that desire
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to find in the undying restlessness and absolute
exigence of the human mind that intellect as intel
lect is infinite, that ipsum esse is ipsum intelligere
and uncreated, unlimited Light, that though our
intellects because potential cannot attain naturally
to the vision of God, still our intellects as intel
lects have a dynamic orientation, a natural desire,
that nothing short of that unknown vision can
satisfy utterly.50
As Augustine saw how our hearts are restless until they rest in
God, so Aquinas realized that our minds are restless until they are
one with Infinite Understanding, generating Infinite Truth,
spirating Infinite Love.
In terms of a theological understanding of God as Eternal
Mystery, the achievements of Augustine, Boethius and Aquinas
have not been equaled in subsequent centuries. Why was it so
difficult for successors to carry this forward? Perhaps the analysis
of intelligibility in terms of motion (e.g., Summa 1beolog iae, I, 2,
3c) was open to misunderstandings. One's attention could be so
engrossed in the obje.ct moving or changing that one would not
attend to one's own intelligence analyzing the motion. This, in
over-simplified brevity, is what occurred with Scotus and an entire
line of commentators from the fourteenth through the seventeenth
centuries (indeed, down to our own time). The components of
being (potency, form, act) became entities; the explanatory break
through of Aquinas was lost as metaphysics became ever more
mechanical, objectivist, logically deductivist.
Thus, one hundred years before Galileo, decadent schoolmen
were arguing at Padua that since forma is fundamentally "shape,"
it would be far better to transpose analysis of forms into an
analysis of forces; the whole of reality is made up of force and
counter-force. Extension and duration were seen as constitutive of
objective reality.51
Not attending to intelligence in act, the stage was set for
rather massive misunderstandings of just what humans were doing
when intelligence-in-act really took off with the methoqs of the
empirical sciences in the seventeenth century. What happened was,
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therefore, a compound of brilliant scientific praxis with disastrously
misdirected cover stories when scientists tried their hand at philo
sophy. The cover stories took on see-saw variations of empiricism
and idealism, and these became part and parcel of the emerging
Enlightenment cultures. Empiricism and idealism marked the
decline into a host of conflicting dualisms as correlates of the
Cartesian res extensa and res cogitans: body-soul, matter-spirit,
object-subject, male-female, action-passion, and so on.
In Descartes and Spinoza, as well as in Newton's theological
works, one can see how the notion of eternity in Augustine and
Aquinas is completely lost. Eternity is infinite extension and
duration with mind (Deus sive natura), or without mind and in
need of hu�an minds to impose order upon the chaos of matter
in-motion. The naive realism of the above view was substituted for
a critical idealism in Kant and Fichte. On 20 August 1770, Kant
defended his thesis, De Mundo sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et
principii, in which he laid out "the concept of time" as the one
and immutable duration - what he would later term "duratio
nominalis" - as Eternity which causes all phenomenal things.
Phenomenal time as we know it is negated, but what such a
noumenal duration is we cannot know.52
Hegel, as an absolute idealist, would take the next step and
seek to identify the divine eternity with Concept as Absolute
Knowledge. Extension and duration are intelligible only if they are
manifestations of Geist. The idealism of "pure reason" is no longer
checked by sense-data; rather the latter are deduced in the Science
of Logic from Concept. Reason as Absolute Spirit was also Infinite
Power, so the "Thinking Power" of Absolute Spirit unfolds in
history with the List der Vernunft, the cunning of Reason. As the
German-Jewish intellectuals of the Frankfurt School pointed out,
especially Adorno and Horkheimer in Dialectic of Enlightenment,
pure reason can transmogrify into pure terror.53

Divine Transcendence and Eternity
Such a Weltgeist is far from the reality of the Eternal God,
who, as Aquinas mentions in De Malo (6, 1 ad 3), governs and
orders everything according to its own inner nature, so that
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contingent beings are moved contingently and free beings moved
freely. God as Infinite Understanding generating Infinite Truth
and spirating Infinite Love is toto coelo different from the monster
of an Hegelian Weltgeist.
There was a progressive clarification and differentiation in the
respective works of Augustine, Boethius, and Aquinas, and, as
Lonergan mentions in Grace and Freedom, the best way of understanding Augustine is to attend to the subsequent speculative
development.54 From the achievement of Aquinas, it might be
stated that eternity is God. The eternal God is an infinitely simple
Understanding, Knowing, Loving in whom there is not the slightest
trace of extension or duration. God's creative act eternally
embraces the totality of all created beings, including the totality
of material creation with all its extensions and durations. Divine
eternity does not negate time. On the contrary, divine eternity as
the Triune God creates all time. The whole of cosmic space and
time, the whole of human history in all its concrete contingencies,
are totally and simultaneously present in the Divine Presence.
Thus to call God eternal and to call the universe eternal is to
use the word "eternal" equivocally. God's eternity is a "Totum
Esse Praesens" (Augustine) or" Vitae tota simul et perfecta Possessio"
(Boethius), which can be said neither of any creature nor of the
created universe as a whole. The "eternity of the world" debate
deals with whether there is any beginning or end to all created
durations, just as the infinity of the universe is a debate on
whether there are any limits to created extensions. God's eternity
embraces the totality of all extensions and durations, the totality
of creation.55
God as eternal is Infinite Being as Unrestricted Understanding,
Infinite Truth, Unconditional Love. Reality is not, therefore, con
stituted by extension and duration per se. Understanding, knowing,
loving are just as real, and indeed higher realities, than all the
"vast" extensions and durations of our material universe. Inter
subjective and interpersonal friendships are higher than atoms,
molecules, mountains. There is not any "competition" between
the material universe and the more intense reality of under
standing, knowing, loving. Atoms and molecules, bones and
mountains, deer and cats and mice and dogs, along with each and
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every human being and each and every event in their lives, are all
eternally present in God's creative ,understanding, knowing,
loving. There is no "before" or "after" in the Divine Presence.
The entire existing universe, with all of the conditioned, con
tingent, and free events and acts within it, is created and present
because of the completely free and gifted divine act of creation.
Far from impinging upon human freedom, God's eternal
presence creating the universe makes human freedom possible and
actual. For God's infinitely free creative act makes actual what
human finite freedom requires: namely, a universe in which there
are many different courses of action objectively possible, minds
capable of understanding such different courses and not deter
mining the will to chose any one particular course of action, and
finally human beings with wills capable of self-determination. 56
Reflect on any free choice and action you have made. It would
not have been possible if you did not exist; if there were not at
least one other alternative you could have chosen. You chose to
do it because it at least appeared as a good for you to so chose and
act. Human freedom is not a neutrality before good and evil.
Created, human freedom by its own deepest and most genuine
desire wishes the good. So from Augustine to Aquinas there are
ever more differentiated explorations of the distinction between
ordered and disordered desire. Ordered desire is desire flowering
in the good, attuned to the created and redeemed universe, because
the desire is immanently oriented to its own divine creative source
in God. Disordered desires choose finite goods by removing them
from their inner order to the good of creation established by God.
So every evil choice does violence to the harmony of creation. As
Aquinas put it: because the human will is oriented into the
universal good, this orientation or tendency cannot be the effect
of any particular cause, but only of the universal cause, God.57
In Grace and Freedom, Lonergan was content with setting out
how God alone has the property of transcendence, so that the
divine "now" or presence is completely transcendent to succes
sion, to duration. So he indicated how St. Thomas "strenuously
and consistently" maintained that our universe of time as past,
present, and future is totally present in the "now" of God's
understanding.58
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So, for the truth of any statement that God willed such and
such to happen, it is required that such and such really happen.59
In God is present each and every event in the whole of the created
universe. The whole of creation is fully intelligible to God. Within
all of this wonderful and mysterious universe, human beings
abused their freedom and sinned. Insofar as the evil of sin (malum
culpae) is defined as "willful withdrawal from the orientation of
divine understanding" (subducere se ab ordinatione divini intellec
tus), it is an "absolute objective falsity." The unintelligibility of
history, the irrationality of history, is true insofar as history is
under the shadows of sin. Augustine had poignantly described the
impotence of the intellectual and moral virtues to deal with the
sinful evils of human history. Left to our own devices, practical
wisdom and justice are quite simply overwhelmed.60 Thus it was
only thanks to the theological virtues - faith, hope, ,and agapic
love - that intelligibility and goodness are again gifted to human
history.
Aquinas provided the intellectual framework for grasping how
we cannot understand the irrationality of sin. Anything is under
standable to the degree that it is commensurable with the divine
understanding. God is not a problem. Nor does God need any
explanation. God is infinite understanding, infinite intelligence.
God is the explanation of everything else. When we human beings
sin against the light and love of the universe, when we commit the
evil of sin, then we commit an absolute objective falsity. As
Lonergan comments:
We can know sin as a fact; we cannot place it in
intelligible correlation- with other things except
per accidens; that is, one sin can be correlated
with another, for deficient antecedents have
defective consequents; but the metaphysical surd
of sin cannot be related explanatorily or causally
with the integers that are objective truth; for sin
is really irrational, a departure at once from the
ordinance of the divine mind and from the dictate
of right reason. The rational and the irrational
cannot mix, except in fallacious speculation. And
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this precept is not merely relative to man; it is
absolute. The mysteries of faith are mysteries
only to us because of their excess of intelligibility;
but the mysterium iniquitatis is mysterious in
itself and objectively, because of a defect of
intelligibility.61
The evil of sin could only be overcome by the graced new
creatioo.,_of God's covenant with Israel and the incarnation of the
Word in Jesus Christ. There is no intelligibility of history which
is not gifted. Insofar as humankind broke the intelligibility of
creation in human history, it could only be newly created by God.
And, as Lonergan was later to elaborate in his De Verbo Incarnato,
God chose to overcome the evil of sin by suffering it. The
intrinsic intelligibility of the redemption of history is the law of
the cross. 62
At the conclusion of chapter five of Grace and Freedom,
Lonergan succinctly indicates how divine eternity is intrinsic to
the theorem of divine transcendence. It is a powerfully beautiful
passage in its metaphysical austerity. It begins with God alone and
ends with the sinner alone. These two very different "alones" find
analogues in the difference between the monk and the monad. The
monk is in the divine solitude whose presence embraces the total
ity of redeemed creation. The monad is in the egophanic solitude
peering out suspiciously at a hostile and terrifyingly irrational
chaos:
God alone has the property of transcendence. It
is only in the logico-metaphysical simultaneity of
the atemporal present that God's knowledge is
infallible, His will irresistible, His action effica
cious. He exercises control through the created
antecedents - true enough; but that is not the
infallible, the irresistible, the efficacious, which
has its ground not in the creature but in the
uncreated, which has its moment not in time but
in the cooperation of eternal uncreated action
with created temporal action. Again, the ante-
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cedents per se always incline to the right and
good. But the consequent act may be good or it
may be sinful: if it is good, all the credit is God's,
and the creature is only His instrument; but if it
is evil, then inasmuch as it is sin as such, it is a
surd (preceded, indeed, by a divine permission
which is infallible without being a cause or a non
cause), and so in the causal order a first for which
the sinner alone is responsible. 63
More profoundly, I believe that here Lonergan has recovered
the context in which Augustine and Aquinas spoke of original sin.
Augustine articulated this doctrine in order to understand how
God as creator is not the cause of evil and sin in human history.
The Greeks tended to understand human being as a metax:y or an
"in-between" the gods and beasts. The difficulty with this is that
it would then tend to ascribe the disorientation of sin either to the
gods or to beasts. Augustine mocked this mythology as unworthy
of reason. The real metax:y of human being is not between gods
and beasts, but between the creating and redeeming God and the
originating disorientation of human beings refusing the gift of t�e
creator God.64 Human nature is naturally oriented to the good;
evil and sin are caused by the refusal of humans to choose the
truly good: This is then transposed by Aquinas. All human beings
are one in nature, so the narrative of the fall is revelatory of the
loss of original justice. Just as the graced original orientation
toward God would have been gifted with nature, so now the
original disorientation corrupts our human being in the world.65
What does Lonergan mean when he writes about God's
efficacious control having its moment "not in time but in the
cooperation of eternal uncreated action with created and temporal
action"? When we cooperate with God, do we somehow parti
cipate in God's transcendence of time? Created and temporal
action is completely dependent upon God's eternal ,uncreated
action. All created and temporal actions are dependently related
(i.e., caused) by God's eternal uncreated action. How is it that
human beings are instruments of God, not instruments of grace?66
Human beings can only be instruments of God. No created cause
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is adequate to moving human beings instrumentally as God can
and does. For, as Aquinas in De Malo makes clear, only God can
move free creatures freely (6, 1).
In Grace and Freedom, Lonergan answers the last question by
pointing out how, for Aquinas, the universal instrumentality of
fate is not only passive in human beings. We participate in the
divine governance of the universe, not only by being governed,
but also by governing. This, then, leads to the differentiation of
operative and cooperative grace. Lonergan found in our natural
knowledge of God the proper analogy for understanding divine
transcendence and human freedom. Redemption is redemption of
creation. It is also far more. For why is grace grace? Because it is
absolutely supernatural; that is, there is only one nature to which
it is proportionate, and that is the divine nature. In Christ we are
called to live and act in ways natural to God. We are called into
a friendship: with the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; with the
communion of saints in the beatitude of eternal life. Theology, for
Aquinas, seeks a theoretical knowledge whose principles are sub
altern to the knowledge of the blessed in heaven. This indicates
why Deus est subjectum huius scientiae - God is the subject of
theology.

Conclusion
This essay begins to answer Fr. McCool's question from the
perspective of Lonergan's first sustained study of Aquinas. A
philosophy of the human mind, not segregated from but enlight
ened by theology, can preserve both the meaning and the truth of
the mysteries of the Christian faith. The ascent to theoretical or
speculative understanding of the truths of faith does not in any
way negate all the concreteness of history. What is required is
attention to intellectual conversion, so that an approach to history
does not collapse into an historicism that negates truly intelligent
understanding. Nor is this intellectual conversion isolated from the
moral turning toward the good and a religious conversion to the
sacred and all-loving Triune God.
In a later work, Lonergan indicates how an intellectualist
understanding of divine transcendence, grounded in the theologies
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of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, affords a proper under
standing of the acts of knowing and loving as participating in
divine knowledge and love. This is not a Cartesian or Kantian
transcendentalism that sets personal presence over against the
intersubjective presence of interpersonal communication. What is
at stake in theology is a proper understanding of the Eternal
Triune God and the genuine proclamation of the Word of God
calling us to eternal friendship and communion.
I shall conclude this tribute to Fr. McCool with a long passage
from Lonergan's De Deo Trino that takes up a perspective which
Fr. McCool shares with his friend and colleague, Fr. Norris
Clarke.67 What is at stake is that fruitful but imperfect under
standing of the mutual indwelling presence of the Triune God
creating and redeeming the whole of reality, including the whole
of human history:
The Divine Persons, the blessed in heaven, and
the justified here on earth are mutually present in
each other as the known is present in the knower
and as the beloved is present in the lover.
Attention is to be given to this knowing and
loving both with respect to its ultimate goal
which is that good which is the good through its
essence and with respect to its proximate goal
which is a common good of order, the kingdom
of God, the Body of Christ, the Church. More
over, the consequent mutual indwelling differs in
accord with the nature and state of each indi
vidual: for the Divine Persons are mutually
present in -each other on the basis of consub
stantiality; the justified are present in God and in
each other on the basis of intentional act of
existence and on the basis of the kind of identifi
cation proper to love; we are in the Word as
known to him and beloved by him both on the
basis of his divine Nature and on the basis of his
human nature; the Word is in us in our know
ledge and love for him as a sensible man as we
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are reaching to'�ard a knowledge and love of God
who dwells in inaccessible light (1 Tim. 6:16).
And because the prior knowledge and love is
easier for us in that it includes our sensitive
memory of the past and our imagination of the
future, we are led by it to that higher knowledge
and love in which we now no longer know
Christ in the flesh but our own inner word
proper to the divine Word is spoken intelligibly
in us on the basis of an emanation of truth and
our own love proper to the divine Love is
spirated on the basis of an emanation of sanctity.
For the Divine Persons are sent on the basis of
their eternal processions so that they may meet us
and dwell in us on the basis of similar processions
that are produced in us through grace. But those
who proceed fr?m and are sent by the Father do
not come without the Father to whom all glory
belongs through the Son and the Spirit.68
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CHAPTER SIX

Theological Anthropology in the
Encyclicals ofJohn Paul II
JOHN O'DONNELL

F

rom 1978 to 1995, Pope John Paul wrote twelve encyclicals.1
Even a glance at their titles reveals a striking diversity: some
are specifically theological, others are concerned with morality, a
few are devoted to ecumenism, two deal specifically with social
questions. Nonetheless, through all of them runs the theme of the
human person. In his first and programmatic encyclical, Redemptor
Hominis, the pontiff had written, "This man is the primary route
that the Church must travel in fulfilling her mission: he is the
primary and fundamental way for the Church, the way traced out
by Christ himself, the way that leads invariably through the
Mystery of the Incarnation and Redemption" (RH 14.1). Thirteen
years later, as if to remind us that he had not forgotten this
leitmotif of his pontificate, in Centesimus Annus, the Pope devotes
once again an entire section to the theme "Man is the way of the
Church.''2
As we would expect from the leader of the Catholic Church,
the Pope bases his anthropology on Jesus Christ. As he puts it in
Veritatis Splendor, "Jesus Christ is the answer to man's questions"
(VS 2.2). Thus J. Michael Miller is right on target when he says
that Christocentrism shines through every encyclical. To sum it
up in a phrase, we could say with Miller, "It is the redemptive
Incarnation of the Man-God, who fully reveals the dignity of the
person: ecce homo!"3
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Pope John Paul II has often reiterated that he considers it his
mission to implement Vatican II. This is no doubt true. What
struck me, however, in reading carefully through the Pope's
twelve encyclicals is that his understanding of the Council is
inspired by a few key texts. At least these are the ones that recur
repeatedly in his writings. I was particularly struck by the
recurrence of a few passages from Gaudium et Spes. Three are
particularly noteworthy. The first is no. 22, where the Council
affirms that Christ, the new Adam, fully reveals man to himself.
The second is no. 24, where the Council affirms that of all
creatures, man is the only one that God willed for himself. In this
number, the Council goes on to affirm that Christ reveals the
authentic vocation of the human person which is fulfilled
"through a sincere gift of self." The third is no. 76, where the
Council states that it is the mission of the Church to safeguard the
transcendence of the human person. The Pope will repeatedly
come back to this point, signaling transcendence as the key to
human dignity. The loss of this perspective led to the atheistic
regimes of the totalitarian states of Eastern Europe as well as to
the moral permissiveness and ethical relativism of so many
countries of the West.
In reading through all the encyclicals in �heir totality, one is
also struck by another fact: the Pope has a number of favorite
scripture texts. The ones that leapt off the page for me were
Genesis 1:26-27 and Genesis 1:28. The index of the collected
encyclicals reveals that Genesis 1:26-27 is cited nine times in the
Pope's letters while Genesis 1:28 is referred to eleven times. This
fact is particularly significant, for it indicates one of the principal
ways in which the Pope thinks of the human person. In the first
instance, he underscores the fact that by the creation the human
being, man and woman, is made in the image of God. But Pope
John Paul II also continually links together the doctrine of
creation and redemption. If by creation the person is made in the
image of God, through the Incarnation he or she is led to a deeper
realization of that image. The person through Christ shares not
only biological life but eternal life. Through the grace of the Holy
Spirit, human persons are introduced to friendship with God. In
this friendship, God's plan for the creation finds its fulfillment.
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The Pope cites Irenaeus to the effect that "the glory of God is
man, the living man." But he also emphasizes that Irenaeus believed
that "the life of man consists in the vision of God" (EV 38.2).
In all the Pope's reflections, we note that the truth about
creation has to be understood in the light of the redemption in
Christ. Ultimately this means that the human being as imago Dei
must be interpreted as imago trinitatis. In his apostolic letter
Mulieris Dignitatem, the Pope reflects on this in a bold and creative
way, arguing that the reciprocal love of man and woman in marriage
with its generative aspect is the best reflection we have of the
Trinity, where the nature of God consists in the love of the divine
persons, specifically the love of the Father and the Son, which has
an infinite fruitfulness in the procession of the Holy Spirit.4
Another aspect of the imago dear to the Pope is grounded in
Genesis 1:28, in the Lord God's command to our first parents to
subdue the earth and have dominion over it. The text inspires
much of the Pope's thinking in Laborem Exercens, where John
Paul offers us his theological vision of work. He breaks new
ground in seeing work not only as drudgery but as an expression
of human creativity, which is a share in God's own proper
vocation to be Creator. The Pope sees in this text God's call to
human beings to be stewards of the creation. Understanding the
human' relation to the creation as domination and exploitation
instead of as stewardship has led to the present ecological crisis,
and once again John Paul appeals to Genesis 1:28 in summoning
men and women to a responsible use of the world's natural
resources (see CA 37).
The Pope's vision of the human is, •therefore, distinctively
ChristologicaL As the Council stated, in the Incarnation Christ
has identified himself in some way with every man (GS 22). Only
by discovering Christ and being conformed to him can men and
women realize their dignity as imago Dei. Let us now look in
more detail at how the Pope spells this out in his encyclicals.
The Spiritual Vision of the Human Person
Pope John Paul II follows the entire Christian tradition in
proposing a spiritual vision of human beings., God has a plan for
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the creature he has willed as his own (Gaudium et Spes 24). This
plan becomes fully revealed in Christ, but the Pope insists that the
plan is already inscribed in human beings by the very fact that
they are creatures. In his first encyclical he wrote, "There is but
a single goal, to which is directed the deepest aspiration of the
human spirit as expressed in the quest for God, for the full dimen
sion of its humanity, or in other words for the full meaning of
human life" (RH 11.2). This phrase echoes Augustine's famous
dictum: "Our hearts are restless and they shall not rest until they
rest in Thee." In other words, human beings are made for God,
and the searching of the human heart will not rest until it finds
God. God is not an extrinsic goal of human life. Finding God and
finding the meaning of human life are one and the same.
Contemporary theologians such as Karl Rahner and Bernard
Lonergan have tried to spell out this same truth in reflecting upon
the meaning of huµian subjectivity as transcendental. In all our
acts of understanding and willing, in our knowledge and in our
freedom, we are seeking to realize ourselves. Yet all these acts are
partial, limited and incomplete. One act leads us to another, and
in each one there is an inchoate presence of the goal of our
striving, the Mystery of God.
Without using Rahner's technical language, Pope John Paul on
various occasions in the encyclicals speaks of being and having as
two dimensions of human being. These terms are analogous to
what theologians such as Rahner and Lonergan call the tran
scendental and categorical aspects of human existence. As subjects
we are. In the depths of our beings, we are longing for union with
the absolute Thou, God as Holy Being. But since we are finite,
our being is always situated in the world. The worldly dimension
of being opens up the dimension of having. We can possess things,
make projects, master the environment. Even our bodies are some
thing we both are and have.
As God's creatures, we are meant to live in the world. It is
wrong to deny the worldly and corporeal dimension of our being.
But if having gains transcendency over being, we lose touch with
ourselves and our deepest roots. Being can be submerged in
having. Western societies, according to the Pope, are particularly
prone to this temptation. When this happens, a spiritual void
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opens up. One can seek to fill up this emptiness with things. The
result is consumerism. John Paul writes, "To 'have' objects and
goods deres not in itse� f perfect �he human, subject, u�le�s i�
.
_ ,
contributes to the maturing and ennchmg of that subJect s bemg,
that is to say unless it contributes to the realization of the human
vocation as such" (SRS 28.4). In another place he notes, "It is not
wron.i to wan.t to \1�e better: wb.at \S wron.i \S a st-y\e ot \ite wb.icb.
is presumed to be better when it is directed to 'having' rather than
'being,' and which wants to have more, not in order to be more
but in order to spend life in enjoyment as an end in itself" (CA 36.4).
1£ consumerism is a false interpretation of the goal of life,
what then in the Pope's mind constitutes the authentic human
vocation? One word to describe it could be life. As Creator, God
shares his life with us. By our creaturehood, we participate in
God's being. It is this participation which makes men and women
the image of God. In Evangelium Vitae, the Pope writes, "God
proclaims that he is absolute Lord of the life of man, who is
formed in his image and likeness (see Gen 1:26-28). Human life is
thus given a sacred and inviolable character, which reflects the
inviolability of the Creator himself" (EV 53.3). Commenting on
this text, James Keenan asks, "Why is life good? Why is it always
a good? The answer is simple and clear: because it is a gift from
the Creator, who breathed into man the divine breath, thus
making the human person the image of God." 5
But of course human biological life does not fulfill the full
meaning of life according to the Scriptures. In the fourth gospel
we read, "I have come that they may have life and have it to the
full" On 10:10). Thus Jesus offers us supernatural life. By the
power of the Holy Spirit, we enter into the very life of God. We
are granted friendship with God. The fullness of life comes
through the covenant of God with humankind. Thus the Pope
writes, "The life which God bestows upon man is much more
than mere existence in time. It is a drive toward fullness of life: it

is the seed of an existence which transcends the very limits of time:

For God created man for incorruption, and made him in the
image of his own eternity (Wis 2:23)" (EV 34.5).
We have seen that an important text for the Pope's thinking
is Gaudium et Spes 24, where the Council affirms that human
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beings realize themselves through a sincere gift of self. Here in the
context of the human vocation, we see that the most radical call
of God to the human person is a call to surrender to the Lord's
offer of the covenant. We are called not only to biological life
within the sphere of a human temporal existence. We are called to
the eternal life of friendship with God. This call is fulfilled when
we surrender ourselves "in a sincere gift of ourselves" to the
Lord's offer of friendship.
In one passage -in Evangelium Vitae, the Pope does not hesitate
to describe the human vocation as a vocation to love. He then
goes on to say that "love as a sincere gift of self" is what gives the
life and the freedom of the person their deepest meaning (EV
96.1). In another passage, this point is clarified further when.John
Paul affirms that love is made possible "by the person's essential
'capacity for transcendence' " (CA 41.3). In other words, because
of human openness to God, an openness which reveals itself as an
unlimited restlessness, the person is made capable of love, love of
God in the first place and then love of neighbor.
In a number of his writings, the Pope deplores the fact that so
much of modern culture consists precisely in a denial of this
transcendence (e.g., CA 13.3; 24.2; EV 22:1-4). Whether in the
explicit atheistic regimes of Marxism or in the undeclared atheism
of-consumerist societies, the reality of God and hence of human
transcendence is denied. There is a pervasive sense of the loss of
God. In this type of culture, the human being easily ceases to be
a subject. He is easily reduced to being a thing. The prevailing
way of relating to reality becomes manipulation, doing, control.
All too easily other persons are also seen as things. The result
becomes, on the one hand, inner confusion, ennui, a sense of
meaningless, and on the other, exploitation of others without
restraint, class struggle, and the survival of the fittest.
The way out of this impasse can only be found by
summoning human beings back to their true spiritual destiny.
Pope John Paul considers it one of the tasks of his pontificate
precisely to articulate this prophetic challenge. He sees it as his
mission to issue a clarion call to rediscover the authentic sense of
human freedom.

mEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY IN JOHN PAUL II

/ 113

The Vocation to Freedom
The meaning offreedom

From his first encyclical, the Pope has been concerned about
the meaning of human freedom. He is inspired by the words of St.
John's gospel: "You will know the truth, and the truth shall set
you free" On 8:32). Commenting on this passage, John Paul
writes, "These words contain both a fundamental requirement and
a warning: the requirement of an honest relationship with regard
to truth as a condition for an authentic freedom, and the warning
to avoid every kind of illusory freedom, every superficial unilateral
freedom, every freedom that fails to enter into the whole truth about
man and the world" (RH 12.3). In a later encyclical, the Pope notes
that "freedom which refused to be bound to the truth would fall into
arbitrariness and end up submitting itself to the vilest of passions, to
the point of self-destruction" (CA 4.5).
The Pope's fundamental perspective, therefore, is a reiteration
of the classical Catholic position that the transcendentals are
intrinsically linked together. The one, the true, the good, and the
beautiful are essentially interconnected, and their ultimate source
of unity is in God. Human beings realize the good through their
moral life. But the good is essentially connected to the truth of
things. One can only do the good by knowing the truth.
In the context of Christian faith, this entails knowing the plan
of God in the creation and redemption. We have already seen
what this means: namely, that all human beings have a vocation
to love, that they can only realize themselves by a sincere gift of
self. This gift of self consists most radically in the surrender to
God in faith, what St. Paul calls the obedience of faith (Rom
16:26). This surrender to God expresses itself concretely in every
day life in the sincere gift of self to one's neighbor. St. Paul once
again has meditated on this Christian understanding most pro
foundly in the fifth chapter of Galatians. Freedom does not mean
serving the needs of the flesh - that is, egoism - but rather the
surrender of self in love. As the Apostle writes, "Be servants of
one another" (Gal 5:13).
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From this it is clear that Pope John Paul rejects the
understanding of autonomy prevalent in much of modern culture.
Human freedom does not consist in creating one's own values, as
existentialists such as Nietzsche and Sartre have proposed. The
Pope warns that modern understandings of democracy often imply
a false understanding of autonomy.In this sense, democracy would
consist in the truth of the majority opinion. For example, if the
majority consider abortion acceptable, this would make it morally
right. This approach to autonomy divorces freedom from its link
with the truth and, as the Pope points out, opens the path to
totalitarianism.
In his moral and social encyclicals, the Pope especially laments
the contemporary skepticism about moral values, the tendency
toward hedonism and the prevailing relativism. These attitudes
lead many men and women to believe that there is no longer any
clear distinction between good and evil, that there are no moral
absolutes. These attitudes must be challenged by recalling human
kind to a vision of freedom rooted in truth.
The abuse offreedom

Christian realism accepts the fact that the history of human
freedom has often been tragic. This sorrowful history has its roots
in the "sin which happened at the beginning" (DV 35.1),
humankind's failure to accept God's offer of love and friendship.
The consequences of this misuse of freedom are revealed today
with a power as perhaps never before. The misuse of freedom has
brought us to the verge of the self-destruction of the human race.
As John Paul began his pontificate, he looked out at the world
about him.He saw humankind as living in profound anxiety, not
only about the meaning of life but also about the possibilities of
the future.The twentieth century has been one of wars on a scale
without precedent, of concentration camps, of totalitarian govern
ments.Although the technological achievements of humankind are
unparalleled, the fact remains that humanity is threatened by the
very things which men and women have produced.The Pope
writes, "Man therefore lives increasingly in fear. He is afraid that
what he produces ...can radically turn against himself: he is
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afraid that it can become the means and instrument for an
unimaginable self-destruction, compared with which all the
cataclysms and catastrophes of history known to us seem to fade
away'' (RH 15.2). Among the other aspects of the modern drama
which the Pope sees is the vast chasm between the rich nations
and the poor ones, between the first world and the third world.
The first world is alienated by consumerism, while the third world
is literally starving. And the divisions between these two worlds
are also fostered by the competing interests of the superpowers. In
later encyclicals, especially in Evangelium Vitae, the Pope will
focus on the culture of death as the glaring revelation of the
misuse of freedom. The culture of death is present not only in
murder and warfare, but also in the devaluation of life in abortion
and euthanasia, and even in capital punishment.
We have spoken of the misuse of freedom. This is another
word for what Christian faith has traditionally called sin, or what
the Pope calls "living in untruthfulness." 6 While the Pope is only
reiterating the classical Christian understanding of sin in the light
of the contemporary situation, he does introduce a new element
when he speaks of structures of sin.
Today, as never before, we are aware that the misuse of
freedom becomes embodied in social structures.Racism is a typical
example. Even if an individual is totally committed to respecting
all men and women as made in the image of God, the culture in
which he lives can be systematically racist. By the very fact that
he lives in this culture, he can be participating in discrimination
against minority races. What I buy in the supermarket may be
literally the fruit of exploitation. Another example would be
trading policies between rich and poor countries. The Pope
specifically mentions the structures of sin found in certain
countries that advocate abortion. He writes, "One cannot over
look the network of complicity which reaches out to include
international institutions, foundations and associations which
systematically campaign for the legalization and spread of abortion
in the world....We are facing what can be called a 'structure of
sin' which opposes human life not yet born" (EV 59.2). He also
calls attention to two other attitudes which are opposed to God's
plan for humanity and which are often structurally embodied in
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modern culture, namely, the all-consuming desire for profit and
the thirst for power (SRS 37.1). While the Pope does not hesitate
to point out these structures of sin, he also wishes to make clear
that they are always "linked to the concrete acts of individuals who
introduce these structures, consolidate them and make them diffi
cult to remove" (SRS 36.2). We cannot therefore hide behind these
structures as a maneuver to escape from individual responsibility.
Each person bears the responsibility for his or her freedom.
The Restoration of Freedom
In a famous meditation in the Spiritual Exercises (136ff.), St.
Ignatius conceives of a vast battle between the army of Satan and
that of Christ. Each leader addresses his forces and proposes to
them the values by which they should live and invites them to
fight under his standard. The idea of the clash between two
superhuman forces occurs in the encyclicals of Pope John Paul.
For example, in Evangelium Vitae he writes, "We are facing an
enormous and dramatic clash between good and evil, death and
life, the 'culture of death' and the 'culture of life.' We find
ourselves not only 'faced with' but necessarily 'in the midst of'
this conflict" (EV 28.1). While this conflict is expressed openly in
society, both for St. Ignatius and the Pope the real locus of the
battle is the heart of the human person. Thus, in Centesimus
Annus, the Pope writes, "The struggle between good and evil
continues even in the human heart" (CA 25.4). Earlier in
Dominum et Vivificantem, the Pope had cited Gaudium et Spes 10
to the effect that "the imbalances under which the modern world
labors are linked with that more basic imbalance rooted in the
heart of man. For in man himself many elements wrestle with one
another" (DV 44.2).
In the Christian vision, however, we never lose hope, because
the Holy Spirit comes to our aid in this struggle. The first work
of the Spirit is to warn us of the danger and to turn our hearts
away from the false sense of autonomy. In a long section of Domi
num et Vivificantem, the Pope meditates on a passage of John 16
where Jesus says that the Holy Spirit "will convince the world
concerning sin and righteousness and judgment" (vv. 7-8). Sin
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consists in the rejection of Jesus, of his way and of his values. The
same John had affirmed earlier in the gospel that Jesus would set
us free. But this can only happen when we first let ourselves be
convicted concerning sin. But as the Pope points out, this
judgment is not for the sake of condemnation but for the sake of
grace, so that we might turn away from sin and toward life (see
DV 27.4).
After accomplishing this preliminary work, the Spirit fulfills
his mission in the proper sense: that is, the Holy Spirit offers us
the new covenant in Christ, opens us up to friendship with God.
When we live within the covenantal relation with God, we live
the life of the freedom of God's children. The Father and the Son
take up their dwelling place within us. The love of God is poured
out into our hearts. In this situation, we achieve our true destiny,
to live in a relationship of filial praise to the Father. The Pope
expresses it in this way:
Against this background of the "image and
likeness" of God, "the gift of the Spirit"
ultimately means a call to friendship, in which the
transcendent "depths of God" become in some
way opened up to participation on the part of
man. The Second Vatican Council teaches, "The
invisible God out of the abundance of his love
speaks to men as friends and lives among them,
so that he may invite and take them into fellow
ship with himself." (Dei Verbum 2) (DV 34)
The second obvious consequence of the gift of the Spirit is
that the love of God overflows from us into love of neighbor. As
St. John stresses in his First Letter, we cannot truly love God if
we do not love our neighbor. Therefore, the sincere gift of self
which we make to the Lord in the obedience of faith becomes in
its turn a sincere gift of self to our neighbor. If, as St. Ignatius
proposed, we see our world as a vast battlefield in which Christ
and Satan clash, it is the work of the Holy Spirit to transform
society, so that our world is no longer ruled by violence and
exploitation, by the universal struggle of classes, but is rather
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governed by the principle of solidarity. It is this principle which
the Pope proposes as the way forward for humankind at the
beginning of the third millennium. As he writes in Sollicitudo Rei
Socia/is, "Solidarity is not a feeling of vague compassion or
shallow distress at the misfortunes of many people, both near and
far. On the contrary, it is a firm and persevering determination to
commit oneself to the common good; that is to say, the good of all
and each individual, because we are all responsible to all" (SRS
38.6). We could say that this is the path along which the Holy
Spirit is leading us. Solidarity, especially with the poor and the
suffering, the marginalized and the victims of injustice, is the
social meaning of our Christian freedom in the Holy Spirit.
The New Adam and the New Eve
We have seen that much of the Pope's anthropology is based
upon the theme of the image of God in Genesis. He also builds
upon the Adam/Christ and the Eve/Mary typology. This is not
so surprising, since this typology is itself related to the theme of
imago Dei. A key passage can be found in Dominum et Vivifi
cantem, where the Pope writes:
It can be said that in this sin the "mysterium
iniquitatis" has its beginning, but it can also be
said that this is the sin concerning which the
redemptive power of the "mysterium pietatis"
becomes particularly clear and efficacious. This is
expressed by St. Paul, when he contrasts the
"disobedience" of the first Adam with the
"obedience" of Christ, the second Adam:
"obedience unto death." (cf. Rom 5:19; Phil 2:8)
(DV 33.1)
Here once again, we find expressed in different words the
fundamental truth of the human vocation, what the Pope calls
obedience. This is the obedience of faith, of which Paul speaks.
But from all we have seen thus far, this is not a servile obedience,
a heteronomous obedience, which thr�atens human freedom. It is
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the obedience of the surrender of self to God in which we find
our deepest selves. This is the mystery of the human.
The same obedience is the key to the identity of Mary, who,
for the Pope, becomes the model of human perfection and the key
to understanding the vocation of woman. In his Apostolic Letter
Mulieris Dignitatem, he wrote, Mary as "the woman" is the archetype
of the whole human race in her "yes" to God's plan for humanity
and for her in particular (see Mulieris Dignitatem 4). In Redemp
toris Mater he refers specifically to the Adam and Eve typology by
citing Lumen Gentium, which in its turn is citing St. Irenaeus:
It goes right back to "the beginning," and as a
sharing in the sacrifice of Christ - the new
Adam - it becomes in a certain sense the counter
poise to the disobedience and disbelief embodied in
the sin of our first parents. Thus teach the
Fathers of the Church and especially St. Irenaeus,
quoted by the Constitution Lumen Gentium:
"The knot of Eve's disobedience was untied by
Mary's obedience; what the virgin Eve bound
through her unbelief, the Virgin Mary loosened by
her faith" (RM 19.1).
What the Pope emphasizes in his encyclical on Mary is her
faith. She is a model of the Church and a model for Christians
because she believed in the promise. In the Pope's words, "In the
expression 'Blessed is she who believed,' we can therefore rightly
find a kind of key which unlocks for us the innermost reality of
Mary, whom the angel hailed as 'full of grace' "(RM 19.2). As
human beings, therefore, we are all summoned to walk the road
which Mary walked, to imitate her "yes" to God's loving design
for the world and for our lives.
In his encyclical on Mary, the Pope only hints at how Mary
is a model for women. He merely notes in passing that Mary of
Nazareth sheds light on womanhood as such, since God entrusted
his Son to her. He simply mentions that the church sees in
women, following in the footsteps of Mary, the loftiest sentiments
of which the human heart is capable: "the self-offering totality of
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love; the strength that is capable of bearing the greatest sorrows;
limitless fidelity and tireless devotion to work; the ability to
combine penetrating intuition with words of support and encour
agement" (RM 46.2).
In the Pope's thinking, motherhood plays a pivotal role in the
feminine vocation. The motherhood of Mary is linked closely to
woman's call to motherhood. Mary was elected from eternity to
be the Mother of Christ. Her motherhood was fulfilled in a new
spiritual way when Christ gave her to the beloved disciple as a
sign of her new spiritual motherhood, as mother of the Church
and all believers. And woman, not man, is called to carry new life
in her womb. It is this vocation which seems to ground many of
woman's greatest virtues as seen by the Pope: a unique ability to love
and be faithful, an instinctive sense of the value of life, an intuitive
openness to relationship which respects the value of the other.
It may be objected that the Pope does not appropriate the
insights of feminism, and some might feel that his picture of women
is a bit stereotyped. But he is certainly a prophetic voice calling on
contemporary cultures to "acknowledge and affirm the true genius of
women in every aspect of the life of society, and overcome all
discrimination, violence and exploitation" (EV99.1). These words are
succinct, but their implications are enormous.
Pope John Paul's fundamental teaching about women is that they
are not objects but persons. He excoriates the idea of male domina
tion of women, especially as sex objects. As women are called to
fulfill themselves in marriage and motherhood, they are called to
form a "communio personarum." One of the great contributions
of John Paul's magisterium is to remind us all of woman's funda
mental dignity as person. Men and women are diverse in their
sexual identity, but they are one at a deeper level: in their call to
that sincere gift of self, which in marriage and parenthood becomes
the most perfect image in this world of the life of the Trinity, the
perfect communion of persons in faithful love and fruitfulness.
The Value of Work
We have been arguing that John Paul II's theology is anthro
pological. Nowhere is this more true than in the sphere of work.
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In the nineteenth century, human beings, including women and
children, were often exploited by the emerging capitalistic system.
In the twentieth century, workers continue to be exploited, but
workers also lose their human dignity because of unemployment.
In this historical context the Pope reminds us that "in the final
analysis it is always man who is the purpose of work" (LE 6.6).
On a philosophical plane, the Pope recognizes that work is
always an objectivization of the human subject. This objectivi
zation has value insofar as it is the expression of the human
subject. Work has value because it is the work of men and women.
In the Pope's words:

The basis for determining the value of human
work is not primarily the kind of work being
done but the fact that the one who is doing it is
a person. The sources of the dignity of work are
to be sought primarily in the subjective dimen
sion, not in the objective one. (LE 6.5)
On the theological level, there are two bases for the meaning
of work. We have already seen that the Pope emphasizes the vocation
of men and women as imago Dei, building on Genesis 1:26-27. He
spells this out even more in appealing to Genesis 1:28, to the Lord's
command to have dominion over the earth. Human beings fulfill this
command precisely through work. In this way, they realize their
being as images of God; that is, they share in the creative power of
God. Here the Pope is launching a fairly new line of development in
Christian thinking about work. Genesis sees work as part of the curse
laid upon humankind by sin (Gen 3:17-19). The Pope does not deny
this. In fact, he appeals to the paschal mystery to redeem the negative
aspect of work. In work, which is often back-breaking and even
death-dealing, we can share in the cross of Christ. But the Pope does
not stop here. Work is not just negative. It is also a way in which we
share in God's Being as Creator.
But work also has another Christological dimension. Jesus
himself redeemed the value of work by spending most of his life
as a carpenter. All of us human beings have to work in one way
or another. In doing so, we can unite our work to that done by
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Jesus Himself. As part of the plan of the Incarnation, Jesus did not
shy away from work but gave it a redemptive value by fully
participating in it. This is another way in which we can verify the
truth affirmed by Gaudium et Spes 22: "By His Incarnation the
Son of God has united Himself in some fashion with every man."
The Human Person and Society
Pope John Paul II will probably be remembered especially for
his social teaching, and he has devoted a number of encyclicals
specifically to this dimension of the human. It would be beyond
the scope of this essay to give a developed account of the Pope's
magisterium in this area, but we can highlight a few points, especially
where the Pope develops new insights into the Church's teaching.
Much of the Pope's thinking is both a commentary on and an
aggiomamento of Leo XIII's Rerum Novarum. At the end of the
nineteenth century, the Church set its face against socialism and
was a vigorous defender of private property. While defending the
right of private property, John Paul II notes that this is not an
absolute right of human beings. This right must be exercised
within the context of the common good (LE 14.2; CA 6.3, 30.3).
The Pope's teaching continues to reject "real socialism" as it
was practiced in the Eastern bloc. One of the reasons for this is
that this system was built on atheism and left a spiritual vacuum.
Such a system could never promote the genuine good of human
beings. But the Pope also rejects it on humanistic grounds. This
system does not give absolute priority to the person. It is a collect
ivist system in which the person becomes a cog in a machine.
Although the Pope does reject socialism, it is too facile to
think that he is advocating capitalism as such. He sees some
significant flaws in capitalism as it is practiced at present
throughout the world. For example, the richer nations have more
purchasing power and can satisfy their needs at the expense of
poorer ones. Moreover, even in rich countries, there are poor
persons who are not able to develop the skills or the education
needed for self-sufficiency. In these countries, government has a strict
obligation to help those who would otherwise perish. Thus, although
the Pope in general favors a free market economy, he notes that:
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there are many human needs which find no place
on the market. It is a strict duty of justice and
truth not to allow fundamental human needs to
remain unsatisfied, and not to allow those bur
dened by such needs to perish. It is also necessary
to help those needy people to acquire expertise,
to enter the circle of exchange, and to develop
their skills in order to make the best use of their
capacities and resources. Even prior to the logic
of a fair exchange of goods and the forms of
justice appropriate to it, there exists something
which is due to man because he is man, by reason
of his lofty dignity. (CA 34.1)
It is interesting that John Paul specifically teaches that it is not
the Church's responsibility to favor one economic system or
another, nor to provide concrete solutions for social problems. It
is the Church's mission to offer a vision of the human person and
to allow Christians to judge social systems in the light of this
vision. In his words:
The Church does not propose economic and
political systems or programs, nor does she show
preference for one or the other, provided that
human dignity is preserved and promoted, and
provided she herself is allowed the room she needs
to exercise her ministry in the world. (SRS 41.1)
In her social teaching, the Church does not offer the technical
expertise of the empirical sciences but the prophetic voice of a
community of faith.
The Call to Justice and Mercy
For me, the most beautiful of the Pope's encyclicals is Dives
in Misericordia, which contains a profound reflection on God's
mercy and a moving meditation upon the parable of the Prodigal
Son. After our analysis of the Pope's social teaching, it would be
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useful to say a word about justice and mercy, since this theme is
important for the Church's social magisterium. Obviously. a
fundamental part of that doctrine is the necessity of justice. There
can be no authentic liberation of persons without justice. But the
Pope warns us that justice alone is not enough. Justice must be
supplemented by mercy, for if we stop at justice, we could find
ourselves in a situation of bitterness where the oppressed loses his
dignity by failing to forgive and where the oppressor loses his dig
nity by failing to be converted.
John Paul observes that very often programs which start from
the idea of justice in practice suffer from distortions. Although
they appeal to justice, it often happens that other forces gain the
upper hand over justice. The fundamental motive for justice can
turn out to be spite, hatred and even cruelty. He writes:
The experience of the past and of our own time
demonstrates that justice alone is not enough, that
it can even lead to the negation and destruction
of itself, if that deeper power, which is love, is not
allowed to shape human life in its various dimen
sions. (DM 12.3)
In another significant passage, John Paul notes that the man
or woman who receives mercy is in no way denigrated. For it is
equally true that the person who shows mercy i_s a beneficiary.
The gift that he receives is the redeemed humanity of his brother
or sister. The father of the Prodigal Son receives as well as gives.
His son is restored to him in his full human dignity. As the Pope
notes, what binds the bestower of mercy and the recipient of it is
the human dignity of the two persons (see DM 6.4). In his words,

He who forgives and he who is forgiven encounter
one another at an essential point, namely the
dignity or essential value of the person, a point
which cannot be lost and the affirmation of
which, or its rediscovery, is a source of the
greatest joy. (DM 14.11)
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In light of these reflections, one can only applaud the Pope's
summons to the contemporary Church to be a herald of God's
mercy, to put it into practice herself, and to summon all of our
brothers and sisters not only to do the works of justice but to let
justice come to its full fruition in healing mercy.
Conclusion
We noted that from the beginning of his pontificate, John
Paul II affirmed that "man is the way for the Church" (RH 14.3).
Even a hasty reading of the twelve encyclicals of his ministry
would reveal that he has been faithful to his original inspiration.
The Pope's vision of the human vocation is consonant with the
great Christian tradition, and it is built upon the theme of imago
Dei as found in Genesis and in Jesus as the new Adam as dev�l
oped in the Pauline corpus. What is perhaps unique to the Pope
is his meditative style, often in the form of a lectio divina, as seen,
for example, in his reading of the story of the Prodigal Son in
Dives in Misericordia, his meditation upon the rich young man in
Veritatis Splendor, his reflection upon Mary as the model of faith
in Redemptoris Mater, his interpretation of the role of the Holy
Spirit in the light of John 16 in Dominum et Vivificantem. All in
all, the anthropology of the present Pope is classical rather than
innovative. At the same time he certainly strikes a prophetic note
in many of his encyclicals: in his analysis of the world situation
after 1989, in his uncompromising affirmation of the value of life
in Evangelium Vitae, in his defense of moral absolutes in Veritatis
Splendor, not to mention his renewed call to ecumenism and the
missionary spirit to evangelize the gentiles and re-evangelize
Christian Europe. In the best sense, we could say that the Pope
fulfills the qualities of the wise steward in Matthew's gospel who
brings forth from his storeroom things old and new (Mt 13:52).
Notes
1. I will use the following code for the encyclicals cited in this essay.
Redemptor Hominis (RH); Dives in Misericordia (DM); Laborem Exercens
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(LE); Dominum et Vivificantem (DV); Redemptoris Mater (RM); Solicitudo
Rei Socia/is (SRS); Centesimus Annus (CA); Veritatis Splendor (VS);
Evangelium Vitae (EV).
2. The official translations of papal documents use the words "man"
and "mankind." When citing these texts, I will retain this language.
Otherwise I will seek to use inclusive language.
3. The Encyclicals ofJohn Paul II, ed. with introductions by J. Michael
Miller, C.S.B. (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 1996), 24.
4. See Mulieris Dignitatem, no. 7.
5. See James Keenan, "The Moral Argumentation of Evangelium
Vitae," in In Choosing Life: A Dialogue on Evangelium Vitae, ed. Kevin
Wildes (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1997), 54.
6. In Dominum et Vivificantem, John Paul writes succinctly but
poignantly, "The sin of the human beginning consists in untruthfulness
and in the rejection of the gift and the love which determine the
beginning of the world and of man" (DV 35.2).

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Witness of Engelbert Krebs
THOMAS F. O'MEARA

I

n the expanding and deepening world of American Catholic
thought over the past three decades, Gerald McCool, S.J., has
played an important role. His studies on the history of Roman
Catholic theology before Vatican II offered to English-speaking
Catholics an understanding of the history of philosophy and philo
sophical theology in the past century and a half. Prior to 1970,
although clergy and teachers had lived in the neo-scholasticism
reaching from 1840 to 1960, few Americans understood h9w that
recent all-dominant philosophy had come into existence, and fewer
still understood the diversity of neo-Thomisms and their conver
sation with modern thought. To a large extent, American Catholic
theologians and historians were unaware that neo-Thomism,
neither perennial nor eternal, had been preceded in the nineteenth
century by a Catholic engagement with German and French
modern philosophies, or that the theologians of Vatican II had not
sprung up within a castle surrounded by a cultural void but were
continuing lines of Catholic philosophies and theologies from
earlier, more creative times prior to 1860. These themes - the
plurality of neo-Thomism, its origins and course, its relationship
to modern philosophers and to contemporary Catholic theologians
- Gerald McCool helped bring to light.
In homage to his work treating the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, this essay describes a Catholic theologian who is little
known outside of Germany but whose life and writings recommend
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some acquaintance with him. Engelbert Krebs, professor at
Freiburg in Breisgau, student of Thomas Aquinas and Hervaeus
Natalis, theologian in the line of Franz Anton Staudenmaier,
counselor to Martin Heidegger and Romano Guardini, was a
historian of Catholic Christianity and a theologian open to
modern trends. He was devoted to medieval philosophical
traditions but was also intent on addressing his own age and the
opportunities it offered to the mission of church and Gospel. His
career reached from the beginning of the twentieth century to
World War II. He examined medieval scholarship, phenome
nology, and philosophies of values; he pondered the end of
monarchy and the role of women in church and academy; and
while explaining the glory of the arts, he rejected the degradation
of German Jews.

Life and Works
Engelbert Krebs lived from 1881 to 1950, and most of his life
was spent in Freiburg in Breisgau, where the lakes and woods of
the upper Black Forest slope down to the Rhine. Along with
Martin Heidegger and Bernhard Welte, he was a product of the
culture and region between the lower Rhine and the higher
begin_nings of the Danube. He was ordained a priest in 1906 and
became in 1919, at the end of World War I, professor of dogmatic
theology in Freiburg. In 1936 he was removed from his teaching
position by the Nazi government, but in 1945 French occupa
tionary forces offered him his professorship again which, however,
he held for reasons of health for only a year. The brief article in
the second edition of the Lexikon fur Theologie und Kirch'e con
cludes: "Influential in various ways and with a certain powerful
effect on educated groups, Krebs particularly emphasized the life
values of dogma." 1
Engelbert, son of a banker, was born in 1881 into a family of
nine brothers and sisters. Upon completion of his qualifying
examinations at the Gymnasium, the Abitur, he entered the
Freiburg University at the beginning of the winter semester
1900/1901 and chose at once to study theology. A year later, he
spent a semester in Munich, where he found the lectures of Georg
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Freiherr von Hertling (1843-1919) encouraging and stimulating.
Hertling, son of •the Palatinate upper classes, had studied under
neo-Aristotelian mentors like F.J. Clemens and Adolf Trendelen
burg. He was saddened by the alienation of his relative, Franz
Brentano, a priest-professor in Wiirzburg with the philosophical
sympathies of late idealism who left the priesthood, moved to
Vienna, and taught both Husserl and Freud; but he was more
disturbed by divisions within German theological faculties and by
Prussian measures against the Catholic Church. He founded the
Gorresgesellschaft, named after the creative philosophical theologian
and polymath of the earlier Munich of Ludwig I and Schelling,
Joseph Gorres.2 Often elected to parliaments, he was a force in the
Center Party's struggles to provide a legal framework for
Wilhelmian Germany. Increasingly active in politics after 1880, he
tackled issues like workers' rights and the conditions of mothers.
In 1909 he was the leader of the Center Party, and by 1912 he was
Bavarian minister-president: five years later, he served briefly as
Reichskanzler. He wrote responses to the theological writings of
D.F. Strauss and Albrecht Ritschl and published legal-philosophical
studies on John l:;ocke and natural law theory.
Hertling advocated limiting the power of the state and
enhancing the rights of persons. Das Princip des Katholicismus und
die Wissenschaft, his important and widely sold work on Catholi
cism and modern culture, appeared in 1899. It begins by stating
that religion is not about myth and the Catholic faith is not about
the unreal:
In Catholicism religion . . . has an objective,
doctrinal content: a system of truths responds to
the ultimate and highest questions about the
origin and destiny of our poor earthly existence.
Catholicism presupposes a faith in the facts of
revelation and clearly grounds the credibility of
the individual truths so that they form this
revelation. 3
Advocacy for the cause of the church joined to a career at high
levels of university and government perhaps served as a model to
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In this view, the themes and forms of the Bible should be
explained genetically and causally - that is, in terms of the
borrowing of forms from other religions. Thus, history inevitably
brought syncretism. Krebs particularly 'Studied Richard Reitzen
stein (1861-1931) and his interpretation of Greek-Egyptian and
early Christian literatures. His work on hermetic literature
(sometimes called, after its first text, Poimandres) interpreted, even
derived Johannine theology in terms of an Egyp tian-Hellenistic
community whose religion combined magic, astronomy, and
gnosticism.8
"I went in August back to Rome," Krebs wrote, "and by the
end of the year was deep in research on the history of religion.
From this came a study, Der Logos als Reiland im 1. Jahrhundert
with an appendix on Poimandres and John which led to my pro
motion on February 22, 1910."9 That dissertation appeared in
1910. Krebs recognized some community of ideas at the end of the
first century, shared language and themes between Christianity
and the surrounding religious world:
But we have also emphasized - and this is easily
forgotten by the non-theological movement of the
history of religions - that despite an extensive
sharing of images, discourse, and customs, Christi
anity assumed in the pagan world a position
which is isolated, attacked, and often mocked. . ..
What sets Christianity apart from the religions
around it? That lies in a mature concept of God
far above that of other religions and in its spiritual
and moral teaching concerning redemption."10
Although he had already earned two doctorates, Krebs, if he
wanted to be a candidate for a position at a German university,
was still required to write a third dissertation, a Habilitation. He
received the suggestion from the pioneering scholar of medieval
studies at Munich, Martin Grabmann (1875-1949): he should look
at Hervaeus Natalis (c. 1250-1323), the Dominican defender of
Aquinas.11 Material already gathered in Rome enabled him to
complete quickly Theologie und Wissenschaft nach der Lehre der
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Hochscholastik an Hand der ungedruckten Defensa doctrinae divi
Thomae des Hervaeus Natalis, O.P." 12

His life of being a university professor extended out into the
pastoral life of a parish priest; his writings were often concerned
with the ministry of the priest and with the structure and mission
of the local and universal church, but in both fields Krebs now
faced the hurdle of the oath against modernism set up by Pius X.
While some German Catholic scholars, those in important
positions, received a local dispensation, the young Krebs did not
receive any release. Through the intercession of Professor
Cornelius Krieg, the pioneer of pastoral theology in the twentieth
century in Germany, the chancery did give him a dispensation,
but only a temporary one. 13 A few years later, when Krebs
routinely asked that his faculties for hearing confessions in the
cathedral and other churches be renewed, he was told that he must
take the oath, which he did at the end of 1912. He commented: "I
regard the oath against Modernism as an undeserved vote of no
confidence by Pius X, something which simply represents a formal
tightening-up of the existing constraints imposed by dogma." 14
Later his taking the oath would be used against him by professors
and deans. So Krebs was entangled in the politique of the oath: on
his own from the first, he had refused on his own to take the oath
in academic circumstances, but then he had been refused an
academic dispensation by the church; he had taken the oath for
pastoral reasons, and that incidental act was used to hold him back
from an academic position.
Krebs' early publications give an indication of how his
intellectual and religious interests went beyond patristic and
medieval research. He wrote on the contemporary problem of
religious indifferentism, the Christian evaluation of the ethics of
Kant and Nietzsche, and the iconography behind the sculpture of
the Freiburg cathedral. A dogmatic theologian drawing on history,
he wrote on dogma but also on church and culture, on sculpture
and poetry, and on mysticism and charity.
When Cornelius Krieg died, Krebs did not accept the offered
chair of pastoral theology but continued in the field of medieval
thought. His first courses on Aquinas and Bonaventure were given
as a Privatdozent in 1911. He lectured in philosophy, however,
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from 1913 to 1916 as only an adjunct faculty member. His contri
bution to educating seminarians and others was welcome, but the
philosophy faculty was reluctant to hire a priest for the permanent
positions that fell vacant.
The year 1914 brought the beginning of war and the death of
the Pope! Krebs praised Pius' efforts to expand Eucharistic
communion, to combat modernism, and to reform the curia and
canon law, but those positive directions had come from an isolated
and authoritarian personality. His rigid pontificate with its
excessive oath and embarrassing encyclical had injured the
Catholic Church in Germany, while Rome was consistently
appointing unqualified men to important positions in the church.15
Reactionary attacks on the Reich's politics, along with imprecise
views on the phantom of modernism, weakened the position of
Catholic Germany. As the First World War began, German
Catholics were embattled by both Vatican and Reich, for the
government suspected their allegiance, and the papacy severely
curtailed theological and intellectual efforts. 16 Krebs wrote:
The Pope is dead. . . . This would have been an
impressive shock in other times, but today it is
one impression among others equally important
or more important. We in Germany have had to
suffer a great deal because of this pope. In various
groups people had longed for his death, for he
had an often unhappy style in the execution of
his good intentions. 17
During the First World War, Krebs was active in political
movements: in ameliorating the conditions of the camps of
prisoners of war and in Catholic movements for social assistance
to· Germans injured by the war. He was a supporter of the war,
seeing in it a union of Christianity and legitimate German claims.
During the difficult years of the war, still without a permanent
professorship, he lectured on areas of dogmatic theology. But
apparently by 1920, Krebs' politics had changed, for he worked
with those urging the abdication of the Grand Duke of Baden, and
he came to interpret war and politics not in political and
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nationalist terms but in theological and ecclesial ones.
Subjectivism, moral relativism, secular movements - they were
the source of Europe's violent disintegration. Only the Catholic
Church stood against them.
Krebs had a new program, and it was a theological one. In Die
Kirche und das neue Europa, he presented a brief theological
compendium for the 1920s. The six chapters began with an
analysis of the political, social, and economic problems of the time
and then moved to the powerful Christian themes which had
empowered society in the Roman empire, in the Middle Ages, and
in recent centuries. Without being rigid or condescending, Krebs
placed church office and dogma as central to religious renewal,
forces which had already shown their importance in history. The
new community, the third united Europe, is only possible'through
the ordering of it, away from excessive subjectivism, to the
objective potentialities of the reign of God found in the realities
of church and sacrament. 18 The sacraments, the liturgy, mysticism,
and love were the mediations of grace in human life, and this real,
causal, but ministerial and human working of grace was essential
to the Catholic vision.
Krebs was an open, welcoming personality: he did not fear
contemporary intellectual currents, and he helped a variety of
people. Romano Guardini was a student in Freiburg from 1912 to
1915 - a beautiful age of science, he called it - but his plans for
a doctoral dissertation had run into obstacles. Carl Braig's
meticulous and agonizing suggestions were of no help. Guardini
recalled in 1944:
A friend suggested I go to Privatzdozent Engelbert
Krebs, who was viewed as prudent and always
ready to help; he was praised as someone
possessing a grand spiritual and intellectual
openness. I went and never regretted it. He
directed me to St. Bonaventure, whose critical
edition from Quaracchi was appearing, and
offered the initial suggestion for a systematic
study, one moreover treating the Franciscan's
teaching on redemption. 19
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Krebs was Guardini's Doktorvater, and a theme from Bonaventure
was also chosen for the later Habilitation in Bonn.20
Although the Kulturkampf had faded away, the laws touching
the Jesuits from July 4, 1872 remained on the books. In 1917 the
government agreed to remove those proscriptions, and Krebs
greeted the end of an injustice lasting forty-five years: "I salute this
flock tested by storm which now confronts struggles over world
views appearing in Germany after this war; for their missions after
1850 did so much to save the church in Germany."21 More than
a decade later, Krebs wrote a monograph on the possible lines of
influence from the German medieval mystics to Ignatius Loyola.
He used this survey of scholarship as an occasion to contrast
obedience to God with obedience to civil power, to distinguish
Christian life within a society and in search of religious, scientific,
and humanist truth from "the new Reich," "the Hitler-State."22
In the early years of teaching philosophy and medieval
thought, Krebs came to know Martin Heidegger, who was
studying theology, natural science, and philosophy at the
University and publishing essays and book reviews on logic, neo
Kantianism, and Husserlian phenomenology. Krebs gave him
advice and encouragement for both doctorate and Habilitation.23
In 1913 Heidegger paid Krebs a visit, and Hugo Ott describes it:
"The meeting with Krebs proved immensely important and
fruitful for Heidegger, even though there is no mention of it in
Heidegger's autobiographical notes - or perhaps precisely for that
reason."24 Krebs mentioned Heidegger in his diary: "An acute
mind, modest but assured in his demeanor,"25 and shortly there
after he wrote: "Ten days ago I was hired to teach philosophy.
Under Heidegger's influence I have been studying Husserl as well
as Heidegger's little study and Geyser's Grundlagen. I talk to
Heidegger often. He helps me much more than he perhaps
knows." 26
Krebs foresaw that Heidegger might be hired for his own
temporary position in philosophy, even if the latter's course,
"Basic Questions of Logic," although popular with the students
in general, was not particularly helpful or intelligible to the
seminarians. Krebs advised Heidegger on his choice of a topic for
his Habilitation, not something in the philosophical analysis of
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mathematics but a theme in scholasticism so. that he might qualify
for the chair in philosophy set up for the education of seminar
ians. Heidegger disliked the new instructions coming from Rome
on the tightening of philosophical teaching in seminaries, and he
wrote to Krebs: "Perhaps you, as an 'academic' could propose a
better procedure, whereby anyone who feels like having an inde
pendent thought would have his brain taken out and replaced with
Italian salad."27
In Freiburg Krebs could learn at first hand of contemporary
philosophy, of its themes of value and life, through Heinrich
Rickert (1863-1936), who had directed Heidegger's Habilitations•
schrift, but for which work Krebs wrote the main evaluation
because Rickert knew little of medieval history and philosophy namely, the philosophy and logic of Duns Scotus.28 Soon it was
clear that Krebs and Heidegger were indirectly competing for
simjlar positions: Krebs was already teachiO:g in philosophy, but
his priesthood, as we saw, raised problems for a permanent
position in philosophy. In 1916, Edmund Husserl, then at
Gottingen, was appointed to succeed Rickert as the representative
of idealist directions. Also Krebs seemed likely to receive a
position in theology, and so friends counseled Heidegger to be
careful about what he said of neo-scholasticism so that he might
receive the position in philosophy which taught the seminarians.29
But Heidegger was passed over in favor of a more well-known
figure.
Krebs at this time knew Edith Stein, who had followed
Husserl from Gottingen to Freiburg in 1916. From 1916, the year
in which she attained her doctorate summa cum laude, to 1918, she
prepared his manuscripts for publication. She returned to her
family home in Breslau toward the end of 1918. In 1922, after a
night of reading the autobiography of Teresa of Avila, her
interests in religion and Catholicism led to conversion. Unable to
pursue a Habilitation because she was a woman (Husserl viewed
her as a brilliant assistant but could not imagine a woman as a
professor), she taught at the Dominican sisters' school in Speyer
from 1923 to 1931 and entered Carmel in 1933.30 Returning to
Freiburg, she visited Krebs in April 1930, as her last year in
Speyer began; most likely she wanted to discuss her problems with
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moving further into academic life, for Husserl had now stated a
new, more positive position for, a Habilitation.31
Krebs' diary entry at that time is perhaps contrasting her to
the meteoric Heidegger: "Edith Stein had earlier a considerable
reputation but she became modest and humble and, as a Catholic,
rather submerged herself in quiet work in the Dominicans' school
in Speyer." 32 They discussed her translation of Thomas Aquinas'
De Veritate. As World War I had drawn to a close, Krebs became
involved in pastoral ministry, which included ministry to the
increasing number of women studying at the University. We do
not know the details of their conversation. How positive was he
towards her academic plans, and how frank was she about her
attraction to Benedictine or Carmelite life? Still, he had just
published in 1929 an essay on the "important questions of the
Catholic woman academician." "At German universities," he wrote,
the woman who is a Catholic lives in a double
alienation: first as woman since the university was
founded by men, exists for men, and is conducted
in a male spirit; as a Catholic because the
majority of academic teachers have a different
spirit and so their lectures and seminars exclude
the Catholic, that is, universal viewpoint. As a
woman and as a Catholic those students have
serious reasons not to be caught up in the stream
of life all alone but to guard and to let mature with others who think like them and have the
same goal - their womanhood and Christianity.33
Naturally he could not foresee the variety and authenticity of
ministries open to men and women appearing rapidly after Vati
can II, but he wrote and spoke of new roles for women which
would be similar to, but not the same as, the widows and
deaconess of the early church.34
To return to Heidegger, in his relationship with the younger
philosopher (by seven years), one can see three periods: first, when
they were young academics; second, when they were in compe
tition for positions in the philosophy faculty and slightly later
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when Heidegger set aside any allegiance to Catholicism; third,
during Heidegger's rectorship and sympathetic stance toward
Nazism. All this Hugo Ott has chronicled in detail.35 Heidegger
taught in 1915 and 1916, but, when Krebs began to teach in
theology, he was not given that permanent chair in philosophy.
On March 21, 1917, Krebs presided at the marriage of Heidegger
and Thea Elfride Petri, a Protestant student at the university.
Elfride thought of conversion, but Krebs advised against it, telling
her to wait for a while before taking such a serious step.36 After
the marriage, contacts between Heidegger and Krebs became less
frequent. The couple had their own life; Heidegger, beginning to
study Luther and Schleiermacher, was entering more closely into
the circle around Husserl. It was to Krebs that in January 1919,
Heidegger wrote dramatically of his new relationship to the
Catholic Church:
Epistemological insights applied to the theory of
historical knowledge have made the system of
Catholicism problematic and unacceptable for me
- but not Christianity per se or metaphysics, the
latter albeit in a new sense ...I have not allowed
myself to sacrifice objectivity of judgment, or the
high regard in which I hold the Catholic tradi
tion, to the peevish and intemperate diatribes of
an apostate. That being so, I shall continue to
seek out the company of Catholic scholars who
are aware of problems and capable of empathizing
with different points of view.... It means a very
great deal to me - and I want to thank you most
warmly for this - that I do not have to forsake
the precious gift of your friendship.37
As Heidegger taught his own courses, and not ones for
seminarians and young students, his new directions must have
startled Krebs. For instance, in 1921, lectures on "Augustine and
Nee-Platonism" treated theories on history by liberal Protestant
theologians like Troeltsch, Harnack, and Dilthey.38 "This evening
after dinner, my colleague Heidegger came ... he is going to
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Marburg as Ordinarius.We spoke about philosophers and books,
and theological studies ...I think this evening joined us together
even more."39 But the friendship faded away. "It was as much as
they could do to get together for a drink on the eve of Heidegger's
departure for Marburg in 1923, where he had at last succeeded in
obtaining a professorship. . . . Krebs followed Heidegger's
subsequent meteoric rise with a keen eye and a sorrowful heart,
but the only further contact he had with him was in a purely
official capacity." 40 When Heidegger returned to Freiburg as the
successor of Husserl, celebrated as a result of the publication of
Sein und Zeit in 1927,Krebs was disappointed at his institutional
and intellectual exit from Catholicism,and relations cooled.They
met when Heidegger was rector because Krebs, as dean of the
faculty of theology, took part in the deliberations that led to
Heidegger being chosen rector.
At the meeting of the administrative council when Heidegger
was elected rector in April 1933, Krebs made a statement of
sympathy for dismissed Jewish colleagues, but the University
found silence a better course.41 On June 2, 1933, pro-rector Josef
Sauer noted in his diary that he had learned from the rector's
office that a complaint had been lodged against Krebs as well as
against an economist and a moral theologian, Franz Keller, a
pacifist.42 Sauer had been professor of art history and Christian
archaeology and the editor of the Catholic literary journal,
Literarische Rundschau fur das Katholische Deutsch/and, in which
the promising philosopher published his first book reviews.Sauer
encouraged the talented young man for over a decade. In the
winter semester of 1910/1911, Heidegger had attended Sauer's
course on "The History of Medieval Mysticism," and for some
years Heidegger planned a book on Meister Eckhart.The Habili
tation of 1916 contained references and allusions to Eckhart, and
originally his course touching on the phenomenology of religion
was to look at the Dominican mystic as well as at Bonaventure
and Teresa of Avila rather than First Thessalonians and
Augustine.43 As pro-rector prior to Heidegger's election in April
1933, he furthered Heidegger's candidacy, not aware of the cadre
of Nazi sympathizers behind the selection and hoping that
Heidegger would be an independent force.44 Even before the
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delivery of the inaugural address with its espousal of the
Fuhrerprinzip, Heidegger had shocked his colleagues, and Sauer,
the acting rector, wrote in his diary: "Heidegger was acting as
though he wanted to run the whole show himself, on the principle
of the Fuhrer system. He obviously saw himself as the natural
philosopher and intellectual leader of the new movement - and
as the only truly great thinker since Heraclitus."45 Within a year,
it• was clear to Sauer, Krebs, and others that Heidegger's rectorate
was to be part of a Nazi quasi-coup and a deception. Sauer wrote:
This was Heidegger's doing. Finis universitatum.
. . . And we're in this mess because of that fool
Heidegger, whom we elected to the rectorship in
order to bring about a new intellectual flourishing
of the universities. What an irony! For the
moment we can do nothing except hope that the
other German universities, particularly in Prussia,
will not take this step into the abyss.46
Heidegger had proved himself to all sides as unsuited to the
administrative work of the rectorate: he was clearly an advocate
of the Nazi Reich and yet had not managed to work with or be
independent from its administrative levels.
The Jews and Christianity
Early on, Krebs was a Catholic activist in the ecumenical
movement with Protestants. He urged Catholic participation in
the international ecumenical assemblies beginning to take place,
although by 1940 he had insightfully come to- the conclusion that
corporate unions (including the dream of corporate return to the
Catholic Church) were not to be the gift and future of ecu
menism.47 His engagement on behalf of Judaism and Jews is
significant. In an article in the secular press in 1922, he noticed
that the increased number of Jews at universities since World War
I had led to manifestations at times of a vulgar anti-Semitism.
Catholic students, he wrote, must not be drawn into this. Love is
the characteristic of a follower of Christ, and love never permits
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despising others or viewing any. human being as someone of lesser
value. Catholics should display the riches of the church by
effective love and intellectual work. "If the percent of Jews in
academia is greater than in the general population, that is just a
serious warning for us Catholics to accomplish the same thing. "48
Anti-Semitism fostered by a "Deutsch-volkisch" ideology, he said,
contains nothing that is truly German or truly Catholic.
In 1929 he published a book on the early church and Judaism.
By this time, anti-Semitism was an open political atmosphere.
Krebs began by rejecting the view of Adolf von Harnack that
Christianity must separate itself fully from Judaism, and
repudiating the false anthropology of Joseph Gobineau, intended
"to isolate the races in nationalistic and racial mis-education."49
Krebs at once confessed that the praxis of the church and the
behavior of popes and bishops toward the Jews left much to be
desired. All forms of anti-Semitism must be rejected: first, because
Judaism is the Mutterboden of the church, and the Jewish inher
itance in the Catholic Church is still alive; second, because the
idea of a fulfillment of the Messianic hopes implies no possibility
of separation or rejection; and finally, because what is Jewish
perdures in the teaching and usages of the church. Christianity can
only present itself as the gift of Judaism and as living from its
heritage.
The teachings of Jesus find their central expression in his
views on the kingdom of God and in the sermon on the mount,
but these themes, as well as Jesus' prayer, cannot be understood
apart from the books of the Hebrew Scriptures and the more
recent writings of Enoch, Daniel, and the Psalms of Solomon.
Jesus was a Jew and a Jew of his own times. Krebs pointed out
that Christianity did not begin with radical separation, nor is it
accurate to find in Acts ofApostles only Jews rejecting the Gospel
or behaving in a hostile way. In fact, most do not. Judaism and
Christianity went their own way over the broadening of the
mission to the gentiles, but Paul was a critic of sparks of anti
Semitism in the Roman church.
Naturally Krebs sees Christ as the fulfillment of messianic
hopes and the entry of the corporate reality of Jews into the
church, but his only proselytism is a positive perspective joined to
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prayer. Interestingly, he stressed the role of the liturgy: he
compared the Catholic liturgy with the Jewish morning prayer of
Sabbath to argue for structural and minor similarities. "It is wrong
to want to derive the prayer of thanksgiving [the preface and
Eucharistic prayer] from only Hellenistic paganism." 5° Far from
accepting popular slogans of excluding Jews, the Catholic Church
lives always in the expression of gratitude for all that it has
received from the Jewish people and in the prayer for that people
which is the people of the Messiah.
Interestingly, Krebs found Protestant liberal biblical criticism
of the Hebrew Scriptures to have served as a preparation for the
current anti-Jewish ethos. No part of the Hebrew canon, like
liturgical prayer and messianic hope, can be rejected by Catholics.
Perhaps his critical studies of theories on oriental and Hellenistic
religions supposedly mixed into Christian forms made him critical
of academic directions excising or demeaning books of the
Hebrew scriptures.
He recommended "a guideline for positive comportment ":
The hate and contempt and the rough rejection in
daily society which is demanded, in the name of
Christianity, from so many sides of our already
so divided people vis-a-vis our Jewish co-citizens
can never be furthered by the Catholic Church
... [which] views the Jews only in a double
mode: on the one hand, with gratitude for all that
we have taken over as our inheritance and which
we today still keep holy . . . and, on the other
hand, with prayer, since we believe to have the
fulfillment of Jewish hopes in the Savior.51
A summary of this book appeared in 1927 in the first volume of
the American Jesuit periodical Thought.52 In 1933 and 1935, Krebs
published further articles in this area, both against Alfred
Rosenberg's Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts, disputing his perverse use
of the German medieval mystics to support anti-Semitism and his
caricature of authentic Christianity.
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Theology
Krebs continued to write on the most varied topics. While he
maintained theological and historical areas of research, his essays
and books treated Dante and Augustine, Aquinas' proofs for the
existence of God, excavations at St. Peter's in Rome, organ music,
foreign missions, and sexuality and psychology. Apparently his
career in teaching philosophy and theology led Krebs beyond
historical research to dogmatic theology, and he did not remain a
scholar of medieval texts nor one of gnosticism and Christianity
in the third century. His first major work in systematic theology
was developed during the war years. It was to present how dogma
could be and had to be related to life. At the end of 1920, the first
volume of Dogma und Leben appeared, with the second volume
following four years later. The author wanted to show "how the
faith of our church, and indeed, how the salvation of our life is
grounded in the content of dogmas (in the strict sense of the
word). . . and how general human values or supernatural goals,
blessings, empowerments and mediations of salvation are con
tained in these truths."53 Each major dogma, an ecclesial definitive
statement, is examined as a moral act, as an enrichment of life, and
as an expansion of the area of knowing and of willing.54
The second volume treats the church and eschatology. Its
ecclesiology gives an interesting picture of a theologian in the
1920s facing the issue of which central themes should present the
church, and the problem of the forms and limits of authority. The
influence of the Body of Christ and the nature of an organic col
lective body are present in the mystery of the church in history.
Krebs described the ordinary magisterium not only as the bishop
but also as the publications, preachers, and catechists commis
sioned by the bishop. Not all that is contained therein is from
revelation, and neither the individual bishop nor those of a single
country have any guarantee of infallibility. That pertains to all the
bishops throughout the world and throughout past tradition. Krebs
did not mention an ordinary magisterium of the bishop of Rome
but treated the extraordinary magisterium of councils and popes.
Preservation from error is not an official entitlement but a gift of
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grace, and the pope himself can certainly err in matters of faith: "It
is not the pope as a person who is infallible but the pope as speaker
of the extraordinary teaching office of the church.'65 The large work
concludes with a pondering of how the times of world history are in
fact being governed by good and being influenced by the church.

In the Third Reich
On a trip to China and Japan, Krebs spent some months of
1926 in the United States, giving many sermons and lectures and
attending in Chicago during June the end of the Eucharistic World
Congress.56 He returned to a Germany shaken by social and politi
cal disturbances. We know only a little about Krebs' reactions to
the Nazi era because his diaries have not survived beyond 1932.
Obviously an outspoken critique of anti-Semitism would attract
the attention of the Nazi party. After the signing of the Concor
dat with the Vatican, Krebs spoke of its value in guaranteeing the
rights of the churches (he cited Hitler's words to this effect) and
in other lectures in 1933 spoke of the value of authority. But even
those lectures were seen by Nazi youth movements as provocative,
and they called for his removal.57 One grasps the times by learning
of crowds of students breaking into the seminary yelling, "Down
with Rome!" "Hang All Jews!" The student newspaper for May
15, 1935 proclaimed: "We are fighting in close ranks against
political Catholicism, against Jesuitism, against Judaism and against
Freemasonry.''58
In the Catholic journal Hoch/and in 1935;Krebs wrote on
Johann Adam Mahler's Athanasius. The book on the Alexandrian
bishop challenging Constantine could inspire the church con
fronting anew the state: "Now is the time to speak, for the time
to be silent is past. Are we waiting for Christ, for the Anti-Christ
dominates. The shepherds must call out, for the robbers are all
around." 59 Krebs' freedom to travel was curtailed, and by 1936
officials were seeking his removal from the University, which
followed in 1937. Diocesan officials supported him to some extent,
and he lectured in the seminary and was given the honor of Geist
licher Rat (Monsignor). If Hitler's goal for the Concordat was to
"domesticate" the Catholic Church, Pius XI's encyclical Mit
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brennender Sorge of March 1937 (which the Gestapo described as
a "highly traitorous attack") was the signal for a broad offensive
against the church.60
Defended by his colleagues and students in theology, nonethe
less, he was disciplined by a temporary removal from teaching by
the Kultusministerium of Baden, and soon after, in 1937, he was
retired from the University. His theological chair was removed
from the theological faculty and given to the areas of law and
politics. During the war years, Krebs worked as a priest and as a
semin,I professor outside of Freiburg. In 1943, a lieutenant in the
Luftwaffe cited him to the Gestapo after hearing one of his
sermons, and only his poor physical condition kept him from
being sent to a concentration camp.61 He was forbidden by the
government to preach, hear confessions, or say Mass in public� In
the same year, Archbishop Conrad Grober (called "brown
Conrad" because he had at times supported the Nazi movement)
decided that there were too many new ideas circulating, and he
attacked aspects of what became the liturgical movement, theo
logies outside of scholasticism, interest in Eastern patristics or
Protestant dogmatics, ecumenism, and new ecclesiologies of
ministry and organic diversity. Grober was blind to the value of
reappropriating venerable theologies of the past or of initiating
any theological or pastoral renewal, and the Archbishop wished
to remain totally within the seminary theology of the end of the
nineteenth century.62 Undistracted by a world war, he issued a
document critical of new theological ideas.
Krebs criticized Grober's views, as did Karl Rahner.63 Typical
of Krebs' openness to the new was an enthusiasm for the deepening
liturgical knowledge and participation taking place during those
years. That movement, furthered by the Benedictines, "pursues
the goal of instructing people on the history and the content of
liturgy and to introduce a co-celebration of the holy uses in the
spirit of an authentic worship service."64 Liturgy, especially during
Holy Week, is part of the new approach to evangelization. Krebs
praised the writings of Guardini for making Catholicism attractive
to young people and intelligible to Protestants.
On November 27, 1944, Krebs was celebrating the evening
Mass in the majestic cathedral as all around buildings collapsed
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during one of the great bombing raids on Freiburg. Much of the
city was destroyed; his lodgings were gone and with them his
atmosphere for work. In May 1945, he was invited back to the
University, but he was physically and emotionally spent and
retired in 1946. Subject to exhaustion and depression, he was
distant from academic and church circles; in silence or in distant
and hesitant conversation with visitors, this once energetic and
powerful personality had either from illness or shock been reduced
to someone waiting for death, an end which came in 1950.65

Conclusion: A Theologian of His Times
Krebs was a German theologian of the early twentieth century
who, like Carl Braig and Hermann Schell, sought to fulfill the
perennial task of the theologian to enable historical research and
contemporary thought to give the Gospel new expression. Medieval
scholasticism, he learned from Grabmann and Denifle, was itself
a rich and complex union of Augustine, Platonic currents, and
Aristotelianism. A philosophy of being remained necessary for
theology, and the masters of the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries never lost their potential for philosophy or theology.
The Freiburger theologian, accepting the tradition of F.A.
Staudenmaier, heir of the Tiibingen school and professor in
Freiburg, also stressed the leitmotif of the reign of God, so
prominent in such Enlightenment theologians as Bernhard Galura
andJ.S. Drey. As with Drey, Mohler, Staudenmaier, and Schell (to
whom he refers in his studies on dogma and values66), Krebs was
not threatened by contemporary philosophies, not by Nietzsche
or by Troeltsch. He studied extensively the philosophy of values
and its proximate and remote sources from Kant to neo-Kantianism,
asking, Why do certain values appear constantly and traditionally?
In the last analysis, being is greater than value: a philosophy and
ethics of values which is not drawn somewhat from being is in the
danger of sliding into a subjectivism, even ultimately into an
irrational faith in a philosophical milieu. 67
Contemporaries observed that Krebs' work was an alternative
to textbook neo-scholasticism and handbooks of positive theology.
In contrast to many other studies, his books on the history of
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dogma of the era before and after World War I struggled to find
a broad viewpoint of what was happening in that history. God is
the most important source of the historical stream of human life
on earth and in nature and history, and has become as co-worker
of humanity. Because of freedom and revelation and grace, God
both enables the human person and commits the deity to limita
tions. The mission of Jesus and the return of Christ give the
meaning of world history, and true revelation offers the ground
and answer to the struggles from Hegel to Troeltsch to find a
philosophy of history.68 Karl Eschweiler said that behind the two
volumes on "dogma and life" was the motif of nature and grace.69
The time between the two world wars in Germany was a time
of considerable theological and pastoral renewal, taking many
forms: the thought of Romano Guardini and Erich Przywara;
liturgy and church architecture;, dialogue with modern philosophy;
the disclosure of the holy in literature and other arts; a deepening
of knowledge of the Middle Ages; a commitment to a theology for
the twentieth century. Krebs belonged to a slightly earlier
generation, but the variety of his writings and interests displays his
intention of belonging to a dynamic church, and unafraid of
leaving antique enclosures to address contemporary issues, he aids
the unfolding of German Catholicism leading to Vatican II.
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CHAPTER EIGHT

Head and Heart in Rousselot and Lonergan
ANDREW TALLON

Newman's Theorem and Faculty Psychology

T

wo themes dominate this essay. First, there is what Lonergan
calls "Newman's Theorem," when he invokes "the basic
theorem in Newman's Idea of a University" (1974, 141):
Positively, Newman advanced that human
knowing was a whole with its parts organically
related, and this accords with the contemporary
phenomenological notion of horizon, that one's
perceptions are functions of one's outlook, that
one's meaning is a function of a context and that
context of still broader contexts. On the negative
side, Newman asked what would happen if a
significant part of knowledge were omitted,
overlooked, ignored, not just by some individual
but by the cultural community, and he contended
that there would be three consequences. First,
people in general would be ignorant of that area.
Second, the rounded whole of human knowing
would be mutilated. Third, the remaining parts
would endeavor to round off the whole once
more despite the omission of a part and, as a
result, they would suffer distortion from their
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effort to perform a function for which they were
not designed. Such was Newman's theorem. (142)
Neglect of affection, the missing third of the triad of con
sciousness, is an instance of Newman's Theorem and is my first
theme.
The second theme is connaturality as a phenomenological
principle applicable to all of human consciousness, beyond
cognition, and thus as a mode of operation of consciousness in all
its intentionalities: affection, cognition, and volition. In all three
intentionalities, ideal human action - that is, action per modum
naturae taken as the paradigm for the high end of developed
human acting - flows much more directly from one's whole self
(or being or nature) than from any single intentionality. Each
intentionality forms part of consciousness. The division of labor
among the kinds of consciousness is a substitute (as Rousselot
would put it) for a better, more unitary mode of operation.
Connaturality was important for Rousselot, but his inter
preters have not emphasized it enough, Martin D'Arey being an
exception. For Rousselot, connaturality names the way we act as
persons, as subjects who by becoming the equal of our natures can
thereby act through our natures as through ourselves, not merely
as collections of faculties. Rousselot better than anyone before
Lonergan transcended faculty psychology, even while usually (not
always) expressing himself in its terms. He transcended faculty
psychology by placing intellect (and will, and so on) into a hier
archy of spirits in which discursive reason and deliberative will
were recognized as substitutes for (or analogously conceived
participations in) the simpler, intuitive, spontaneous operations of
higher spirits. In this essay, I will approach Rousselot and
Lonergan from the vantage points of these two themes.1
In Head and Heart, I drew primarily upon two contemporary
traditions, the phenomenological and the neo-Thomist. Speci
fically, I depended on recent continental thought since Husserl for
the former tradition and, for the latter, on twentieth-century
transcendental Thomism, represented mainly by Pierre Rousselot,
Joseph Marechal, Karl Rahner, and Bernard Lonergan, but also on
Dietrich von Hildebrand, a philosopher known more for his
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allegiance to Augustine than to Aquinas. This essay updates the
analyses of that book, analyses which were, not surprisingly, given
the timing of most academic book publishing, already dated by a
couple of years at the time they saw light. To do so, I will focus
for the most part on the work of Rousselot and Lonergan. As
editor and translator of three of the four volumes in a new series
that will publish Rousselot's philosophical works and having spent
part of a sabbatical working on Lonergan and visiting the Lonergan
Research Institute in Toronto, I have had opportunities to con
tinue working on restoring affection to consciousness, in accord
with Newman's Theorem, a restoration best done by an extending
of the Thomist idea of connaturality.
The first thesis of Head and Heart is that there are as many
kinds of consciousness, or ways of being in the world of persons
and things, as there are kinds of intentionality, hence the subtitle:
Affection, Cognition, Volition as Triune Consciousness. The first
seven chapters establish the existence and nattlre of affective
intentionality and of a distinct affective consciousness, irreducible
to cognition or volition. I needed seven chapters because while
cognition and volition are generally conceded to be intentional
and therefore to be legitimate kinds of "spiritual" consciousness,
feelings and moods have generally not enjoyed equal status with
them. Why is this important? Why bother about redressing this
imbalance?
One good reason is Newman's Theorem. Let us apply this
theorem to the condition of human consciousness when affectivity
is neglected. Whenever an essential third of consciousness is
neglected, the remaining elements suffer distortion, consequent
misunderstanding, and misuse because they have to take up the
slack, so to speak, by being forced to do what the missing third is
supposed to do. Cognition and volition are asked to perform
affection's function; since they are not suited to do so, the result
is not only reduced performance of their own functions, but an
unbalanced situation and state of tension produced by their
doomed attempts to perform those of that missing element. At
first, the false substitutions may go unnoticed, but if enough
people pay enough attention and come to identify the problem
and learn how to solve it, eventually a remedy will appear, and
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when it does it will seem quite obvious to all who finally notice.
In other words, if affectivity is not recognized as a distinct, albeit
inseparable, element constituent of human consciousness, cognition
and volition will themselves be pressed into roles they cannot fill,
to their own dysfunction and that of our affective lives as well.
I submit that that is exactly what has happened by the
exclusion of feelings and moods from full status as intentional
consciousnesses, and that a contemporary phenomenology of con
sciousness can help remedy this neglect of affective consciousness.
Let me offer just a little more detail, using Newman's theorem, to
clarify this claim before going on to update the positions of Head
and Heart.
There are at least three clear instances of the neglect of
affection in the history of philosophy and theology that readily
come to mind. The first is tributary to the faculty psychology
(and its concomitant metaphysics) that has bedeviled Western
thought since the Greeks set the agenda and terminology in the
fifth century B.C.E. By faculty psychology, I mean what now is (or
should be) generally recognized as a methodologically misleading
tendency to name and posit, as though to explain our conscious
operations, a vast array of invisible and non-experiential entities
or principles like soul and body, intellect and will, reason and
sensibility, spirit and matter, and the like. Biblical language did
little to counter or correct this tendency, for it too spoke m
similar terms. Lonergan put it this way on one occasion:
A faculty psychology divides man up: it distin
guishes intellect and will, sense perception and
imagination, emotion and conation, only to leave
us with unresolved problems of priority and rank.
Is sense to be preferred to intellect, or intellect to
sense? Is intellect to be preferred to will, or will
to intellect? Is one to be a sensist, an intellec
tualist, or a voluntarist? The questions vanish,
once one has ceased to think in terms of faculties
or powers. What is given to consciousness is a set
of interrelated intentional operations. Together
they conspire to achieve both cognitional and real
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self-transcendence. Such is the basic unity and
continuity. ("Faith and Beliefs" 8-9; my italics)
If we are not to fall into just another version of faculty
psychology by making affection, cognition, and volition but
names for faculties, we must remind ourselves that a major
difference between the intellect and the will as faculties and the
triad of consciousness as interrelated intentional operations is that
the former are not directly experienced and the latter are. The
latter are operations we perform, and they are conscious, that is,
immediately available both in their actual performance and as able
to be objectified as the data of consciousness. But that is not
enough; we also have to avoid attributing knowing to cognition
or loving to affection in any exclusive way, for that Would divide
us· up just as badly as faculty talk. It is always the person who
knows and loves, always the whole subject who acts, and what we
are at pains to do is correct one mistake without falling right into
another. The terms "head" and "heart," at least, are so obviously
metaphors for cognition and affection, rather than faculties, that
they are less likely to be taken literally even by someone still in
the thrall of faculty psychology.
Now one of Lonergan's chief claims about Aquinas was that
like so many who have written about consciousness, Thomas'
method and practice were often more instructive and more reliable
guides for us today than his theory, especially as expressed in the
terms of the faculty psychology and metaphysics of his day. His
explicit language did not usually transcend the limitations of his
time as well as his actual performance did. This very insight is, in
fact, at the core of transcendental Thomism's ability to enter into
mutually fruitful dialogue with philosophy and theology today.
An especially provocative instance of this is the concept of
connaturality found throughout Aquinas' writing and brought to
contemporary attention primarily by Rousselot and Maritain, but
also by Ricoeur aad others; I will focus on this later. The point
here is that because of a metaphysics of soul as spirit and of a
faculty psychology that spoke and thought in terms of (spiritual)
intellect and (spiritual) will as belonging properly to the (spiritual)
soul, while it spoke of the feelings and affections as practically
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equated with sensibility and thus as belonging to the physical and
material body, we ended with a two-part soul in Aristotle and his
disciple Aquinas. Affection as a distinct intentionality was driven
from the soul, and despite Plato's tripartite soul and Augustine's
cor inquietum, the tradition of a two-part soul prevailed. The
result was that the operations of affective consciousness were
mistakenly attributed to either intellect or will, when they were
considered spiritual, or to sense and embodiment, when they were
not. This dualism is evident in the language of Descartes, Kant,
Hegel, and in every philosopher and theologian who thought and
wrote from within a faculty psychology and the metaphysics
derived from it.
The second instance follows directly from this first and
perfectly illustrates Newman's Theorem of phenomenological
neglect, if I may so name it: for lack of a way to talk about love
as it really is experienced, the medieval solution was to make love
an act of the will. Under the terms and conditions of a faculty
psychology, love had to come from and be attributed to some
faculty, despite the obvious physical and passionate side of love,
since spiritual beings like God and the angels were not to be
denied the power to love; but since they had no bodies, love had
to become a will-act. The "better" and higher love then became
an -�Ct of will, much to the disparagement of the "worse" and
lower. The limitations of a faculty psychology forced this
improper attribution and reinforced the neglect of affection. Love
as felt, as affective response, lived a double life, once in the body
and senses, and again in the will, where it took on a special jargon
(intention and fruition becoming aliases for desire and joy). At the
same time, there has always been an interest in affective conscious
ness and some serious work done to give it the attention it
deserves (see Alquie; Bernard; Davis; Guerin; Noble; Schrag;
Simonin; Strasser 1969, 1970, and 1977; Sweeney).
The third instance is one that anyone in tune with Newman's
Theorem might have foreseen: today we have philosophers like
Robert Solomon and Martha Nussbaum saying that emotions and
passions are judgments, which is just another reduction - this
time mistaking affection for cognition, whereas the medievals
mistook affection for volition (see Chenu and Guillaumont). In all
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these instances, which I cite here merely as examples, not only is
affection neglected but' cognition and volition are misunderstood
and distorted by being said to accomplish what they do not and
cannot. Naturally, therefore, we have thoroughly confused
attempts to figure out the so-called cognitive content of feelings
and moods, or to understand how love can be reduced to a
commandment within the language and thought patterns of a
philosophical and biblical tradition that tries to deal with affection
while excluding it from equal status with cognition and volition.
We have reached critical mass on this issue, and replacing faculty
psychology with intentionality analysis is our best hope for
method in the human sciences. (A few nonphilosophical works
that try to integrate affection into consciousness have also caught
public, even popular, attention; see, for example, Damasio;
Goleman; MacLean 1980, 1990; Restak; Veldman).
Please do not misunderstand me and end up with no more
than another version of the same mistake. I am not excluding
cognition or volition from love, nor affection from knowledge,
certainly not from value judgments, but simply trying to show by
philosophical argument that the exclusion of affection from
consciousness has led to presenting knowledge and love as though
they were better off without feeling. That exclusivist, faculty
centered approach is a perfect instance of Newman's Theorem:
first the omission, and then the attempt to justify it, with all the
involved elements suffering distortion. The restoration of affection
to full status in "spiritual" consciousness (to revert to the terms
used to exclude it) goes awry if we do not go all the way from
faculty psychology through intentionality analysis to the unity of
the subject, and do not stop halfway by limiting love to affection
or knowledge to cognition in ways that make them allergic to one
another.
So the answer to the question "Why bother?" should be
obvious: because it's good for all three kinds of intentionality that
constitute triune human consciousness. Cognition will not have to
carry the burden of value judgments without the value apprehen
sions that occur in feelings, and volition will not have to account
for the absurd hypothesis that makes love an act of will, almost
always to the disparagement of feeling. There is not a single act of
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the subject that is not constituted by all three intentionalities of
triune consciousness. We do not pursue knowledge without deciding
to do so, nor appropriate our emotional lives responsibly without
reflection and decision to do so, and so on. This triadic structure
operates throughout the full range of conscious life. But of the
three currents that make up the one stream of consciousness,
affection needs the most work to find and hold its place. Inten
tionality analysis, as replacing and remedying faculty psychology,
makes this possible by offering the thesis that feelings and moods
are best understood as affective intentionalities.
Affective Intentionality
To take seven chapters to establish affective intentionality,
while it may seem to be too much (one would hope) for most
philosophers today, is apparently still not enough for others. We
might well ask why. Why is the transition from faculty psycho
logy to intentionality analysis so difficult for us? No doubt
because we are creatures of habit, and having all learned to speak
and think philosophically at the feet of Plato and Aristotle right
down to today, with the blessing and reinforcement of the
language of the Bible, we probably find our Denkformen so fixed
that it must seem revolutionary to think in any other way. The
phenomenological movement is about method, of course, and the
single unifying factor across most of the figures associated with
what has been called (and then uncalled) existentialism, and even
including a great part of what goes by the name "postmodern,"
is the phenomenological method. The heart and soul of that
method is intentionality. To jettison intentionality and the analysis
of consciousness in terms of intentionality would be to forgo the
single most important remedy for faculty psychology and its
metaphysics. I have little to add to Head and Heart's first seven
chapters except to suggest that what Rahner calls Vorgrilf should
be understood not as solely cognitive but as the stream of triune
consciousness toward what Levinas calls l1nfini (the Infinite,
consistently mistranslated as Infinity in the English). Neither
Vorgrilf nor l'Infini is a cognitive abstraction nor a knowable
object, on the one hand, nor a presence or absence subject to
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voluntary control, on the other, but both are unoverridable
structures of consciousness, together naming a transcendence of
everything and everyone finite toward a horizon that is not only
horizontally but vertically infinite, toward a "ground" that is a
"height" (or "depth") more than a "ground," and that is always
figured but never a figure, always personal without being a person,
desired without being needed (in the sense of necessary for a hyp o
thetical "natural" rather than a "supernatural" life). Were I to
rewrite those chapters, I would emphasize Levinas' contribution
much more and bring him out from the background, where he
silently guided their whole movement.
I would also emphasize one phenomenon in particular, that of
prayer. To ask why we humans spontaneously pray is to note that
prayer is the purest form of the Rahner/Levinas structure of
Vorgriff/Infini, not just in the sense of children asking for a
heavenly mother or father to come to their rescue, but in the
much deeper sense of the peculiar intentionality that prayer
manifests in human consciousness (see Lonergan 1996, 178-82, esp.
179). Granted the truism that not all feelings are intentional - as
von Hildebrand has clearly spelled out, and as Lonergan has
followed him, there are certain unintentional physical states like
fatigue and irritability, or certain goal-oriented tendencies, like
hunger and thirst, that may appear to be intentional but are more
accurately and parsimoniously explained by routine causality we need look no further than inside ourselves for their adequate
intelligibility, since they are explained by causes, not by
intentions. But one thing distinctive about affective intentionality
is the primacy (or at least the enhanced degree of the importance)
of the "Other," i.e., of a degree of passivity or receptivity so
much greater than that experienced in insight that Lonergan often
calls feeling a quasi-operator, as though reluctant to grant it as
much activity as cognition (although it must be said that the
receptive nature of knowledge cannot be denied: I can no more
promise to understand Einstein's relativity theory - that is,
promise to have an insight - than I could promise to feel a
certain emotion, because both truths and values have to be given
to me as gifts to my questions and desires, no matter how great
my effort).
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There is a vast domain, the world of value, parallel to that of
truth, the domain of cognition, which a fuller reading of Rahner
includes in the Vorgrifl (perfectly consequent with Rousselot's
"good" intellectualism, which recognizes in the intellectus agens
much more than a cognitive operation but rather the defining
kinesis of finite spirit as such) and which Levinas names the trace
of the Other, the Infinite, who, like Descartes' idea of the Infinite,
functions to give human consciousness its specific human bend and
curve, making it personal and ethical. The Infinne's ethical reality
emerges with the advent of the human Other (i.e., another
person), an approach that is mediated, to be sure, by embodiment,
by that ambiguous first otherness of my own flesh which I both
and neither am and have; this is the face of the Other, which in
Levinas' philosophy gets its ethical power from connaturality with
the trace of the Other whose trace in consciousness is the Infinite
(Tallon 1995). That Infinite, never an object, is operative in all
knowing and loving of persons and things, revealing their finitude
and our own finitude. For twenty-five centuries, we have been
offered the contemplation of truth as the human ideal, but we
need reminding that we are more than a desire to know - desire
for more than a beatific "vision" - for it is the desire of a
person, and for a person there must be a person. Prayer, both
human and divine (Nedoncelle), is in this context but the purest
and simplest spontaneous affective intentionality of a person for
a person and is the primary connatural attunement of human
consciousness to its infinite Other (the mystical eros and pathos),
who meets the face of the finite Other as the one for whom I am
responsible before I know it or will it (the ethical eros and
pathos).
Lest this seem overly rhapsodic, let me immediately wrench
us back to terra firma with the methodological caution that only
in inclusive intentionality analysis will this make sense. To stay
locked inside a faculty psychology is to continue to speak of
sensibility, intellect, and will and then refuse to use analogy to
allow the metaphysics of spirit and matter derived from that
faculty psychology to extend to affection. The result is an easy
dismissal of affection from the core of consciousness as though
unequal to cognition and volition. To make more sense of the
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relation of prayer as personal attunement to the ground of
consciousness, I need now to come back to the pivotal theme of
connaturality.
Connaturality and Feeling
A person is a who and a what. Persons are grounds (and
depths �nd heights, to use spatial metaphors; we could as well (or
even better) use less visual and more temporal, historical ones),
and what we know about them is the sum of figures on those
grounds. This Gestalt structure seems unavoidable in all our senses
and in all conscious operations, in our affections, cognitions, and
volitions. There is always a background, a context, a field in or
against which or whom the object or subject of affection, cognition,
or volition is placed, projected, situated, contextualized, figured.
This figure-ground structure can never be transcended and never
is, no matter how many times a former ground is placed against
a new ground and becomes a figure itself, as when I write some
thing or sketch some picture on a blackboard. At first the
blackboard is the ground and is co-known 'nonobjectively (and
usually just plain ignored, not even noticed) along with the word
or picture on the blackboard, which is the necessary condition for
knowing the word or picture. To turn the nonobject, the black
board, into an object, I must first refocus by looking deeper into
the background, past the figure; I thereby expand my horizon so
that I now include the wall on which the blackboard is mounted.
To know the wall, formerly a ground, as an object, I must project
the three-dimensional room as its ground. And on it goes, to ever
expanding horizons that successively objectify the room, building,
campus, city, state, country, planet, galaxy, universe, until I stand
in imagination at the edge of space and project the whole material
universe against the ground of being.
This example seems to illustrate our vision bias, but the
structure pervades hearing (as when too much background noise
makes the foreground inaudible, speech unintelligible), and taste
(as when without a clean palate the wine or cheese doesn't have
its own taste), and so on. Notice that in all these cases there's a
line, limit, boundary, border, threshold between figure and ground.
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When we define, we set that limit or boundary and say, "Here the
object ends and the background begins." The object stan�s out or
up or against the ground, and it's tempting to play with words
and say that to "under-stand" is to "grasp" what "stands up," or
that in-sight is seeing into the field and spotting the figure, or
seeing past the foreground into the background. But as Lonergan
has taught us, all these visual models fail to account for insight as
an act of intelligence and can lead us astray: understanding is not
like seeing or any of the senses. As an act of intelligence,
occurring on another level of cognition, and only as intelligence
performed by someone in action, it must be experienced in its
own right for anyone to understand it without reducing it to vision
or falsely conceiving it in terms of vision, and for that to happen, the
data of consciousness must themselves become objects of cognition.
What about feeling? Do we not have a similar problem with
reducing affection to cognition and volition and so falsely con
ceiving it in terms of the (theoretically and practically) better
known (cognition) and/or better exercised (volition)? We have
been told that feeling is coterminous with all four levels of human
consciousness, which is already an attempt to define feeling by
setting up "cognitional/volitional structure" as the better known
against which to locate feeling as the less well-known. So doesn't
this also tell us something about how we try to understand feeling,
even when it is recognized as a distinct, affective intentionality?
Even when we recognize that feeling changes as we move up in
vertical finality from experience through understanding to judg
ment (the first three levels: cognition), and that feeling changes
again at the level of decision, choice, and action (the fourth level:
volition), doesn't this mode of analyzing feeling betray it to the
extent that the other two kinds of consciousness set its terms of
understanding? Do we have to understand feelings analogously?
Should cognition set the levels, so that then we speak of empirical
feelings, intelligent feelings, rational feelings, responsible feelings?
Does this illuminate consciousness or only blur it more? Do we
really have a choice, given that what we are attempting here is to
understand feelings?
Granted then that we experience feelings, c an we make the
move to understanding feelings with not only the same caution we
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exercise when understanding any experience, namely, not to fall
into a visual bias, but with the added caution that we not fall into
a cognitive bias (or volitional bias, when we try to understand
feelings at the fourth level)? Can we completely reconceptualize
affection by liberating it from Gestalt imagery? That's exactly the
problem: feeling is never allowed its own definition, or its own
terms, with its own intentionality, and is always forced to fit
better known models supplied by cognition and volition.
Something gets lost in the tailoring. Even Pascal's "the heart has
its reasons" betrays feeling by talking about it in terms of reason,
and some of Lonergan's less guarded borrowings repeat this
unhelpful saying. The "heart's reasons" may be feelings in some
sense, but feelings are not really reasons, nor are reasons feelings.
Of what genus would feeling be a species? Only consciousness
itself. If consciousness is truly triadic, its three intentionalities
must really be distinct (albeit never separate), indeed ·so distinct
that each achieves its identity and makes its unique contribution
to the whole of consciousness precisely by not being the others.
Now does this line of thought help us recognize what is
distinct about affective intentionality? It does, and both Rousselot
and Lonergan go back to a relatively overlooked Thomist concept,
that of connaturality, to explore that distinction. Not that
connaturality does not operate in all of consciousness - that is
not my thesis (when we explain connaturality in terms of habit as
virtue, it becomes clear that since there are cognitive and
volitional habits, so there will be cognitive and volitional
connaturality) - but that its operation in affection is quite
different from its operation in cognition or volition.
The key text for Aquinas on affection is Summa Theologiae, Ila
Ilae q. 45, a. 2. What Summa Theologiae, I, q. 84, a. 7 is for cog
nition, this text is for affection:
Whether wisdom is in the intellect as its subject?
Objection 1. It would seem that wisdom is
not in the intellect as its subject. For Augustine
says (Ep. cxx) that "wisdom is the charity of
God." Now charity is in the will as its subject,
and not in the intellect, as stated above (24, 1).
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Therefore wisdom is not in the intellect as its
subject.
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Sirach
6:23): "The wisdom of doctrine is according to
her name," for wisdom [sapientia] may be de
scribed as "sweet-tasting science [sapida scientia],"
and this would seem to regard the appetite, to
which it belongs to taste spiritual pleasure or
sweetness. Therefore wisdom is in the appetite
rather than in the intellect.
Objection 3. Further, the intellective power
is sufficiently perfected by the gift of under
standing. Now it is superfluous to require two
things where one suffices for the purpose. There
fore wisdom is not in the intellect.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49)
that "wisdom is contrary to folly." But folly is in
the intellect. Therefore wisdom is also.
I answer that, as stated above, wisdom denotes
a certain rectitude of judgment according to the
Eternal Law. Now rectitude of judgment is two
fold: first, on account of perfect use of reason
[secundum perfectum usum rationis], secondly, on
account of a certain connaturality fpropter con
naturalitatem quandam] with the matter about
which one has to judge. Thus, about matters of
chastity, a man after inquiring with his reason
[per rationis inquisitionem] forms a right judg
ment, if he has learnt the science of morals, while
he who has the habit of chastity judges of such
matters by a kind of connaturality [per quandam
connaturalitatem]. Accordingly it belongs to the
wisdom that is an intellectual virtue to pronounce
right judgment about Divine things after reason
has made its inquiry, but it belongs to wisdom as
a gift of the Holy Ghost to judge aright about
them on account of connaturality [secundum quan
dam connaturalitatem] with them: thus Dionysius
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says (Div. Norn. ii) that "Hierotheus is perfect in
Divine things, for he not only learns, but is
patient of, Divine things."
Now this sympathy or connaturality [compassio
sive connaturalitas] for Divine things is the result
of charity, which unites us to God, according to
1 Cor. 6:17: "He who is joined to the Lord, is
one spirit." Consequently wisdom, which is a
gift, has its cause in the will, which cause is
charity, but it has its essence in the intellect,
whose act is to judge aright, as stated above (I-II,
14, 1).
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking
of wisdom as to its cause, whence also wisdom
[sapientia] takes its name, insofar as it denotes a
certain sweetness [saporem].
Hence the Reply to the Second Objection is
evident, that is if this be the true meaning of the
text quoted. For, apparently this is not the case,
because such an exposition of the text would only
fit the Latin word for wisdom, whereas it does
not apply to the Greek and perhaps not in other
languages. Hence it would seem that in the text
quoted wisdom stands for the renown of doctrine,
for which it is praised by all.
Reply to Objection 3. The intellect exercises
a twofold act, perception and judgment. The gift
of understanding regards the former; the gift of
wisdom regards the latter, according to the
Divine ideas, the gift of knowledge, according to
human ideas.
This text, which is but one among many, has attracted some
attention (D'Avenia; Faricy; Gumnior; Hayen 1957; Kadowaki;
Keane; Lebacqz; Marin-Sola; Mclnerny; Moreno; Titus). As
Kadowaki demonstrates, connaturality was not something Thomas
came onto late (16); he used this concept from the Commentary on
the Sentences all the way through his works, and there was a
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definite development toward more use as he matured, especially
as his practical philosophy of prudence and wisdom evolved.
Aquinas says there are two ways to live our personal lives - that
is, to live our relations with human persons (the ethical), and our
relations with divine persons (the mystical). One way he calls the
"way of cognition" (per modum cognitionis) - head - and the
other he calls the "way of connaturality" or "by a certain
connaturality" (propter connaturalitatem quandam)- heart- or
"by inclination" (per modum inclinationis), or "by nature" (per
modum naturae), literally, "by way of (one's) nature" (see Hayen
1957, 238-55).
The first question might be: Why is this text the basis for
saying that beyond the way to action based on cognition there is
another way, based on affection? After all, Aquinas seems to
contradict himself. He first distinguishes two ways by saying one
comes from cognition and the other from nature, but then calls
them both ways to judgment; but judgment is one of the opera
tions of cognition, the very culmination of cognitional structure
at the third level. How are we supposed to interpret this without
contradiction? If we recall the often mentioned admonition about
theory and practice, we will not allow Aquinas' own language to
mislead us into taking connaturality as just another kind of
cognition, against Aquinas' own explicit contrast of cognition with
something-else.
Kadowaki accuses all interpreters before him of falling into
false, subjective views because they focus only on texts where the
terms associated with connaturality occur literally, but they
neglect the background of Aquinas' texts necessary to understand
them (87-88). He finds six conditions for a correct interpretation
of connaturality, especially of the key text (ST, II-II, 45, 2). He is
quite correct to emphasize that an accurate interpretation will
focus on the dynamic character of connaturality, and thus all of
his six conditions are correctly oriented around action, but all his
conditions attribute too much to the will's influence (he never
does free himself from faculty psychology, so we have to try to
see through it as best we can). The first three conditions place the
practical orientation of intellect in its subjection to the will. In the
fourth condition, he puts love in the will and then takes the usual
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position of then having intellect influenced by love; this, too, is
thought to fulfil the condition of being dynamic by showing a
nonspeculative finality. Even his promising recourse to habit ends
up by saying that the virtue of love, as gift of the Spirit, resides in
the will. We never get beyond a two-part soul and a rather arid
discussion of prudence and wisdom in terms exclusively of
intellect and will; affection has again been absorbed. Had
Kadowaki managed to break the hold of faculty psychoJogy when
discussing affection and love, which he does at length but
consistently in terms of will alone, his implementation of his
principles of interpretation might have worked better.
This apparent confusion has stymied every interpretation I've
seen of this and related texts. No writer on the subject has
managed to get past the explicit language to consider that what
Aquinas means here is not, as is usually taken to be the case, at
least since John of St. Thomas Oean Poinsot; see Maguire) and
Maritain, that intellect is under the influence of love, because love
is always in the writer's mind considered an act of will. When
interpreters work from within the tradition of faculty psychology,
we must remember, they allow themselves only intellect and will
as the "tools" of interpretation. Even when the language of
affection is used, it is attributed to will; such is the force of this
example of Newman's Theorem.
But what if Aquinas means another, quite different way to get
not to cognition but to action, a way different enough from
cognition, namely, by affection, so that its contribution will really
make a significant and important difference? We have to move
away from a logocentric, cognition-centered perspective (from a
presumed primacy of cognition) to an agent-centered, person
centered, subject-centered perspective (to the primacy of action) to
be in a position to ask the question at all. This shift of perspective
from cognition to action makes all the difference. It takes off the
blinders of faculty psychology and the two-part soul and reframes
the whole interpretation. Roy succeeds to some extent insofar as
when discussing the gifts of the Spirit, he states that the problem
is not how many gifts there are or how to divide them up
between the faculties, but what they accomplish, which is to
supernaturalize us and to coadapt (attune) our action in such a
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way that we can know and love in accord with those gifts (1948,
174-86, 292).
Secondary questions might be: Just how, according to this
text, is cognition different from affection? What really distin
guishes cognition from affection? Does Thomas give a clue to how
they differ? Is there anything else we know about his language
here that could help? I think these questions go together in this
sense: not only is affection proposed as a distinct-path to action,
but when first it is identified as "by way of one's nature" instead
of "by way of one's cognition," and then further, in the two
examples, when it is precisely identified with one's second nature,
not one's first, that is, with one's virtues (understood as habits,
acquired in the case of the ethical, infused in the case of the
mystic;,:al, and in both cases, these virtues are the very attunements
of first nature that make it better and so make it work more
surely, quickly, and spontaneously), we then have a complete
explanation. Let me try to show this.
How does connaturality itself work? Aquinas explicitly
answers that question when he says that the "other way,"
different from the way of cognition, is the way of virtue. It's a
perfectly consistent position for him to take, given that virtues are
(good) habits and that habits are second nature, for then connatu
rality is really a statement about how this second nature operates,
and he merely gives a name to this way to action, a way that
flows more,from (second) nature than from knowledge. A nature
is, after all, just a principle of action; actions reveal natures and
define them. Connaturality says that we can attune our first
nature so that its action can become easier, more congenial, more
intuitive (not needing discursive reasoning), more spontaneous (not
needing voluntary deliberation) and more "natural" than it is
without the appropriate virtue. This is Charles Davis' "achieved
spontaneity" (140). It is the "resonance" that Lonergan speaks of
in the marvelous section on art and patterns of experience,
especially on feeling as the most purely experiential, as elemental
meaning, as non-conceptual, as presenting rather than representing;
there (with a bow to Merleau-Ponty) he describes my body as "a
piece of space that feels," describes bodies as feelers in kinesthetic
space (1993, 211-32).
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With the suitable virtue, we are already in motion toward the
action, inclined toward it, leaning into it; we are "suited" to it
because it "befits" us, and we have sympathy and affinity with the
values associated with such actions; we have a feel for them, are
in touch with them. Whereas a phenomenology of cognition
might be expressed in terms of objectifying, grasping, mastering a
subject, and so on, a phenomenology of affectivity might be
expressed in terms of leaning, tilting, inclining, being moved,
being touched, and therefore expressed as an affective response to
being affected, so much so that the proverbial "falling" in love
would be on a continuum with this leaning over so far as to fall,
that is, to lose oneself in, to, and for the other. Without making
too much of such poetic descriptions, we can at least note that the
striking difference between cognition and affection comes to the
fore when we recontextualize them both by making action
primary. Cognition and affection are two complementary and
inseparable although distinct ways to get to the ethical thing to
do, or, in the case of the mystical, two ways to pray. These two
personal (intersubjective, social) worlds, the ethical and the
mystical, set the paradigm for affection.
It may seem that recourse to connaturality attempts to explain
the obscure by the more obscure, which is why I have been at
pains to get past the term connaturality to its underlying structure.
On the surface, "con"+ "natural" means a nature plus whatever
goes with it and is attuned to it, whatever actions and values
resonate in harmony with it (and in Head and Heart I try to cover
the full range of meanings of this "going with").

Connaturality and Personal Becoming
There is another textual clue that while too much should not
be made of it, at least something should. This is the very phrase
itself, per modum naturae. Might there be an allusion, no matter
how distant, in the phrase per modum naturae to the fact that
angels act more through their natures than through either their
"faculties" (presumably not so distinct from their natures as ours)
or through the even more derivative agency of "intelligible
species" reached, as are ours, by conversio ad phantasmata? Recall
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Joseph de Finance's idea of habit as remedy for finitude. Habit is
virtue or second nature, improving first nature, bringing it closer
to the angelic nature. If Aquinas is saying that in connaturality we
act through our nature (we act "by nature," "by heart"), might
he not be (however distantly) alluding to an approximation to the
mode of operation of our (distant) cousins, those less finite spirits
to whose least performance stands to our best performance as its
asymptotically approached upper limit? What in us is spread out
in a spargi ad multa among disparate faculties and their so-called
proper objects, can become, at the high end, by an operational
synthesis of affection, cognition, and volition, an approximation
of knowing and loving per modum naturae - that is, by connatu
rality, after our angelic models.
That is, of course, the familiar thesis of Rousselot's
Intellectualism of Saint Thomas, namely, that discursive reasoning
and deliberative willing are substitutes for a higher mode of
connatural knowing and loving that are transformed into those
higher operative modes by the presence of affection, that is, by
including in the triad the missing third of consciousness, the
element of affection and empathy that allows us to feel the
consonance and dissonance, encourages us to respect the feelings
of attunement, of harmony, of good and bad "vibes," of the
consolation and desolation that Ignatian spirituality finds essential
to discernment of spirits. The genius of Rousselot's "good
intellectualism" - or "more full-blooded intellectualism," as the
Downside Review critic cited by D'Arey calls it (324-25) - is to
restore the full triad of consciousness so that human knowing and
loving are not forced into "dyadic soul" explanations that omit
affection. That is also the brilliance of Rousselot's The Problem of
Love in the Middle Ages, namely, to give much more room for
human affection in the phenomenology of love. Even though
historically "stuck" in faculty psychology, he manages to free
himself enough to suggest to us today a Thomas whose "intellect"
and "will" were fully charged with an ecstatic, passionate desire
that refused to deny the affective third of consciousness.
But the most important help Rousselot gives us in under
standing the role of connaturality is achieved because he gets
beyond the literal reading of it as restricted to cognition (the usual
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potency to act, will be for him to tend to this
conquest, to this adequation. So it is, therefore,
on the one hand, that the sense of the operation
characteristic of humanity, which is its intellec
tion, ought to be taken from the innate desire
which the human subject has of equalizing itself,
of winning its own nature; on the other hand,
that the specific note of this intellection is the
distension which we have said exists between the
nature conceived and the subject (exterior)
connoted. At the moment when the interior dis
tension of man ceases, the representative
distension, the distension of his concept, will also
cease. Man would envisage his essence, his
substantial self; man would live his soul, his
whole soul, and at the same time, he would know
exterior being by sympathetic intuition. All
material apatby would vanish in spiritual
sympatby; not having in itself a remainder to
reduce, the soul too would no longer find an
obstacle in penetrating objects. In short, the deep
root of the conceptual distension, of the ab
straction proper to the category of thing, is the
incompleteness of our spirituality; if man cannot
bring his object to light, it is because he is not
himself enlightened. (D'Arcy, 318-19; italics in
original)
D' Arey reads Rousselot as offering us a paradigm for human
action not from the low end, from the bottom up, as though what
defines us were to limit us, but from above, inviting a trans
ascendence, as Levinas puts it, toward a vertical horizon. Insofar
as we approach the angelic model, we do not so much transcend
our nature as actuate it, and in so doing, simplify its operations,
somewhat in the manner of Teilhard de Chardin's "all that rises,
converges." Affective connaturality works to make this experi
ential, and we could describe such a person thus:
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He has reached a stage near to that of Rousselot's
connaturality or sympathetic vibration. The law
of the intelligence is that "a spirit who would be
self-conscious, could penetrate to the heart of the
real. 'The more spirit one has,' says Pascal, 'the
more original things one sees' and for the pure
spirit, there are only originals. He, who is all
spirit, is all affinity with beings, all noumenal
affinity; everything real is sympathetic to him, all
his quality is 'connatural' to him; he does not
find there, to speak in Hegelian language, a
'suchness' which he comes up against, but he
insinuates himself and flows into the inmost place
where we cannot penetrate. The pure spirit, says
St. Thomas, knows the individual in its very
singularity; the human soul abstracts at its own
opportunity the idea of quiddity. Still absent
from itself, how could it apply itself entirely to
objects?" (320-21; italics in original)
The idea of connaturality is therefore less a limited theory about
practical judgments, despite its being usually and almost exclu
sively so presented, than a general concept of human development
toward its natural and personal fulfillment, which is toward action
through (and identified with) one's nature or being. Such action,
like second nature, is the product of virtuous habit, and is thus
more spontaneous, more perfect, and so on; in a word, it is more like
a natural appetite than an elicited appetite. Fred Lawrence indirectly
confirms this general line of thinking, here based on Rousselot, by
drawing on Lonergan. Beginning with the comment that
the reason why human beings form an inner
word in order to know is the lack of coincidence
of esse naturale and esse intentionale whenever
created beings know something. Hence, the finite
knower has to form a surrogate copy and present
it to itself in order to know any real thing: this
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may be the inner word or concept that we fashion
for ourselves, or it may just as well be an imagined
representation (Vorstellung) that substitutes for
the esse naturale of the thing known. (396)
But suppose we could dispense with the surrogate because there
was no such lack of coincidence between our nature and our
intentions? Suppose, like Aquinas' homo castus, there was connatu
rality between oneself and one's intended deed? One would then
act from feeling that very sympathy, without needing to think, to
reason, to know (at least not as the operative intentionality in this
action at this moment, without excluding later reflection, con
comitant cognitive consciousness of oneself as an acting subject, or
later acknowledgement of one's responsibility, and so on) because
of the union of esse naturale and esse intentionale. Indeed, we might
think of connaturality as just that union.
We have here another expression of the meaning of con
naturality, one emphasized by Miller: connaturality allows us to
know through our being or nature, or, better to act through our
being or nature rather than through our knowing. Lawrence
develops this in presenting Lonergan's exposition of Verbum: "we
know by what we are rather than by what we produce" (410).
Aquinas advanced Augustine's noetic "by adding to Aristotle's
theorem of knowledge by identity a theorem of knowledge by
intentionality." Knowledge as knowing by what we are is proper
only to God and needs the addition of intentionality to account
for finite knowing. But Aquinas does not abandon the former in
offering the latter; the lower is a participation by analogy with the
higher:
Ontologically expressed, the possibility of finite
self-transcendence in knowing is this: the ultimate
ground of our knowledge is God, but the reason
why we know is within us. It is the light of our
intellects; and by it we can know because "the very
same ... intellectual light which is in us is nothing
other than a certain participated likeness of
uncreated light" (ST, I, q. 84, a. 5). (Lawrence, 411)
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Conclusion: Restoring Affection to Triadic Consciousness
Intentionality is a finite, deficient participation in infinite
knowing through self-identity, self-presence, self-possession. To the
precise extent of our finitude, we must have recourse to inten
tional consciousness to know and love. What is natural to infinite
spirit is intentional for finite spirit; analogy allows us to place
them on a continuum, like the Perudo-Dionysian hierarchy of
spirits so dear to Aquinas. The goal is finite self-transcendence
toward an appropriation of one's own God-given, God-illuminated,
and God-blessed nature. This transcendence requires the steady
development so emphasized by Lonergan, but that development
is by a series of leaps. The model Lonergan follows (in Insight) is
first knowledge (the example of leap is an insight) and later, in
Method in Theology, we find the development of affectivity given
special emphasis as growth we are called to .in virtue and value
apprehension. In both cases, the leap has the character of a
conversion; one's mind is turned away, for example, from the
model of knowing as taking a look, and one's heart is turned away
from subjective preferences toward what is objectively good.
Now in all this, we should be alert to notice that what
Rousselot calls a substitution or a surrogate for knowing through
one's being or nature, namely, intentionality, is never completely
transcended - we never stop being human, after all - but this
takes nothing away from also recognizing that intentionality gets
its innermost meaning and value from being our way of over
coming finitude on the way toward action through our more
perfectly operating nature, when a more perfect synthesis of
intentional operations occurs as we are connaturalized to the
ultimate Truth and Value in which we participate.
Finally, theology reminds us again that virtue can be both
acquired and (by grace) infused, that is, given as a gift (the gifts of
the Spirit are virtues, traditionally faith, love, and hope), elevating
our nature (a nature created "a little less than the angels"): "God's
gift of his love is the cause of our knowledge of God by connatu
rality" (Lonergan 1985, 250). Grace can raise us higher and make
us a little closer by healing us, a further remedying of finitude
(sanans et elevans), making our performance, as Lonergan (1971)
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says so well, statistically a little closer to the angels. This grace
from above is Lonergan's main instance of conversion, his favorite
scriptural quotation having to do with God's love poured forth
into us, flooding our hearts; it is also the same as his self
transcendent subject, who is at once the criterion of truth and
value (the good), which is, as he explicitly says, also the same as
Aristotle's virtuous person.
The contemporary recovery of the affective cannot be accom
plished by attributing feeling to will, or by locating passion solely
in "the body," or by reducing consciousness to brain states
without intentionality, or by calling emotions judgments. Only
when feeling is understood as an irreducibly distinct but never
separate intentionality in its own right will consciousness be
described as it is experienced and its triadic structure be
recognized, accepted, and allowed to become fully operative in
explanatory and problem-solving analyses of ethical and mystical
experiences. There are resources in the Thomist concept of
connaturality as explicitly or implicitly deployed in philosophy
and theology today, as the example of Rousselot and Lonergan,
among others, amply demonstrates, to advance the task of
restoring affection to triune consciousness.
Notes
1. I certainly do not wish to deny the general usefulness of the first
order interpretation of connaturality in Aquinas, as exemplified by Pope
Pius XII's encyclical Humani generis, which I quote for its succinct
summary:
Never has Christian philosophy denied the usefulness
and efficacy of good dispositions of soul for perceiving
and embracing moral and religious truths. In fact, it
has always taught that the lack of these dispositions of
good will can be the reason why the intellect, influ
enced by the passions and evil inclinations, can be so
obscured that it cannot see clearly. Indeed St. Thomas
holds that the intellect can in some way perceive
higher goods of the moral order, whether natural or
supernatural, inasmuch as it experiences a certain
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"connaturality" with these goods, whether this "con
naturality" be purely natural or the result of grace; and
it is clear how much even this somewhat obscure per
ception can help the reason in its investigations. (cited
in Mclnerny, 173)
2. D'Arey mentions that Ralph Harper translated three of
Rousselot's articles1 which D'Arey used {379); he also mentions that
Harper wrote an excellent introduction to them and that he (D'Arey)
believed they were to be published. Unfortunately, they never were. I
wrote Mrs. Ruth Harper, Ralph Harper's widow, hoping she could find
these translations among his papers, but she reported that there were no
unpublished papers of any kind left behind. This fact, along with Gerry
McCool's remark in a review of Eyes of Faith that Rousselot's book on
love and those articles (there are actually five; see Works Cited) should
be translated, confirmed my resolve to make all of Rousselot's philo
sophical works available. In my judgment he is the most original genius
of all the so-called transcendental Thomists who have transformed
twentieth century Thomism, not despite but through Aquinas. See the
forthcoming: Pierre Rousselot, S.J., Collected Philosophical Works. Volume
I: The Intellectualism of Thomas Aquinas, new translation with an
introduction and notes by Andrew Tallon. Volume II: The Problem of
Love in the Middle Ages, translated with an introduction by Alan
Vincelette; Philosophical Articles, translated with an introduction and
notes by Andrew Tallon. Journals and Course Notes, previously
unpublished materials from the Archives of the Jesuit Province of France,
edited, translated, and with an introduction and notes by Andrew Tallon.
All four volumes will be published by Marquette University Press over
the next three years.
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CHAPTER NINE

The Vicarious Use of Conscience:
Love versus Ideology
FRANS JOZEF VAN BEECK

I

n many ways, the theme of Father Gerald McCool's
philosophical and fundamental-theological scholarship has
been the central theme of neo-Thomism of the "transcendental"
variety: human self-awareness as_ a fundamental anthropological
and theological given. On this 'subject, the idee maitresse of a
Catholic intellectual tradition of close to two centuries' standing,
Father McCool has mainly adopted the historian's posture. But
like any historian worth his salt, he has been not a chronicler but
an interpreter, i.e., a thinker who shows his own hand, albeit
mostly indirectly. By virtue of this hermeneutical stance, he has
been a reliable guide to a philosophical and theological landscape
of which he is an integral part rather than just a commentator,
let alone a mere tour guide. And he has done so not only as a
Jesuit at a Jesuit university, but also (and here he has acted in
ways that are less typical of Jesuits) as a team player, as one
member of the small group of talented Jesuit philosophers and
fundamental theologians at Fordham University who were as
like-minded as they were independent. Who among North
American students of Catholic philosophy and fundamental
theology over the last forty years has not heard of W. Norris
Clarke, Joseph Donceel, Robert Johann, J. Quentin Lauer,
Gerald McCool, Robert O'Connell, Vincent Potter, William
Richardson, and Walter Stokes, not to mention (admittedly at a
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substantial remove from Fordham) Gerald McCool's hero, Karl
Rahner?
As an intellectual tribute to this gentle, modest, learned Jesuit
priest, I propose, in this essay, to address a theme that never
loomed really large in transcendental Thomist thought, yet has
an inner affinity with it. By and large, the transcendental
Thomists were interested, ever since the days of Joseph Marechal
and Pierre Rousselot, in the transcendental preconditions of
reliable human knowledge. By contrast, the theme of this essay is
conscience, that transcendental precondition par excellence of
responsible human action. Specifically, I want to explore, by way
of a little late-twentieth-century exhortatio ad martyrium, an
ethical issue which has given rise, in recent social thought and
practice, especially in milieus favorable to liberation-theology and
Ideologiekritik, to quite some excitement and idealism, much of it
genuine, but some of it quite undiscerning, and even (or so it
would seem) downright immoral. That theme is thoroughgoing,
principled altruism as a moral imperative. 1
Cosmic Alienation and the Emergence of Conscience
No true human identity without life in alienation.2 And
alienation is not a simple, black-and-white proposition. Rather,
the experience of alienation reflects the entire range of dynamics
open to humanity as the one genuinely cosmic agent that enjoys
transcendence over cosmic process and at the same time finds
itself inalienably oriented to the mystery of God. Accordingly, it
involves us in a dynamic process with many shades of grey (or
rather, with many colors shading off into each other). That is to
say, the human experience of alienation occurs at different levels:
cosmological, anthropological, theological.
For present purposes, let us more or less take for granted
that human engagement with otherness occurs at the cosmo
logical (i.e., the biophysical, psychophysical, sentient) level. At
this (initially pre-moral) level, human beings draw life and
growth from cosmic otherness, and they do so not only by
depending on it, but also by facing it and by facing it down, and
even by attempting to force it to comply with them. While
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holding the appalling capacity for a subhuman life governed
largely by passion, life in cosmic alienation naturally has. a
positive prognosis. In and of itself it may not be the fully human
life, but it certainly lends itself to it. For at this level, our
sensibilities are shaped, and indirectly, our mentalities - that is,
the accomplishments that are the prelude to a life not only
disciplined and civilized, but also positively and deliberately
moral. If things go well in our growth and development, others
will sustain us and challenge us and thus fashion us with nurture
and discipline; this will awaken in us, in due course, an aware
ness of our own place in the community of mutual care. It will
also help bring to the surface specific character traits and tastes
both individual and communal; and these will in turn support
reliable habits of self-discipline as well as lay the foundation for
properly chosen commitments. Beyond this, the care offered to
us by close-by others will inspire in us an emergent sense of self,
along with a first consciousness of an individual (or rather,
personal) conscience, mainly in the form of a developed moral
sense. Thus we come to find ourselves on the threshold of
genuine freedom.3
As promised, this essay will not go into any detail in the area
of the dynamics of life in cosmic alienation. Instead, it will focus
on the human engagement with otherness as it occurs at the dis
tinctively anthropological level. In other words, our issue is: how
does engagement with otherness occur in the properly human
(i.e., deliberate) life - the life of emergent rationality and free
choice, of growth and development in humanitas proper, and
thus, of morality and immorality, and hence of the self-conscious,
conscientious self?
The first point to be made here is that human development
toward mature virtue will never leave. behind the matrix from
which it emerges; as long as we live, we remain beholden to the
sentient, passionate life and its powerful dynamics. As we mature,
we realize that we cannot live without passion and sense. But we
will also realize that if we live largely by them, we will find
ourselves mindlessly craving, not only to live, but also to secure
life at all costs. Worse, we will find ourselves fighting to secure
life by hook or by crook, regardless, against all odds and against
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all comers. Only on the basis of this sobering piece of self
knowledge can we make the much-needed efforts, not only to
discern the difference between the impulse of vital passion and
the life of the mind, but also to act on that discernment in such
a way as to integrate sense and sensibility into the life of
deliberation in a balanced fashion. And conversely, only to the
extent that we succeed in creating this balance will we also begin
to plumb the depth of humanity's inclination and even prepared
ness to place its powers of deliberation mindlessly at the service
of passion and sensuality. Thus a good sign of growth in the
direction of our true (if always to some extent presumed) integ
rity is this: that we find ourselves consciously noticing as well as
acknowledging the extent to which we continue to be beset by a
clutter of confusions and imbalances inherent in alienation,
confusions and imbalances giving rise to concupiscence at the
sentient level. And on the other hand, should we find ourselves
habitually judging and 'taking action rashly and inconsiderately
(that is, on the basis of passion, imbalance, sensibility, and the
waves of concupiscence), we would do well to take this as a sign
of personal and moral misdevelopment, for we would be allow
ing ourselves to be led by the instinctual, the agreeable, or (at
best) the merely convenient, rather than by the reasonable, the
normative, the conscientious, the truly humane.
No wonder conscience (and hence, the conscious, conscien
tious self) is elusive. It has a way of surprising us as we develop.
It will surface, sporadically perhaps but unmistakably, in memo
rable experiences of felt self-identity and responsibility (but also,
often no less frequently, of confusion about and disenchantment
with ourselves). If and to the extent that we really mature, this
deeper self will even manifest itself habitually, frequently by way
of a basic, wordless sense of contentment with how we are
turning out and who we are, especially if we are fortunate
enough to find ourselves surrounded, affirmed, guided, and
corrected by the affectionate concern shown us by morally
mature others. Thus enabled and cheered, we will find ourselves
moving, whether gradually or by leaps and bounds, from mere
craving to authentic desire, from mere fantasy to creative imagi
nation, from self-maintenance and self-assertion to self-acceptance
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and self-possession, from absorption and immersion in otherness
to positive regard for otherness. We will grow in detachment,
habitually rise above passion, and attain levels of serenity and
apatheia at which our moral sense is increasingly animated by a
deep, liberating sense of duty.4 Thus we will reach levels of
maturity at which other-regarding, humane love becomes an
attractive option, or even a fairly reliable habit.
Accordingly, we will find ourselves enabled to prize other
things in their distinctiveness, and other persons even more so; to
the extent we do so, we will also discover our truer, more genuine
selves. This in turn will greatly enhance our native, distinctively
human ability to transcend passion and narrow self-interest;
inspired by a curious, hard-to-pin-down love and a deep-seated
desire for goodness,' we will find ourselves shaping ourselves in a
truly deliberate, responsible fashion. In short, we are becoming
deliberately "self-actualizing" persons, capable of deep self
acceptance and loving regard for all that is other. In practice, this
willing formation of self takes the form of a lifelong pursuit of a
whole array of intentionally acquired habits of enjoyably respon
sible, conscientious living: virtues.
Conscience
Conscience is elusive. It is not a fixed, solid entity within us
that readily offers itself to observation and study. This is not
surprising. Conscience, after all, is a function of humanity's
transcendental attunement to all that is and, ultimately, to God.
Like the attunement itself, conscience comes into effective,
experienced existence only by emergence, a lifelong process. Like
the transcendental attunement, too, conscience can become an
"object" of understanding only by reflection. But then again,
what gives rise to this reflection is none other than the experi
ence of conscience itself, both in others and in oneself. But since
the mature experience of conscience is a function of the devel
oping moral life, conscience offers itself for reflection only to
those learning to live conscientiously.5
We must conclude that conscience comes into its own only
in alienation. That is to say, the formed conscience arises within
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and through concrete situations: situations involving objective,
"material" values "out there," values appealing to the given,
specifically human sense of moral responsibility. Thus, while
arising from the depth of the human spirit, conscience never
ceases to be beholden to otherness, as to the matrix of its own
emergence. Conscience's highest function, the sense of duty, will
not emerge in us apart from a reliable, realistic, fairly articulate,
ever-developing moral sense.
This moral sense derives almost entirely from otherness, of
course. It results from behavior enjoined on us or suggested to us
or demanded of us or drawn forth from us by "outside" factors:
early training and conditioning, familial nurture, religious and
cultural formation, and countless other forms of discipline,
precept, challenge, and invitation. Besides, the moral sense results
from the demands made upon our sense of duty by the values we
spontaneously feel are objectively resident in otherness - other
persons, other things.
It follows that positive, situational data, past, present, and to
come, are conscience's starting capital as well as the stuff of its
continuing activity and development. External facts and objective
values, in other words, remain pertinent to us even in our
deepest moral maturity; at no time can conscience afford to stop
appreciating, recounting, evaluating, and reevaluating them.
It also follows (as Max Scheler has so admirably shown in
Der Formalismus in der Ethik, and as his admirer, Pope John II,
has recently recalled in his encyclical Veritatis Splendor) that the
genuinely mature conscience is not the individual conscience that
claims to have successfully emancipated itself from the matrix of
its emergence, which is otherness.6 That is, the mature conscience
is not simply autonomous, responsible to nothing and nobody
but itself, and hence, purely formal (as the Enlightenment tended
to imagine, foolishly). Rather, it is the conscience that has come
alive, thanks to the developing sense of duty deeply resident
within itself (that is, ultimately, thanks to the sense of God), to
the objective conditions of its own ongoing emergence. These
"objective conditions" consist in life as it is lived in practice, day
after day. The mature conscience, in other words, results (in the
words that Plato attributes to Socrates) from the practice of:
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raising questions, on a daily basis, regarding the
nature of virtue and regarding the other things
about which you can hear me talk with others
and scrutinizing both myself and others.7
Conscience Used in the Service of Self-Representation
In explaining this, we have, very importantly, uncovered the
first and fundamental use of conscience. Conscience represents in
us our own selves as essentially responsible subjects. By keeping us
alive to moral issues that face us, our conscience represents, to
each of us, the "better self" that we have become; it also repre
sents to us the "better self" that we are not or have not yet
become, yet are natively called to be.
Let us term this use of our conscience self-representative. We
avail ourselves of our conscience in a self-representative manner
whenever we have recourse to it as the inner faculty that enables
us to take responsibility for ourselves as free agents. Let us put
this more descriptively. We use our conscience in a self-represent
ative manner whenever we scrutinize, test, and appraise our own
lives and the lives of others with whom we are connected by
bonds of moral association, with a view to both amending our own
lives and enhancing their moral quality. This occurs at two levels.
More obviously and perceptibly, by taking stock of our
behavior, we test and examine our actions (and thus indirectly
ourselves) by existing norms. These are offered to us by our
concrete moral sense - that is, by such prevalent moral norms
as we recognize as conscientiously binding on ourselves. In doing
so, we at least implicitly regard these norms as equally binding,
as a matter of ordinary justice, on other members of the moral
(and religious) community or communities of which we are
members. Conscience understood as moral sense is what enables
us to examine our lives and ourselves, so as to reveal to us our
moral standing, both in our own eyes and (presumably) before
the tribunal of the particular moral community to which we
belong and presumably are content to belong.
Less obtrusively and more basically, however, conscience
enables us to test our actions and ourselves by reference to a
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decisively higher tribunal, namely our sense of duty, the thirst
for goodness residing within us. Conscience understood in this
latter capacity represents, at the heart of our day-to-day lives, the
"perfect selves" we deeply aspire to being, at least implicitly,
before God. This boundless aspiration is superior to any moral
norm, no matter how conscientiously accepted and followed;
accordingly, it essentially transcends the limited norms by which
the moral community is accustomed to test itself and its members.
For the true measure of the moral caliber of our "cause" - that
is, of our lives as total projects - is not law but never-ending
desire. It alone sets the ever-receding standard of excellence that
keeps alive what is deepest in us: the ceaseless quest both for
moral integrity and for the transcendent Goodness that beckons
us beyond all moral integrity.
Socrates, who knows this and who makes this quest a matter
of daily practice, explains that it springs from "the familiar
oracular impulse of the divine spirit" in him. This spirit not only
warns him away from what he should not do; it is also the
"manifestation of the god," the mysterious divine presence deep
down within him, about which he finds it impossible to "keep
quiet" without "being disobedient to the god."8
No less than Socrates, John Henry Newman is familiar with
the ,experience of transcendence as integral to the experience of
conscience; he can even turn it into an argument for the existence of
a transcendent God. But he is equally concerned to regard the
moral sense, that yardstick of objectivity and adjustment to
otherness, as an integral part of the experience of conscience,
even though he rightly holds that particular duties enjoined by
the moral sense are legitimately subject to change, and hence, we
may infer, to responsible debate.
Thus, for Newman as for the Great Tradition of the West,
conscience is that mysterious reality within us by virtue of which
we mediate, more and more responsibly as we grow, between the
living God and the whole range of values resident in the universe.
No wonder that, in a splendidly indignant passage, Newman can
turn this double conviction into a sharp indictment of the way in
which modern liberalism has confused conscience with autono
mous, wholly self-regarding, heedless self-will:
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Now let us see what is the notion of conscience
in this day in the popular mind. When men
advocate the right of conscience, they in no
sense mean the rights of the Creator, nor the
duty to Him, in thought and deed, of the
creature; but the right of thinking, speaking,
writing, and acting, according to their judgment
or their humour, without any thought of God at
all. They do not even pretend to go by any
moral rule, but they demand, what they think is
an Englishman's prerogative, for each to be his
own master in all things, and to profess what he
pleases, asking no one's leave, and accounting
priest or preacher, speaker or writer, unutterably
impertinent, who dares to say a word against his
going to perdition, if he like it, in his own way.
Conscience has rights because it has duties; but in
this age, with a large portion of the public, it is
the very right and freedom of conscience to dis
pense with conscience, to ignore a Lawgiver and
Judge, to be independent of unseen obligations.
It becomes a license to take up any or no
religion, to take up this or that and let it go
again, to go to church, to go to chapel, to boast
of being above all religions and to be an im
partial critic of each of them. Conscience is a
stern monitor, but in this century it has been
superseded by a counterfeit, which the eighteen
centuries prior to it never heard of, and could
not have mistaken for it, if they had. It is the
right of self-will.9
With this, we have arrived at a point of no return. In the last
analysis, conscience is oriented away from self and toward both
otherness and Transcendence. This explains that the Great
Tradition has recognized a second, more self-transcendent, and
hence, more admirable use of conscience: conscience used in the
service of representation of the other. Let us put this in different
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words. The Christian conscience continues the Jewish tradition
of acknowledging that certain obligations are incumbent on us
simply because the inherent worth of others - other persons,
other things - demands that we do justice to it. This vital issue,
largely overlooked by the Enlightenment and its aftermath, but
also by most textbooks of traditional Catholic moral theology,
must be examined and pondered at some length.
Conscience Used in the Service of Representing the Other
Developmentally speaking, morally mature persons have a
knack for presence to others freely and spontaneously offered,
for disinterested identification with others, for generous self
communication to others in such a way as to enhance, not dis
place, their integrity and identity. In other words, human self
actualization has an innate drift toward a mature, implicitly
theonomous form of self-transcendence: positive regard for other
ness precisely as other, a disposition better known as selfless love.
Here we meet once again the delightful paradoxes of authentic
self-transcendence: the more self-transcendent we are, the more
creatively immanent in others we are liable to be; the more we
live by our immanent integrity, the more liable we are to tran
scend ourselves by creatively identifying with and enhancing the
other precisely as other. Mature moral integrity is identical with
the recognition, the acceptance, and even the cherishing of the basic
moral integrity of the other.
This implies that the conscientious life becomes fully
responsible (because fully responsive) only at the outer limit of
the deliberate life, where the life of duty turns into the practice
of love. This is so because in the self-forgetful regard extended to
others, moral responsibility fully becomes a function of respon
sive identity, of the kind that approximates that coincidence of
identity and alienation which is the essence of love.10
Let us rephrase this: morality is maturer according as it
grows in the ability to recognize and embrace otherness inas
much as it makes unconditional claims on the conscience. To the
morally mature, other persons {and occasionally, things of rare
value and nobility as well) embody, in and of themselves, the
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kind of concrete (and in that sense, "objective") moral demand
that itnmediately appeals to conscience, and·which in that sense
surpasses the abstract objectivity characteristic of moral norms.
So whenever and wherever responsiveness to otherness becomes
the heart of the deliberate life, moral maturity is existentially
redefined. It is no longer measured by the ability of human
persons to live by the moral law, but experienced as directly
proportionate to their ability to accept the integrity of the other
as the measure of the moral quality of their own conduct.
The Letter to Diognetus implies this. After drawing an
engaging picture of Christians as ordinary citizens and giving
some telling examples of practices of morality and love freely
undertaken by them, it sums up the Christian understanding of
moral maturity in a simple claim, which both states the differ
ence between prevalent ethical standards and Christian conduct
and softens it: "[Christians] obey the established laws and in
their own lives outdo the laws." 11 Dietrich Bonhoeffer's ethical
thought provides another instance of this drift in the direction of
a higher morality. Always mindful of tendencies toward self
righteousness and immaturity inherent in the cultivation of
moral laws, he regards responsibility freely undertaken as more
crucial to Christian conduct than either obedience or freedom. In
our own day, Emmanuel Levinas has powerfully restated a
central conviction of the Jewish and Christian traditions by
emphasizing that the concrete other person embodies the
unconditional moral imperative that comes to us, ultimately,
from God.
Let us now forge ahead in our argument, cautiously. Wherever
and whenever morally mature persons respond to others out of
inner concern for them, regardless of the prevailing moral laws
(even though seldom in deliberate contempt of them), this is apt
to become a matter of public witness. For it stands to reason that
those habitually disposed to live by selfless love will regard the
love of others as the genuine measure of the moral standing of
the human community at large. They will convey this conviction
not only tacitly, by conduct, but quite often in explicit words as
well. Accordingly, morally mature persons (and the religious
communities that often are their spiritual homes) have a way of
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commending a demanding love ethic to the moral community at
large, even though they will at the same time admit that it is
seldom feasible to codify such an ethic, let alone make it an
obligation or enforce it as a matter of moral law.
In this way, very importantly, we have discovered, m
addition to the first use of conscience, the second use of
conscience mentioned in the previous section: representation of
the other. Conscience is used to represent the other (or, in the
terminology adopted here, used "vicariously") whenever people
explicitly and thematically appeal to conscience in order to take
responsibility for the moral claims of otherness in all (or at least
some of) its forms. Human persons and communities do this
whenever they resort to their own conscience to scrutinize, test,
and appraise the ways in which justice is being done (or not
being done) to persons (and occasionally things) other than
themselves, and with a view to changing at least their own
conduct in their regard out of loving consideration for them.
This use of conscience, in other words, is a function of the moral
life understood, not primarily as the pursuit of one's own
personal moral integrity and identity, but as a life lived for
others and in the service of the truly common good. Such a life
is open only to the secure; it can spring only from a relatively
untroubled, "decentered" experience of identity - that is, an
experience of identity as responsive. And since "responsive self
experience becomes manifest in the phenomenon of witness,"
those motivated to live by responsive identity will represent and
uphold the moral claims of those they love; in this way, they
will implicitly become the advocates of selfless love embraced as
the first (in the sense of highest) principle of mature morality.12
Like the first, self-representative use of conscience, this
second, vicarious use of conscience occurs at two levels. More
obviously and perceptibly, conscientious living means using the
norms offered to us by our moral sense: when established human
rights of allegedly universal application are being trampled, the
truly moral will take the part of the unjustly marginalized. If life
is taken to be a life lived for others, the integrity of the other
demands that their moral claims be honored. Now, since we
derive our moral sense largely from the moral community to
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which we belong, odds are that, in the life lived for others, we
take our bearings from a community that considers selflessness a
central value. Not surprisingly, therefore, we will find ourselves
examining our actions (and thus ourselves) by reference to the
"positive divine law" cherished (if not always observed) by the
Jewish and Christian traditions. 13 This "law" commends and
sometimes even enjoins, as a matter of principle and in a great
variety of ways, forgetfulness of self and self-abandon in the
service of others (even of bothersome others), so much so that
Paul can commend "carrying one another's burdens" simply as
the fulfillment of "the law of Christ." This law is recounted and
celebrated in narratives of, and exhortations to, self-sacrificing
love kept alive in the community of faith. 14
More fundamentally, however, we test our actions and our
selves by recourse to a higher, far more dynamic norm, namely,
the sense of duty in us, animated, in the last resort, by our
transcendental attunement to God. But when conscience, and the
sense of duty inherent in it, are put to the task of representing
others, something happens to the sense of duty that carries us
forward to the living God: it takes on compelling moral features.
The ever-receding standard of excellence set by the sense of duty
becomes concrete for us in the face of the other, calling for
unconditional love. The conscientious but morally self-regarding
scribe looking for a sound but essentially limited moral answer
to the question, "Who is my neighbor?" finds his question
tacitly reversed by "the Man for Others," and turned into a
challenge that knows no bounds. That challenge is: "Who can I
be a neighbor to?" (see Lk 10, 29.36).
Here we find ourselves at the outer limit of the deliberate
life. Those who embrace a life lived for others find themselves
opting for the double love command as the heart of daily living;
they venture to take their stand at the juncture where morality
reaches its peak and turns into theonomy, in the concrete shape
of self-sacrificing, worshipful love. They propose, in the words of
Ruusbroec, to "make [their] home between the love of God and
of our fellow-Christian," and indeed, of the human family at
large. 15 They aim to find themselves (that is, to attain their true
identity) by losing themselves (see Mk 8, 35 parr.) in the service
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of others, by a commitment to radical mediation. In this more
deeply moral universe, the truly common good is the glory of
God and the dignity of all human persons without exception,
and ultimately, of the whole world.
Naturally, the question arises how conscience used vicar
iously differs from, and how it is continuous with, conscience
used as self-representative. In traditional terminology, liow are
the obligations resulting from charity different from, and con
tinuous with, the obligations springing from justice? 16
Conscience and Theonomy
For the sake of clarity, let us begin by stating our conclusion.
The vicarious use of conscience differs from the self-representative in
that, in the last analysis, it is truly and inescapably theonomous.
Accordingly, much as commitments in justice and commitments in
charity have this in common that they both inherently relate
human persons and communities to the living God, justice is theo
nomous only virtually and in the last resort, whereas charity is
theonomous directly and in actuality. This can be approximated and
argued as follows.
When maturely conscientious persons appeal to their conscience
to call for justice for all, without exception, they cannot help
putting their own selves on the line. Paradoxically, though, in so
doing they do not mean to put forward their own moral selves as a
warrant for the justice of their cause; that would be tying the cause
of others to a profession of their own moral excellence, an exercise
in naivete at best, in smugness at worst. Rather, in bearing witness,
in their own persons, to the inherent moral worth of all human
beings, such witnesses have to move beyond conscientious self
representation. The ground on which they take their conscientious
stand, therefore, must be not their own moral standing, but their
own integral persons as the concrete representatives of the inherent
claims of others. These "others" include each and every concrete
human being (and at times even deeply humane concerns), regardless
of their present standing in the moral community.
At the heart of this witness, therefore, lies the paradoxical
conviction (but one well known in the Jewish and Christian
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traditions) that, in the last resort, a moral ·community can enjoy
equal justice only if its disadvantaged members are given prefer
ential treatment. What we have here in modern dress is not only
the ancient Hebrew Bible's notion that the treatment accorded,
beyond the limits of strict justice, to widows and orphans is the
true yardstick of a community's moral standing before God, but
also, and especially, the community ethic enjoined by Paul on
the church at Corinth by recourse to the allegory of the body (1
Cor 12:7-26).
Paul explicitly as well as very forcefully states that, by virtue
of the one Holy Spirit, the communal body is one, but (since the
Holy Spirit is the source of gifts) this unity occurs only because
the different members have different gifts to offer to one another.
These differences, he implies, are not unrelated to the fact that
there prevails a hierarchy among the members; the organs of the
full-grown natural human body (which displays its eminence by
its erect posture) are arranged in an ascending order of honor or
dignity (time: v. 24), a commonplace idea in the ancient world.
Thus the organs of sight are placed higher than those of hearing,
which conveys that they are superior to them; thus, too, the ears
are superior to the organs of smell, which in turn are higher than
the organs of taste and of touch; in the same way, the head is
superior to the hands, and the hands to the feet. Paul does not
explicitly mention the order customarily thought to obtain
among the internal organs: the brain over the heart, the heart
over the liver, the liver over the intestines and the sex organs;
but he does imply this hierarchy by stating, that some parts of
the body are "weaker" (asthenestera, with connotations of
"softer" and "needier") in comparison with higher organs,
whose nobility (so it was thought) is underscored by the hard
ness, respectively, of the skull and the rib cage that encase them.
What is very interesting in Paul's detailed allegory is that the
first threat offered to the unity of the body comes, not from the
higher organs asserting their superiority, but from the lower
reading themselves out of the unity of the body - that is, by the
foot and the ear saying that they are not really part of the body
because, respectively, they are not a hand or an eye (vv. 15-16).
The problem raised for the body's unity by the higher organs is
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different. It is that they regard themselves, not so much as
superior (for that is what they are), but as the whole; conse
quently, they jeopardize the body's unity not so much by their
greater influence as by their failure to include the other
members: "I do not need you" (v. 21). If this posture of self
sufficiency on the part of the higher members were to prevail,
that would be the end of the body (v. 19); the higher members
must recognize the lower members as necessary. This implicitly
raises the question, How are the inferior members to be assured
that they are truly members of the body?
Paul has his answer ready: by a policy of studied inequality
of treatment. To assure them that they are part of the body and
have a share in its dignity, we surround the weaker members,
generally considered less dignified (atimotera) or even downright
improper (aschemona), with honor proportionate to the embar
rassment inherent in their lowly estate: we dress them up, a
recognition the higher members do not need (vv. 23-24). In
. Paul's vision, therefore, the unity of the body is a matter of real
equality, but this equality is not a natural given (for naturally,
the members do not have equal status), but the fruit of a unified,
unifying effort at mutual concern (to auto hyper allelon merim
nosin ta mela: v. 25), regardless of differences. Only if all the
community's members take responsibility for each other's needs
and claims will the grief or the joy of any member be the grief
or the joy of all; only in this way, that is, will the community
effectively embody Christ (v. 27).
Recent years have seen interesting Catholic attempts to
commend to whole societies, as a high form of morality, the
other-regarding love that underlies the use of conscience in
representation of others unable to represent themselves. In the
first social encyclical, Rerum Novarum (1891), Pope Leo XIII had
already pointed out that it is incumbent on rulers and govern
ments to protect and promote "in the highest degree" the
legitimate interests of the working poor, to assure them, by
appropriate legislation consistently enforced, of the benefits from
their labor due to them under the rubric of distributive justice.
In recent years, conscientious witness on behalf of the poor
and the marginal has taken the shape of two interesting
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documents issued by bishops' conferences. First, there is the call,
issued at Puebla, Mexico, in January, 1979, by the Conference of
Latin American Bishops, for a "preferential option for the poor
and for the young." 17 In issuing this call, the bishops implicitly
appeal, of course, to the understanding that Latin America is a
Christian civilization, even though they recognize the pressure of
growing pluralism, and indicate some directions for a positive
Catholic response to it. Understandably, no such understanding
underlies the United States bishops on the economy, which seeks
to offer a Catholic contribution to the development of a "moral
vision" that can be recognized as "common ground" by citizens
at large, with their "different backgrounds and concerns." 18 Still,
while recognizing this context, the bishops do not hesitate to
issue a characteristically Christian call for "a fundamental 'option
for the poor "' and for that most threatened of moral institutions
in the United States, the family. Interestingly, they justify this
appeal by pointing out that preferential treatment of the poor is
connected with a value publicly recognized in the United States
as fundamental, human dignity and the rights predicated on it a connection that received Vatican endorsement in the same year
in which the American bishops' letter saw the light. 19
In taking this conscientious stand on behalf of the moral
claims of others, especially the poor, the witnesses find
themselves "convert[ing] to God's valuing of the universe, and
therefore to the intelligibilities intrinsic to it."20 Thus they
cannot help appealing, at least implicitly, to God by means of a
twofold appeal. Since God is the transcendent Source and Guar
antor of the inalienable worth of every single human being and
hence, of the moral claims predicated on that worth, so the
witnesses will at least implicitly claim, God is also the Guarantor
of the integrity of the conscientious stance they themselves
choose to adopt as their own. This two-pronged, unmistakably
theological appeal conclusively demonstrates that the vicarious
use of conscience pushes all the parties concerned beyond current
understandings of the common good (that is, of accepted moral
ity). Precisely because of this, it has dramatic consequences, both
social and personal. These consequences demand careful descrip
tion and analysis.
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The Effects of the Vicarious Use. of Conscience
First of all, the vicarious use of conscience constitutes a
public call for general, and indeed sweeping, moral conversion.
What is significant about this call (and this is a crucial
observation) is that its appeal is of the non-theoretical kind. Let
us put this in descriptive terms. Whenever a few conscientiously
motivated witnesses presume to stand up on behalf of all, this
invariably reminds the many in the moral community, not of
humanity in general (that would be harmless enough), but of
very part_icular human beings, whom they would rather not be
reminded of, namely, those in the community (whether they be
few or many) who are not in a position to represent themselves,
whether materially or morally: the powerless, the marginal, and
the lonely and unloved - in short, the victims of every kind.21
Thus the established moral community finds its cherished (or
at least current) moral sense prophetically (that is, uncom
fortably) called into question by an appeal to none other than
the living God, seldom to its liking, and sometimes to its
downright consternation. This is not surprising, for a direct
appeal to God in criticism of the established order is more than
most settled, responsible, moral communities will ordinarily
bargain for. The reason for this is that such theological appeals
take the moral discussion beyond the practical, manageable,
responsible life; they shake the foundations, not just of the
deliberate life, but of human life tout court. .
In other words, the impression is created that the conscien
tious witnesses are unconcerned about the common good, and
this impression is intensified by the fact that conscientious
witnesses are usually indignant, which makes them look aggressively
opposed to the common good. Yet the witnesses' indignation is
the inevitable concomitant of their compassion with the victims
they champion;22 the undeserved ill fortune suffered by victims
is, in the eyes of the witnesses, an implicit indictment of the
good fortune of the fortunate; annunciation involves denunci
ation, as Gustavo Gutierrez has explained so well. And, since the
fortunate tend to think of themselves as deserving (are they not
the upholders of the order of justice, and thus its rightful
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beneficiaries as well?), those who champion victims look like
enemies of the common good, despite the fact that what moti
vates them is not aggression or temper, but compassion and grief.
Besides, the witnesses' stance reflects a self-commitment, which
makes them look like personifications of aggression and temper.
No wonder genuine witnesses tend to be as unpopular personally
as the causes they espouse. That is, they will meet not so much
with objective disagreement as with fierce incomprehension in
regard to their persons, in the form of mockery, suspicion, slurs
and insinuations, charges of disloyalty and irreligiosity, threats of
violence, and actual violence, sometimes even of the judicial kind.
This not only challenges the witnesses; it also profoundly
changes their self-experience. For they will find themselves under
pressure, not only internally, by reason of the conscientious
stance they have adopted, but also externally, by reason of the
opposition they encounter at the hands of the moral establish
ment. And since an unconditional stand on behalf of others
implies an appeal to God, the witnesses will find themselves
driven, by the inner logic of the vicarious use of conscience they
have adopted, into a personally adopted stance of unconditional
abandon to God - that is, of absolute, naked faith.23
Not surprisingly, this radical posture will stir up in the wit
nesses that critical feature of humanity: its "unstable ontological
constitution."24 But there's the rub. For when conscientious
witnesses to the moral integrity of others will find themselves
faced with the anxiety-provoking, fully theological choice that
puts the responsible life as a whole in the balance, they must
choose in the teeth of adverse human judgment. That is to say, they
must opt either for reliance on God's just judgment and acceptance
of the misery inherent in the stance they adopt on the basis of their
analysis of the situation of injustice, or for the parody of these two:
aggressive self-justification and self-righteousness, and towering rage
against the status quo and the powers that be.
Appealing to Conscience in the Service of Alleged Love
Here, if anywhere, what becomes crucial is the difference
between an ever fuller yet elusive identity established by reference to
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others and to a gracious God, and an incomplete, irresolute ego
desperately dependent on self-assurance and hence, apt to be
obtrusive. To the extent that the witnesses fail to endure the
unsettling combination of outside pressure and the inner
trepidation that is the common lot of humanity seeking self
definition, the stances they take on behalf of the weak will turn
inauthentic. That is, unsure of their own deeper selves and afraid
of death, the witnesses will get both in their own way and in the
way of the very others whose cause they champion. They will
shift their ground, away from deep identity and toward ego that is, away from responsiveness and toward self-affirmation;
away from weakness and self-abandon and toward power, self
maintenance, and self-assertion; away from compassion with
victims and toward bitterness toward the establishment; away
from justice and love and toward temper and violence. In this
way, the witnesses will become painfully defensive and self
serving; what began as an exercise in the vicarious use of
conscience deteriorates into an exercise in the self-representative
use of conscience, except that the latter is now aimed, not at self
examination, but at self-defense and self-justification. Even worse,
this self-serving use of conscience simulates its exact opposite the vicarious use of conscience. Miserably, "proper partiality"
turn� "improper," as inauthentic moral self-representation now
postures as �uthentic representation of the other, and belligerent
self-righteousness masquerades as divinely inspired compassion.25
In this tragedy of moral pretense, the focus of moral and
religious attention irrevocably shifts. The victims and their plight
are displaced by the forceful self-righteous and their causes; and
the disadvantaged (on whose behalf the stand was taken in the
first place) are lost sight of; they become victims once again, with
only the living God to take their part.
The consequences of this are not so much moral as theological.
God and the cause of justice are now going to be claimed by all the
parties in the fray. Pathetically, people of good will (including, at
times, well-intentioned bearers of ecclesiastical office) will forge new
authoritative (but essentially political, i.e., non-theological) parties
and alliances in order to settle things by mediating, not between
God and the victims of injustice, but between the righteous at war.
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This usually serves only to intensify the central problem,
which is that the living God is tacitly treated as the God of some
at the expense of others. In this way, intolerant claims to moral
and conscientious excellence obscure the divine countenance once
again, only worse than before. All (except the powerless, the
marginal, and the unloved, who have little choice) forget that
peace and justice are to be expected, not from the victory of the
righteous, but from the conversion of all to the living God,
whose mercy is for those who live in awe of God, and who
forever disappoints claimants to righteousness. For the God of
peace and justice is the God whose omnipotence encompasses the
power to be wholly self-effacing; the God who alone can disarm
the righteous, bring them to the realization that they are self
engrossed, caught in the middle, "worn down, pitiable, destitµte,
blind, and without cover" (Rev 3:17), and thus, the victims of
their own self-defeating strategies; the God who alone can teach
them that, at bottom, life and goodness lie in endurance (see Lk
21:19).
Conscience and Martyrdom
These sobering realizations open the door to an under
standing of what is really involved in the vicarious use of
conscience. Here if anywhere, it is essential to sit down and
count the cost (see Lk 14:28). Deciding to live for others, to
stand up for victims - the powerless, the marginal, the lonely,
and the unloved - is a matter of taking responsibility for their
suffering, not from a comfortable distance, but by participation.
That is, it is a matter of agreeing to share in it by agreeing to be
a victim, freely and willingly. In this way, taking a stand on
behalf of the poor, the disenfranchised, and the victimized
involves, as a matter of principle (and if it should have to come
to that, also in practice), the agreement to suffer for their sake
without attempting to force anyone else to pay the price - that
is, without attempting to pass their own suffering on to others.26
Such meekness is liable to spell death, of course, one way or
another. This is martyrdom, and it is available only to those who
live without fear, no longer intimidated by enemies and liberated
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from the fear of death (see Lk 1:74-75). These are the people who
have learned to live morally by, dint of doing what is beyond
morality: entrusting themselves and the others for whom they live
to God by way of a living offering of praise and thanksgiving.
But this is not all. For in entrusting themselves to God, those
who stand up for victims find themselves faced with a commit
ment of even broader significance. If the living God is the God
of all at the expense of none, then offering oneself to God drives
home what is involved in embracing all human beings, whatever
their cause, not only the victims and their cause. This is
martyrdom at its most bewildering. For by agreeing to live for
others precisely as others - that is, to witness to the inherent
worth of all, good and evil, just and unjust (see Mt 5:45) martyrs find themselves having to agree not to offer resistance to
those who are evil {Mt 5:39), but rather to outdo evil by
goodness (Rom 12:21). This means putting oneself on the line,
not just on behalf of the world's victims, but also on behalf of its
oppressors, those violent prisoners of their own fears of losing
their lives. The Christian tradition has called this: loving one's
enemies. "Loving one's enemies" ends up meaning: being
prepared to die at their hands, and on their behalf.27 That is to
say, in the end, love means being prepared to die on behalf of all.
Jfere we have struck upon the depth of the mature Dietrich
Bonhoeffer's Christological intuition, namely, "that Jesus 'is
there only for others."' He wrote it down during the final phase
of his imprisonment, eight months before he was to give up his life:
Jesus' "being-there-for-others" is the experience
of Transcendence! Only out of his being free
from himself, out of his "being-there-for-others"
unto death, does omnipotence, omniscience,
omnipresence spring. Faith is participation in this
2
being of Jesus. 8
Justice and Love
This love unto death raises a pressing moral question: Is
there any continuity at all between other-regarding, self-
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sacrificing love and common virtue, between charity and justice,
between conscience used in the service of self-representation and
conscience used vicariously? On this subject, two observations
are in order.
In the first place, the vicarious use of conscience, being
predicated on nothing short of total self-abandonment to God,
involves moral risks (as well as theological ones) so enormous
that underrating them is morally irresponsible. It is sometimes
proposed (often in furious denial of the self-serving moral ideals
of the Enlightenment) that the second use of conscience is not
just superior to the first, but in practice radically opposed to it.
Living by reasonable, reliable moral laws, it is then said (especially
by representatives of certain types of passionate moral idealism),
breeds only boredom, moral slavery, and self-rignteousness;
moral freedom, true responsibility, and genuine love are the
privilege only of those moved by the obvious injustice done to
the powerless, the marginal, and the lonely and unloved.
Those embracing this position are usually quite generous;
thus they are living proof that a rational, closed morality fails to
satisfy the human thirst for goodness. Yet they overlook several
things. First, objective moral laws established by right reason
neither cancel nor deny the value of responsibility; in fact, they
implicitly appeal to it because sound moral laws convey precisely
that conscientious agents owe it to the objects of their actions to
do justice to them out of positive regard for the values embodied
in them precisely as other. Second, as well as more unfortunately,
ardent moral and especially religious idealism are not guaranteed
the privilege of immunity from either self-righteousness or
prejudice, as the self-justifying, characteristically ideological
intolerance of moral visionaries regularly shows. In fact, when
compared with the blind, fanatical fury of the morally auto
nomous, the common, humble self-representative use of con
science of the morally heteronomous, while not the pinnacle of
morality, looks preferable, if only because it has at least the
potential for growth in the direction of self-forgetful love.
The second observation. Let us clarify the way in which the
vicarious use of conscience is continuous with its use by way of
self-representation. At the heart of conscienc,e, there resides the
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sense of duty, which guides people to the realization that the
ultimate measure of the moral life can only be a reality of
transcendent justice and holiness that eludes every grasp. Con
science, therefore, even if responsibly used in the service of self
representation, gently but inexorably points the way, beyond the
moral integrity we gain in the life of deliberation, to the tran
scendent region where all human beings both profoundly long to
go and profoundly hesitate to go. For, though made for ever
lasting life, we are unnerved by trepidation, conscious of moral
inadequacy, burdened by sin, mortally afraid of dying; even as
we desire, we malinger. This is where conscience used in the
service of self-representation comes to our aid. The legitimate
concentration on our present moral selves that conscience fosters
can last only so long. In due course (and in any case in the last
resort), morally responsible persons must overcome their concern
with their moral selves and yield to boundless love; relying on
their inner sense of duty, all human beings must sooner or later
entrust themselves to the absolute Otherness, which will carry
them beyond both the limits of morality and the straits of death
into the self-abandon of worship in hopes of life beyond life.
The tradition of the Christian West, especially since the
Reformation, has of course also raised the issue of the continuity
between justice and love in terms of the relationship between
two distinct types of love, the former explicitly Christian, the
latter distinctively human: agape and eras. But that is a s(ory for
another day.
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the private world of subjective preference and preconception; obligation
is alien to it; it is purely voluntary.And since "charity" makes no
moral demands, any hardship excuses one from acts of charity; only
justice is properly a matter of conscience.This reasoning embodies the
spirit of the Enlightenment at its most rationalist and individualist (and,
it should be added, morally minimalist).It assumes that charity is no
more than human generosity, and thus, that justice and charity belong
to two different worlds; life together is assumed to be possible without
forms of loyalty, friendship, or love whose inspiration is transcendent.
It admits no claims on the individual conscience except the obligations
agreed on by public, strictly human consensus; only matters of law are
properly moral.
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This understanding of love and moral obligation, widespread in the
United States and in those parts of the Western world touched by the
Enlightenment, ignores the deeper, transcendental, properly religious
and theological dimensions of morality; it also implicitly denies that
these dimensions can give rise to ,true obligations, experienced and
acknowledged as such not only by inspired individuals but also by
communities that regard their moral selves and their moral world (as
well as the human community at large) as founded on something deeper
than social contract. What is true, therefore, is this: in particular cases,
only severe hardship constitutes an exemption from the obligations of
justice, whereas felt obligations based on human decency leave a much
broader discretionary margin. Thus the maxim must be understood to say:
humanitas non obligat cum tanto incommodo ac iustitia ("in cases of appre
ciable hardship, one is more readily excused from obligations resulting from
hwnan decency than from those resulting from strict justice").
17. Final Document, 1134-1205, in Puebla and Beyond: Documentation
and Commentary, ed. John Eagleson and Philip Scharper (Maryknoll,
NY: Orbis, 1979), 264-72.
18. Economic Justice for All: Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching
and the U.S. Economy, 22 (Washington, D.C.: National Conference of
Catholic Bishops, 1986), 11.
19. See Denzinger-Hiinermann 4760-61.
20. Patrick H. Byrne, "Ressentiment and the Preferential Option for
the Poor," 241.
21. On this subject, James Alison has given us a touching book,
Knowing Jesus (London: SPCK, 1993).
22. Indignation is well defined as "grief over someone else's undeserved
good fortune." See Thomas H. Tobin, "Controversy and Continuity in
Romans 1:18-3:20," Catholic Biblical Quarterly 55 (1993): 298-318. Tobin
gives references to classical treatises on rhetoric for this definition.
23. On "naked faith," see van Beeck, God Encountered, vol. i, §9.
24. See van Beeck, God Encountered, vol. ii/3, §112, 5.
25. See Stephen J. Pope, "Proper and Improper Partiality and the
Preferential Option for the Poor."
26. This phrase is borrowed from Iris Murdoch's novel The Unicom
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1963): "Ate [Gk. Ate: 'fate'] is the name of
the almost automatic transfer of suffering from one being to another.
Power is a form of Ate. The victims of power, and any power has its
victims, are themselves infected. They have then to pass it on, to use
power on others. This is evil, and the crude image of the all-powerful
God is a sacrilege. Good is not exactly powerless. For to be powerless,
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to be a complete victim, may be another source of power.But Good is
non-powerful.And it is in the good that Ate is finally quenched, when
it encounters a pure being who only suffers and does not attempt to
pass the suffering on" (116). It is not farfetched so suppose that the
allusions to Christological themes are intentional on the part of the
author. See van Beeck, God Encountered, vol. ii/2, §110, 4, b, [hh].
27. See F.J. van Beeck, Christ Proclaimed: Christology as Rhetoric
(New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 483.
28. ". .. daB Jesus nur 'fiir andere da ist.' Das 'Fiir-andere-da-Sein'
Jesu ist die Transzendenzerfahrung! Aus der Freiheit von sich selbst, aus
dem 'Fiir-andere-da-Sein' bis zum Tod entspringt erst die Allmacht,
Allwissenheit, Allgegenwart. Glaube ist das T eilnehmen an diesem Sein
Jesu." Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Widerstand und Ergebung: Briefe und
Aufzeignungen aus der Haft (Hamburg and Miinchen: Siebenstem
Taschenbuch, 1966), 191, italics added; translated into English as Letters
and Papers from Prison, revised edition (New York: Macmillan, 1967}, 202.
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APPENDIX

Spirituality and Philosophy:
The Ideal of the Catholic Mind
GERAID A. McCOOL

S

ome time ago, a promising young theologian gave a sermon
before a university audience in Paris which caused quite a
stir. It was blunt and incisive in its assessment of contemporary
intellectual confusion. Three great evils, the young preacher said,
had caused disarray in the modern university. The first was the
intellectual pride of professors who invented new theories simply
to call attention to themselves. The second evil was provoked by
the first. Ceaseless battles, in which truth was the first victim,
went on between factions on the faculty grouped around rival
professors. Given the first two evils, the third and worst became
inevitable. The students gave up all hope of finding the truth. And
so the university, by driving its students into agnosticism through
intellectual despair, finally robbed them of their Catholic faith.
The only cure for these three evils, the preacher continued,
was a return of the university to Chi;ist. There were plenty of
poets, scientists, philosophers, and theologians in the world of
higher education; but Christ, the Word of God, was the only
teacher of truth to be found there: Ch�ist, the Word, Pre-existent
and Incarnate, the universal master of every student - Christus
omnium magister. For, without the light, natural and supernatural,
1ms e5StZJ was presented as the Bishop Curtis Lecture at Sacred Heart University
on April 27, 1989.
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which flows into the human mind from the Word of God, no
thinker's mind can hope to find the truth. Saint Augustine had
seen that centuries ago, and none of us can afford to forget it. But
professors do, and, by cutting themselves off from the light of
Christ, they make their own human minds the ultimate norm of
truth. When that happens. the result is confusion and disarray in
education.
As I said, that sermon was preached some time ago - quite
some time ago - about seven hundred years ago, to be exact. The
preacher was St. Bonaventure, theologian, mystic, educator, and
administrator, friar of the new order of St. Francis, professor of
the new University of Paris, and soon to be elected General of his
order. What he was urging, even as he was teaching in a new way
in what was then a new type of school, was retention of the
tradition of Catholic education which he had inherited from the
Fathers of the Church - the same tradition, by the way, in which
many of you, like me, were educated. Develop that tradition by
all means, even transform it, as he himself was doing at the Uni
versity of Paris, St. Bonaventure urged, but never abandon it.
Otherwise the result will be intellectual confusion in which both
our faith and the truth slip away from us.
It is about this patristic tradition of Catholic education that I
would like to speak to you tonight. It was already an old tradition
when St. Bonaventure helped to bring about one of its great re
newals. As a philosophical theology of culture, education, and
spirituality, it reached back, through Augustine, to the great
theologians of Alexandria, Clement, and Origen. The thirteenth
cen,tury crisis in theology, religious life, and education, provoked
by the rediscovery of Aristotle, the establishment of radically new
kinds of religious orders, and the disp lacement of the monastic and
cathedral school by the university as the center of higher education,
had shaken its foundations. Rising to that challenge, the great
theologians and spiritual writers of the thirteenth century, espe
cially St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, both of them university
professors and members of the new religious orders, brought
about its restoration and development. Challenged once again by
the Reformers and the Humanists of the sixteenth century, this
patristic philosophy of education, theology and spirituality took
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on new life in the Catholic renewal after Trent. It showed itself
in the restoration of Catholic theology and social thought and in
the re-flowering of spirituality among the Carmelites, the Jesuits,
and the priests and religious of the French School. In education it
took on new life by adapting itself to the age of the baroque in
the curriculum of the new Jesuit colleges. Almost buried in the
Enlightenment, the patristic tradition came back to life once more
and adapted itself to the modern age in the great Catholic Renais
sance of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Our system
of Catholic schools, the growth of teaching congregations, and the
social teaching of our popes from Leo XIII to Pius XI are memo
rials of that last reincarnation of the tradition to which a number
of us owe our intellectual formation.
Essential to this tradition, which seems to survive through
constant transformation, is the conviction, based on both faith and
reason, that the world makes sense and that the human mind has
the power to understand it. That understanding can be brought
about if the liberal arts, science, and philosophy are unified by a
sound and believing mind under the light of faith. Once human
knowledge has been integrated by a coherent education, it will
enable the believing mind to und�rstand God's revealed word.
More than that, it can lead a prayerful and reflective mind through
the meaning which it finds in God's creation to knowledge and
love of God himself. Inspired by that tradition, in its sixteenth
and seventeenth-century form, my own intellectual ancestors, the
old Jesuit schoolmasters, could cheerfully spend their life in the
classroom. For what they were doing was forming minds which,
in the beautiful Ignatian formula, "could find God in all things."
But to assign an aim like that to our own classroom work
today would strike a lot of us as a charming but outmoded ideal.
For, whether we look at the world from the point of view of
culture, philosophy, or theology, the very possibility of that type
of integration of experience has become extremely questionable.
And with good reason. For the philosophical attack on the
foundations of our traditional philosophy of Catholic education
goes deeper today than it has done at any time in the past. And
even those who, like myself, are unwilling to concede that a long
lived tradition has reached at last the moment of its death, must
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admit in all honesty that contemporary philosophy and culture
have brought it to an hour of crisis. We know that, if this time
around, we hope to contribute to another renewal of our inherited
tradition through our philosophical reflection, we will have our
work cut out for us.
We must refresh our memory of the philosophical and theo
logical tradition from which our schools have come; we must
honestly assess the difficulties which are now brought against its
intellectual foundations; and only then can we determine whether
our educational tradition can be renewed once more without
losing its continuity with its past. Should that renewal prove
impossible - and it may - then a completely new aim will have
to be found for Catholic education, and its future history will be
one of rupture, of radical discontinuity, with its past.
Intrinsic to the spirituality of the Church Fathers as it was to
their theology was a view of man, human knowledge, and human
freedom which can be summed up in what I will call the ideal of
the Catholic mind. The same ideal structured the Fathers' philo
sophy of education, the tradition of Catliolic education which we
have inherited from them. That ideal was once as familiar to
Catholic teachers, who knew their Newman, as it was to the
Fathers of the Church, but in the last few decades it has been
practically forgotten. This lapse in our Catholic memory is signi
ficant, as I hope to show you. For the crisis in Catholic education
is due to our present uncertainty as to whether our inherited ideal
of the Catholic mind can continue to serve as a viable aim for
Catholic education.
Let me then speak first about the ideal of the Catholic mind,
its history, its pervasive place in the tradition of Catholic
education, its possibilities for development, its philosophical and
theological foundations. This I will do at some length and with
great affection. Then I will outline the serious intellectual
difficulties brought against the viability of this ideal today. This I
will try to do honestly and soberly. Finally, I will assess the
prospects of this ideal passing in our time through another
moment of continuity through transformation. This I will do
tentatively and with great caution.
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The Ideal of the Catholic Mind
When, at the turn of the century, a group of American Jesuits
decided to found a review of Catholic intellectual interest, the
name which they decided to give it was The Catholic Mind. Their
choice is quite understandable. By the turn of the century, the
Catholic intellectual revival was well under way. Cardinal
Newman had published his Essay on the Development ofDoctrine,
his Grammar ofAssent, and The Idea of a University. Leo XIII had
recommended the philosophy and theology of St. Thomas as the
structuring element of a Catholic liberal education in his landmark
encyclical, Aeterni Patris. In the United States, the Catholic
University of America had been established, and a thriving system
of Jesuit higher education was coming into being. In their defense
of the uniqueness, breadth, and excellence of Catholic education,
its defenders usually pointed to its integration of the arts and
sciences by the believing mind under the guiding light of theology.
This was, of course, the ideal of Catholic education proposed by
Cardinal Newman. Papal support for that ideal and some practical
hints for its realization could be found in Aeterni Patris, the
encyclical of Leo XIII, who had made Newman a cardinal at the
outset of his pontificate. Jesuit educators claimed the authority of
these great prelates for their own educational endeavors.
Catholic education was unique and successful because the
philosophy of man and the knowledge which guided it promoted
both the unity of knowledge and the proper distinction and
independence of the individual disciplines. Integration of the disci
plines, rather than the imperialism of a single type of knowledge
or a single scientific method, was the key to a humanistic educa
tion. Because the distinctions between faith and reason, theoretical
and practical intellect, conceptual science and artistic imagination,
defended by both Newman and the scholastics, were properly
appreciated in the Catholic school, philosophy and theology,
scientific and literary experience could be progressively integrated
in the individual's mind in the course of his liberal education.
Since the living mind, oriented by nature and grace to
intuitive knowledge of God, progressively prepared itself for the
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culminating experience through its response in knowledge and
love to God's whole creation, visible and invisible, the goal of
Catholic education, which Newman described as the development
of the integrative habit of mind, could rightly be called the
cultivation of the Catholic mind. 1
The cultivation of the Catholic mind was the directive ideal
of Catholic education during the first half of this century. It is the
ideal of Christian education proposed by Pius XI in his encyclical
On the Christian Education of Youth. Jacques Maritain presented
a brilliant theoretical justification of this ideal in his Thomistic
philosophy of man and knowledge. Maritain's major work, as you
recall, was The Degrees of Knowledge, sub-titled Distinguish to
Unite.2 It should not surprise us then that the turn of the century
team of Jesuit editors chose The Catholic Mind as the title for their
intellectual review. In choosing it, they echoed the common con
viction that Catholic uniqueness and Catholic universality were
reconciled through the integrative habit of mind developed by a
Catholic liberal education. A centuries-old tradition in Catholic
philosophy, theology, and spirituality could be drawn upon in
support of this contention.
The Jesuit review is no longer in existence. It died because, in
a market place crowded with competitors, it could no longer rally
enough support to stay alive. The same, I am afraid, could be said
of the Catholic mind as an ideal of Catholic education. In the
latter half of our century, the idea no longer stirs the interest
which it provoked a quarter century ago.
There are good reasons, of course, for the current decline in
interest in the idea. Nevertheless, the decline represents a loss. For
it can be argued that the idea of the Catholi� mind is one of those
notions whose life and interest put it in the category of what
Cardinal Newman called "leading ideas." A leading idea not only
proposes a thematic view of some important aspects of human reality;
it also tends to organize around itself institutional forms of social
realization, schools, societies, and religious orders, for example! This
has surely been the case with the idea of the Catholic mind.
Among the institutional forms of social organization to whose
constitution this idea has contributed significantly since its
emergence in the Alexandria of Clement and Origen are great

THE IDEAL OF THE CATHOLIC MIND /

221

religious orders. .l\.mong these we can surely count the Benedic
tines, Augustinians, Franciscans, Dominicans, and Jesuits, whose
contribution to the history of education is significant. Through
their schools and their educational tradition, these orders have
notably influenced the development of Catholic education. Other
forms of the idea's social realization have been the classic works
on Christian education whose abiding influence on Catholic
schools extended over many centuries. Among these classics we
might mention Clement of Alexandria's Paedagogus, Augustine's
De Doctrina Christiana, Bonaventure's ltinerarium Mentis in Deum
and Reductio A rtium ad Theologiam and, on a much lower literary
level, the various editions of the Jesuit Ratio Studiorum.4
An idea which has remained alive for a millennium and a half
and incorporated itself in a variety of concrete realizations in the
course of its history is also what Newman would call a "develop
mental idea." An understanding of the idea of the Catholic mind
as a developmental idea could provide a key to a proper appreci
ation of the continuity in Catholic education. The idea of the
Catholic mind has incorporated itself in the Alexandrian cate
chetical school of Clement and Origen, the Benedictine monastery
school, the Franciscan and Dominican studia generalia at the
medieval universities, the Jesuit college of the Catholic Reformation,
and Newman's Oratory School in the nineteenth century.5
Developmental ideas have a history of continuity through
diversity. They are personal and historical realities. They are
neither Hegelian ideas nor elements in a deductive system. Because
developmental ideas incarnate themselves in the concrete historical
world, they constantly provoke us to a fresh contemplation of their
object. This means that they are successively interpreted and clarified
over a period of time. They die in one incarnation only to come
to life in another. They unfold their virtualities through change.
The variety of concrete educational projects which the idea of
the Catholic mind has inspired and directed in diverse cultural
epochs from Clement's Alexandria to Newman's Birmingham
makes it reasonable to anticipate that the virtualities of this idea
have not been exhausted. If, as some would argue, the idea is no
longer effective in the concrete form it took in the Catholic
college and school of the first half of our century, there may he
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reason to believe that it will reemerge in a new and more effective
form. Such has been its history of continuity through change in
the past, and it is probable that its history of development will
continue in the future. In any case, it might pay the philosopher,
the theologian and the educator to remain alert to this possibility.
It might be worth our while, therefore, to look a little more
closely at this educational ideal which Catholic philosophers,
theologians, and educators found so attractive at the beginning of
our century. Its history shows us that, although the idea of the
Catholic mind is not compatible with every system of philosophy,
it is by no means restrictive in the variety of philosophies through
which it can be expressed, and by no means narrow in the range
of cultures in which it can incorporate itself. Its first great pro
ponents were the Alexandrian theologians, Clement and Origen.
Augustine carried the idea to the Benedictines of the Middle Ages.
The Franciscan and Dominican scholastic doctors picked it up and
passed it on both to the Anglican Church of Andrewes and Laud
and to the Jesuit educators of the Catholic Reformation.6 That is
why both Newman and the Benedictines - neither of whom
found Jesuits or scholasticism particularly congenial - shared the
Jesuit commitment to the ideal of the Catholic mind and to its
educational significance.
What, then, in the broad patristic tradition, shared by Augustine,
the scholastic doctors, and Newman, despite their significant
philosophical differences, was meant by the Catholic mind? Before
we consider its catholicity, we will have to examine the patristic
notion of the mind itself. In the patristic tradition, the thinking
mind is always a concrete, spiritual reality. The human mind is
distinguished from its objective content. Unlike many post
Cartesian philosophers, the Fathers of the Church never confused
the living personal mind with an idea or a complex of ideas. St.
Thomas never confused the ideal system of the Summa Theologiae
with the concrete subject who reasoned, made moral decisions,
and submitted himself to God's personal influence in prayer.
Abstract concepts have no history. Personal minds do. The Platonic
and the Christian elements in the patristic tradition both support
its conviction that the conquest· of truth is the result of an interior
conversion of the mind and will, and that self-transformation
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through the moral and intellectual virtues is the necessary condition
for human growth and the integration of knowledge. Conversion
and self-transformation is the path to contemplation of the truth.
Truth was the fruit of personal activity. Nevertheless, the
activity of the human mind, ordered to truth by its very nature,
was a participation in the light of truth communicated by the
Word of God himself. For Clement, the Word was the Universal
Pedagogue. For Augustine, Christ, the Word, was the interior
master dwelling in every mind. Growth in truth was always both
teaching and learning, the interpersonal cooperation of the human
person and the Word of God. Learning was conversion, the pro
gressive transformation of the student into the likeness of the
Eternal Word.
In this conception of the human mind, illuminated by God
himself, we find the reason for the sacred character of the work
of teaching - any teaching whose goal is the truth - in the
patristic tradition. To teach is to share in the work of the Interior
Master, the Divine Pedagogue. In the eyes of Newman, whose
theology was formed by the Alexandrian Fathers, teaching the arts
and sciences was a sacred ministry.7 As the Interior Master taught
by shedding his own light, the human teacher taught by his
personal influence. Both teachers, human and divine, taught by
sharing with their students what they were. Teaching - any
genuine teaching - was a holy and highly personal activity. It
was never a job like another. Once you hold the patristic
conception of the human mind, that conclusion follows.
If growth in learning is a process of self-transformation, we are
far from the world of abstract impersonal reason drawing conclu
sions from universal principles. As a good Aristotelian, St. Thomas
placed great stress in his moral and religious teaching on prudence,
the virtue of the practical intellect which enables the mind to
judge correctly in individual cases. As a disciple of the Fathers,
however, he placed equal weight on synderesis, the moral sensi
tivity of a well-developed conscience, and upon connaturality, the
"feel" of the religiously or aesthetically cultivated mind for
definite areas of experience, a "feel" developed only through lived
experience, personal history, and good moral habits acquired
through the exercise of proper moral choice.
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Their common commitment to the patristic tradition of
learning as the interior transformation of the personal intellect,
will, and imagination through the acquisition of good cognitive
and moral habits explains why both Newman and Maritain, two
of the great defenders of the Catholic mind, insist on the need for
literary and artistic as well as scientific education in the formation
of the cultivated mind. If learning is conversion in the full sense
of the word, theoretical education cannot be divorced from moral
education. On the other hand, the proper distinction of the
intellectual disciplines demanded by a coherent philosophy of
knowledge requires that the individual teacher observe the
demands and follow the proper method of his own subject. Inte
gration is not confusion. Systematic schooling in the arts and
sciences, and the personal influence of a community of educators,
not all of them classroom teachers, must work together to develop
the integrative habit of mind. The school as a community of per
sonal influence is all-important in the patristic tradition of the
Catholic mind. 8
Our consideration of the mind in the patristic tradition up to
now has been largely philosophical. But the mind is not only
catholic in the universal sense. It is also Catholic in the specific
sense attributed to a mind illuminated by the Catholic faith and
elevated and strengthened by the power of supernatural grace. In
the patristic tradition, the Word of God is not only the creator
and supreme exemplar "through whom all things are made," the
normative truth whom all reality imitates. He is Christ, the Word
Incarnate, the Redeemer who restores fallen nature to a new life
of grace. In the spirituality of all the great religious orders who
have influenced the history of Catholic education, Christ, the
Creator and Redeemer, is the key to the meaning of nature and
human history. The goal of human development achieved through
a liberal education can be properly appreciated only through the
light of faith.
It follows, then, that a theoretical education which in principle
divorces itself from the truths of Christian revelation formulated
in the Church's theology and a moral education which in prin
ciple denies the need and efficacy of grace and prayer will fail to
develop the integrative habit of mind. Neglect of Christian truth
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does not mean simply that a significant element in liberal education
has been omitted. The meaning of the whole of knowledge, in the
light of which each of the liberal disciplines and their relationship
to one another must be interpreted, has been fundamentally
misunderstood.9
Within that whole of meaning, created nature and, human
history can be understood, and the concrete world, to which each
bne of us must respond through the history of his life, makes
sense. Created and redeemed by the Word of God, who is Wisdom
and Truth, created nature is neither corrupt nor meaningless.
Visible creation has its own intrinsic intelligibility, autonomy, and
order. The theology of the hypostatic union and the theology of
grace and nature, by proclaiming the intelligible autonomy and
goodness of God's restored creation, grant to every art and science
its own independent status.
In the patristic tradition, however, visible nature points
beyond itself. In Newman's theology of the economies and in St.
Thomas' metaphysics of man and being, subordinated to his
theology, visible nature is sacramental. 10 It is a sign leading the
reflective mind to the invisible God. Only through the gift of
faith, however, can the sacramental sign of nature and history be
understood in the light of what it signifies. To the believer, there
fore, Christian revelation is not an intruder in the field of liberal
education. Christian revelation makes possible the interpretative
whole of meaning within which the arts and sciences can be
properly appreciated.
The Contemporary Challenge
Such was the ideal of the Catholic mind which directed
Catholic education in the first half of our century. Given its
coherence, its attractiveness, its perdurance through the history of
Catholic education, why has it so suddenly and dramatically
dropped from view?
There are serious reasons for its disappearance. Some are
practical problems of application. The expansion and diversi
fication of Catholic education, the increased variety of the
curriculum, the demands of university research, and the growing
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specialization of graduate education make practical application of
the ideal across the board diffic,ult and ambiguous. Catholic
education has many more tasks today and serves a more varied
clientele than it did at the turn of the century when it confined its
efforts largely to academic high schools and liberal arts colleges.
These problems of interpretation and application, however,
formidable though they are, are not the profound intellectual
challenges which today threaten the very life of the Catholic mind
as a directing principle in Catholic education.
The intellectual validity of the ideal itself has been called into
serious question within the Catholic community. There are
Catholic theologians and philosophers today who would deny any
probability to the claim that the idea of the Catholic mind could
be called a leading idea in Newman's sense of the term. The idea
of the Catholic mind, they believe, can no longer provide a sound
thematic view of man or education. Far from being able to inspire
Catholic enterprises as it did in the past, the idea of the Catholic
mind is superannuated, and it can only hurt educational institu
tions which still cling to it. A new and different ideal must inspire
Catholic education today.
The challenge to the old ideal, which has reached crisis pro
portions, is due to the radically different approach to culture,
theology, and philosophy in the Catholic community in the
quarter century after the Second Vatican Council. The ideal of
culture regnant in the Catholic Church before that time was
essentially the normative classicist culture of Greece and Rome.
This was the conception of culture which shaped Leo XIII's view
of education, and it dominates the educational writing of Cardinal
Newman. Its norm of taste was dictated by classical literature. Its
universal person, we are now told, was no more than Aristotle's
ideal of human nature. Greek philosophy determined its norms of
thought and truth. This culture's universal man, in other words,
was the Christianized Greek man of Hellenistic society, Clement
of Alexandria's educated man.11
The supposed universality of the culture was really a sign of
its great deficiency, its ignorance of history and of empirical social
science. History and the social sciences have taught us that there
are and have been many cultures. There is no such thing as a
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single universal culture based on human nature. There are many
cultures, Eastern and Western. All are historical creations. All are
culturally conditioned. Each enjoys its own cultural autonomy,
sets its own norms, proposes its own view of man.
If the Catholic Church wishes to be truly universal, it must
abandon its alliance with an outmoded classical culture, venerable
though that culture may have been. The Church can no longer
afford to tie her theology, her spirituality, her preaching, and her
ideal of education to the pseudo-universality of an outmoded
classicist culture. So runs the first challenge to the idea of the
Catholic mind today.
The second challenge comes from a radically changed approach
to theology in the Catholic Church since the Second Vatican
Council. It is no secret that Catholic theologians, as a whole, are
no longer devoted to Scholastic philosophy. Increasingly biblical
and historical in their approach, and deeply concerned with the
ecumenical dialogue, contemporary Catholic theologians are chary
of metaphysics, and of Greek metaphysics in particular.
One consequence of this change is that the affection for the
Greek Fathers which nourished Newman's thought is not the
distinguishing trait of contemporary Catholic theology. Yet the
idea of the Catholic mind is clearly part of our patristic inher
itance. Born in the Greek East, it has come down from the
Alexandrian Fathers, through Augustine, to the Latin West. The
patristic inheritance is too deeply embedded in the Church's
tradition both in doctrine and in spirituality for it to remain long
out of the center of theological concern. For the moment,
however, the metaphysical theology of the Fathers is a source of
problems rather than of inspiration for contemporary theologians.
The project of defending the patristic heritage of the Catholic
mind does not attract them.
Two other serious challenges to the idea of the Catholic mind
come from contemporary philosophy, where the influence of
Hume and Kant is still felt. Contemporary analytic philosophers
would question the philosophical evidence for the existence of a
personal mind clearly distinguished from its objective content.
They would question the existence of a spiritual mind associated
with a power of free choice and a sensibility. They would ask for
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evidence that there really is a person, known through immediate
self-consciousness, whose capacity to integrate his knowledge and
judge soundly in ethics and aesthetics can be developed through
the experience of a life and a history of personal choices. As we
indicated earlier, a philosophy of knowledge and a philosophy of
the human person are implied in the idea of the Catholic mind. A
number of contemporary philosophers would question them.
The second difficulty which contemporary philosophers
would raise is whether any philosophy, even aided by theology,
can validate a world-view, an integrative interpretation of the
whole of knowledge, which, even in principle, could lay claim to
universality. The vastness of the universe, the limited nature and
uncertainty of human knowledge, the partial and historical
character of every viewpoint make any universal world-view
philosophically impossible. Each one of us must view the world
from his or her own limited point of view. Within that limited
viewpoint, we determine our scale of values, set our definition of
humanity, decide what we mean by human development and the
means to achieve it. Universal agreement, even in principle, on the
fundamental meaning of the world and the basic value of human
life is quite impossible. All that we can do is to talk to one
another across our fundamental disagreements and try to solve our
immediate common problems in a reasonable and decent way.12
Ideals, based on catholicity as universality, like the integrative
habit of mind or the Catholic mind, are chimeras. They can do no
good. All they can do is breed intolerance and block discussion.
We can begin to understand the malaise that affects both
Catholic religious orders and Catholic institutions of education
when we appreciate the pervasiveness of the idea of the Catholic
mind in Catholic spirituality and education. From the time of
Clement of Alexandria to the present day, the history of Catholic
spirituality and Catholic education have been intertwined. It is
easy to see why. Implied in both is a philosophy of personal
development through response to the world in knowledge and
love. Every crisis in culture provokes a crisis and a reaction in
Catholic spirituality and Catholic education.
None of these crises, however, has been as intense or wide
spread as the cultural crisis which we face today. The malaise
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which many of us feel today arises from the perception, clearly
seen or dimly felt, that the ideal of the Catholic mind, which has
structured spirituality and education for centuries, and whose
foundations are under attack today, may not survive.
If the idea of the Catholic mind is a genuine developmental
idea, which preserves its identity through change, then Catholic
philosophers and theologians should be able to reexamine the idea,
modify, and develop it in the light of the serious difficulties which
have been brought against it. Should they succeed in their endeavor,
a developed idea of the Catholic mind might continue to inspire
Catholic education and structure a reinvigorated Catholic spirit
uality. Continuity would be preserved through change.
If, however, the idea has been thoroughly invalidated, continuity
has become impossible. A new model of Catholic spirituality and
education must be found. Otherwise both will lose their identity
and disappear. But when the new model emerges, it will be in
radical discontinuity with the past.
At the moment, Catholic philosophers and theologians are
divided over which of these alternatives represents the sound
Catholic option for the future. Hence the crisis in the Catholic
philosophy and theology of education and the malaise in Catholic
education which it has provoked.
Prospects for Survival
Is it likely that the idea of the Catholic mind will survive the
attacks directed against it today? Does it still have a future as a
valid ideal for Catholic education? I am not a prophet. Still, I am
not convinced that the time has come yet to count the idea out.
In the first place, the idea of the Catholic mind, even if we
grant it only plausibility as an ideal, justifies a number of values
in Catholic education which many of us are convinced are sound.
Among these are the focus of education on the formation of the
total person, the ideal of the integration and distinction of the
disciplines, the emphasis on personal influence in teaching and the
demands which it places on the teacher, the sacredness of the
teacher's work, and the appreciation of the school as a community
of personal influence.
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The ideal of the integrative mind, even if we take it as an
asymptote, preserves education from a number of distortions.
Faith in the presence in the world of a creating and redeeming
God is a protection against a narrow, this-worldly secularism or
a despairing resignation to an unintelligible universe. Conviction
that the human person has a divine call to wholeness is a defense
against a narrow professionalism in education or the tyranny of a
single discipline or a single method. Interdisciplinary cooperation
is neither a sacrilege nor an imposition. Fidelity to an old and
coherent tradition frees the educator from slavery to the present
or to the immediate future.
Nevertheless, are the difficulties against the idea of the
Catholic mind from the contemporary understanding of culture
and from contemporary philosophy so great that they are unanswer
able? They are formidable, I admit, but I remain convinced that
they can be handled. It would take more time than we have at our
disposal to do more than drop a few brief hints to indicate why
I believe that my hopes are not without foundation.
Implied in the idea of the Catholic mind was a philosophy of
the person as a spiritual knower associated with a power of choice
and ordered to self-development through his grasp of a variety of
distinct disciplines, each with its own proper method. The path to
self-development was through intellectual and moral conversion
under the illumination and attraction of the Supreme Truth
present through his causality in the human spirit. In Maritain's
Degree of Knowledge, the philosophy of the person was the
philosophy of St. Thomas. Newman's original philosophy of the
person was inspired to a great extent by the metaphysics of the
Alexandrian Fathers and the ethics of Aristotle.
In his major works, Insight and Method in 1beology, however,
a contemporary philosophical theologian, Father Bernard Lonergan,
has developed a philosophy of knowledge and of the human
person through which I am convinced the great values of the idea
of the Catholic mind can be defended.° Yet Lonergan's philo
sophy of the person is not a Greek philosophy. It is not bound to
Greek metaphysics or to the Aristotelian conception of human
nature. It is a contemporary philosophy which presents evidence
for its assertions which contemporary philosophers can understand.
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Father Lonergan is well aware of the distinction between the
classicist and contemporary notions of culture. He too is con
vinced that what he calls classicist culture is dead. If, however, the
human person, who is the author and reviser of cultures, tran
scends culture, as Lonergan claims he does, then an idea of the
Catholic mind and its integration of knowledge based on a
philosophy of the transcultural person need not perish with the
classicist ideal of culture. The ideal of the Catholic mind may have
to be transformed but it need not die. In other words, it may turn
out to be one of Newman's developmental ideas.
Finally, if the mind's self-development is ordered to the vision
of God, whose Second Person is the Word, then we know, if only
by faith, that the world which came from Unity and Truth is an
intelligible whole. If matter has been assumed by God himself, it
is an autonomous, intelligible sacramental sign, sound in itself, yet
pointing beyond itself. Trying to make sense of it in its own
reality and in its status as a sacramental sign is the way in which
we prepare ourselves to contemplate the Truth. For continuity
goes beyond the grave. Life is changed, not ended.
Therefore the drive to integrate our knowledge, which philo
sophy of knowledge reveals at work within us, is not a drive to
frustration. The drive makes sense. It should be fostered, even if
total integration, in our modern world, must remain an asymptote.
The philosophy of the person and the Catholic theology of the
Word as Creator and Redeemer, as Karl Rahner, one of our great
contemporary theologians, has pointed out in his Foundations of
Christian Faith, make marvelous sense out of the experience and
aspirations of contemporary man. 14 Why should they not provide
an antidote to much of contemporary philosophy's despair of
finding meaning in the world in a contemporary idea of the
Catholic mind?
It would seem, then, from what has been said about the
philosophical theologies of Rahner and Lonergan, that one of the
great intellectual traditions in Catholicism at least, the tradition of
St. Thomas, can be transformed and developed sufficiently to cope
with the contemporary problems of knowledge and culture which
threaten the viability of the ideal of the Catholic mind. The ideal
itself, however, is older than St. Thomas, and, as our consideration
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of Bonaventure and Newman showed, it can be defended by
philosophers other than the Angelic Doctor. Catholic educators
should remember nonetheless that not every philosophy is capable
of bearing the weight of the Catholic ideal of the integration of
culture. Nor is every theology capable of doing justice to the Catholic
tradition of created and redeemed human nature. The Catholic mind
cannot be just any mind formed by any philosophy or theology. Nor
can the Catholic school be just any sort of school which a group of
Catholics decides to attend or support. Its intellectual justification has
to be more than "birds of a feather flock together."
Conclusion
The crisis of Catholic education today, I have argued, is due
to its inability to define and defend the basic purpose of its work.
Up to now, I have also argued, its traditional purpose has been
defined through the ideal of the Catholic mind, an ideal now
subject to serious intellectual attack. Can a Catholic philosopher,
or group of philosophers, be found capable of doing justice to that
traditional ideal aim of Catholic education in our contemporary
climate of cognitional and cultural pluralism? If they are to make
the attempt with any hope of success, they will need a theory of
knowledge capable of dealing with both nature and history, and
a philosophy of being which can lead the mind from the created
world to its personal creator. I have not given up my hope that in
our Catholic tradition and in the community of philosophers and
theologians formed in our Catholic schools we have the resources
to create that contemporary philosophical theology. But I dearly
wish that more of our philosophers and theologians would show
some interest in the project; for with some notable exceptions, few
of them have made any move in that direction. Should they do so,
Catholic education, along with Catholic spirituality and Catholic
education, should wish them well. For what is at stake today is
our intellectual continuity with our past, the continuity through
change which is found in every living tradition. Will the ideal of
the Catholic mind survive through renewal as it did in the time of
St. Bonaventure with whose sermon our talk began? We cannot be
complacent, but we can hope. And I, for one, still do.
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